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THE UNITIVE PRINCIPLE OF MARIAN THEOLOGY

BEFORE the end of the last century there were very few theological works treating all of Marian Theology as a separate unit. The Spanish Jesuit, Father Bover, writes that the definition of the dogma of the Immaculate Conception was the signal for a tremendous growth not only of Marian piety, but also the Mariological science.[1]

Previous to this period of Mariological history, doctrines concerning the Blessed Virgin were usually treated as an integral part of Christology. Also a great deal of theological literature was devoted to particular Marian problems, such as the Immaculate Conception. A few exceptions are to be found, for instance, the Mariological writings of St. Albert the Great and St. Bonaventure, but as a general rule the exclusively Mariological works came into being at the begining of this

[1] Bover, S. J., *Sintesis organica de la Mariologia*, p. 3.

century. This, being the age of specialization, such a development is quite understandable. Theological specialization is rather common today; this is the age of Mariology, Ecclesiology and other such special studies of doctrine.

With this development of Mariology, the theologians have naturally attempted to build the tract as an organic whole. Consequently the problem of a primary Mariological principle has been of great concern to the Marian theologian. The prime principle is the foundation and the unifying element of any systematic and scientific treatment of a subject. Science, we must remember, is not a mere collection of facts, but rather it is the organization of these facts into an intelligible whole, the indication of a relation of one fact upon another. In Theology the positive theologian may be quite content to find the facts in the sources of revelation, but the speculative theologian demands that a logical order be established among these facts of faith. So quite naturally the speculative Mariologist has sought a prime principle for his tract.

Some have asserted that there is no one prime principle in Mariology, rather the whole tract can be reduced to two irreducible principles: the Divine Maternity and Mary's association in the Redemptive activity of her Son.[2] Yet, others claim that one Marian doctrine or the other serves the purpose of a primary principle. Some of these propose the doctrine of the *New Eve,* which is a biblical-patristic analogy indicating Mary's association in the Redemption. The vast majority, who hold to but one Mariological principle, favor the Divine Maternity as the seminal and fundamental doctrine of the tract.

We do not intend to examine in detail each of these opinions, but rather to seek out the principles of solution for the problem. However, there are certain necessary points that must be first looked into: namely, the nature of Mariology, its relation to Theology and the nature of a theological principle. Once having arrived at the principles of solution, we will consider the two principal Marian doctrines in the light of these principles.

[2] Roschini, *Mariologia,* tom. I, pp. 324-337. Father Roschini gives a complete presentation of all the opinions offered in solution of the problem.

1. The Nature of Mariology

According to the classic Aristotelian-Thomistic method of arriving at the knowledge of the nature of a subject, one must proceed from the more known to the less known. Thus time and time again in the *Summa Theologiae* the Angelic Doctor begins his investigation of a subject with its nominal definition and ends with the real definition. Having established the real definition, he points out the logical consequences which necessarily follow. This is the method which we will here utilize in the investigation of the nature of Mariology.

The word, *Mariology,* quite obviously is derived from the Greek words: Μαρία and λόγος. Their latin equivalents are *Maria* and *sermo,* and in English, *Mary* and *discourse.* An investigation of these two words will shed much light upon the nature of Mariology.

First, let us see why the notion of discourse is found in our subject. In its first sense, λόγος, *sermo* or discourse means simply the spoken word. It is that oral sound signifying thought. In the course of time philosophers applied the word, λόγος, to that which these oral intelligible sounds signified, namely, the mental word or concept. The word has been even further extended to signify not merely one concept, but judgments, which are composed of concepts. *Discourse,* further, has come to mean an orderly intelligible series of judgments. The λόγος of Mariology, then, signifies knowledge of some kind concerning the Blessed Virgin. Is this, however, the knowledge that the ordinary faithful have of her: knowledge that she is the Mother of God, immaculately conceived and our Mother also? This is the knowledge that comes from faith and it is within the reach of the simplest of minds. The suffix *logy,* signifies more than that; it has always implied an orderly logical knowledge of facts. In other words, it is scientific knowledge as opposed to vulgar knowledge. Mariology, then, is a science, the science of the Mother of God.

Granting the scientific character of Mariology, the next logical step is to inquire whether it is an independent, but

subordinated, science, or is it a part of a science? Ordinarily we do not find the suffix, *logy*, attached to proper names. We do not commonly find courses, such as *Caesarology*, *Napoleonology*, *Washingtonology* or *Lincolnology*, offered on the curricula of the Universities. These are individual persons of history. Biographies have been written about them and scholars have studied their lives, but most scholars recognize that these studies are not independent sciences. Rather, they are parts of the science of History. Although we do find the terms, *Mariology* and *Christology*, we cannot say that they signify independent autonomous sciences. Science is about the universal and the necessary; the humanity of Christ and Mary, although exalted, is still singular and contingent. Since Mariology is not an independent science, it must be a part of some other science. Is this science history? It is quite conceivable that Mary the Virgin could be the object of historic investigation and in fact she has been. But the limiting of Mariology to the status of historic science is patently inadequate. Mariology deals with realities that are over and above history. The lives of Jesus and His mother are historical facts (of that there can be no doubt), yet historical research falls short of giving us a knowledge of the most important factors of their lives. Relying solely upon history we know that a certain Jesus of Nazareth was born of a woman, called Mary, and that this man died the death of a slave. It fails, however, to inform us that this man was not a human person, but divine; that consequently His mother is truly the Mother of God, conceived without sin and assumed bodily into heaven. There is something more here than history; mystery is here, mystery that can be known, thanks only to faith. The basis for this science is the supra-historical mysteries of faith, therefore, Mariology must be related in some way to the science, whose principles are the mysteries of faith, that science being the science of Theology.

Mariology is related to Theology as a part is related to its whole. St. Thomas distinguishes three types of wholes: the universal whole, which has subjective parts; the integral whole

with its integral parts; and the potential whole with its potential parts.[3] The universal whole is said to be in each and every one of its parts according to its whole nature and according to all its power. Thus animality is found totally in both man and horse. Are the parts of Theology related in this manner to Theology itself? Is Theology a universal whole, having subjective parts, like the relation of mathematics to arithmetic and geometry? To answer in the affirmative would be to destroy the unity of Theology, because a science, related to another science, as a subjective part to its whole, has a formal object different from the objects of the other parts of the whole and of the whole itself. St. Thomas is insistent that Theology has but one formal object, namely, God precisely considered under the aspect of His divinity.[4] Mariology, consequently, is not a subjective part of Theology.

If it is not a subjective part of Theology, can we assert that it is related to Theology as a potential part? "The potential whole," writes St. Thomas, "is present to each of its parts in its complete essence, but not in all its power" (*De Spiritualibus Creaturis*, a. 2, ad 2). The Angelic Doctor's classic example of this type of whole is the human soul with respect to its vegetative, sensitive and intellective functions (I, q. 76, a. 8; q. 77, a. 1, ad 1). The whole soul is active in each of these functions; yet, its complete power is not active in each, e. g., in the function of vegetation, the soul's sense and intellective powers play no part. The human soul, a single form, is able to exercise the operations proper to the vegetative soul, those peculiar to a sensitive soul and the operations proper to it inasmuch as it is rational and intellective. This form includes within itself a multiplicity of operations. Theology, too, is a potential whole and its potential parts are the various activities and functions, which it exercises in reference to its object.* In

[3] *Summa Theol.*, II-II, q. 48, a. 1. [4] *Ibid.*, I, q. 1, a. 7.

* F. Muñiz, O.P., *The Work of Theology*, (trans. John P. Reid, O.P., Washington: The Thomist Press, 1953, p. 7.) Note: This comparison of Theology to the soul does not of course in any way imply that Theology and the soul are the same sort of whole. The former has the unity proper to a sapiential habit; the latter has a unity proper to a substantial form.

this manner Theology *explains* its principles, *defends* them and from them it *deduces* conclusions. Each function is truly theological, containing the whole essence of Theology; yet, no theological function exhausts the entire power of Theology. In this sense of the whole-part relation we cannot say that Mariology is a part of Theology, since all these functions are used in Mariology. The Mariologist, for instance, explains, defends and deduces with reference to the Divine Maternity. In passing, let us note that this type of whole-part relation is the basis for the division of Mariology into *Biblical Mariology* (the discovery of Mary in the Scripture), *Patristic Mariology* (the Marian doctrine in Tradition), *Scholastic Mariology* (the explanation and defense of the principles of Mariology and the deduction of conclusions from these principles).

The only remaining explanation of the relation of Mariology to Theology is the relation of the integral part to the integral whole. The integral whole is not in each and every one of its parts either according to its whole nature or according to its entire power. It is rather the result of the coalition of all the parts taken together. Thus the essence and power of a house is only had in the actual conjunction of all its parts and it is not found in any one of these parts or any number of them, taken separately. Is science so constructed? Although science is one and simple as a *habit*, nevertheless its material object is multiple. Its material object is the aggregate of all those things that can be considered under the formality of its formal object. Theology is concerned about an almost infinite number of material objects, which constitute a certain total object, i. e., everything that is revealed. Thus we have the basis for the division of Theology into tracts, v. g., concerning the One God, concerning the Trinity, concerning the Redemptive Incarnation, etc. Mariology is one of these tracts; it is an integral part of Theology. To remove it from Theology would be like removing a hand from the human body. The hand is useless disconnected from the body; so too is Mariology of no avail removed from Theology. Why is this study part of Theology? It is a part of Theology only because the immediate subject

matter is related in a unique way to God, the proper subject of Theology.[5]

Establishing the fact that Mariology is an integral part of Theology, we have been led to the immediate object of the tract. The suffix, *logy,* has expressed the connection of this tract with the science of Theology; while the main stem of the word, *Mari,* expresses the immediate material object of this portion of Theology. The Virgin Mary is a person about whom many things are revealed by God through Scripture and Tradition. A problem, which arises, concerning the proper object of this theological tract can be expressed in the question: why must there be a theological tract on the Blessed Virgin, when other persons in Holy Scripture are not so treated. The solution to the problem is found in a principle of St. Thomas ". . . the more a thing approaches the true nature of divinity, the *more especially* should it be considered in this science." [6] Since Mariology deals with that human person, who was related to God as a mother, the very closest relationship possible, then we must conclude that outside the tracts on God and the humanity of Christ, Mariology is the most important of the theological tracts. It is important and its importance springs from the fact of her close relationship to God. The relationship of any material object of a theological tract to the Divinity is the only reason for the being of that tract. Thus Mariology considers Mary under the precise formality of her relationship to God. The expression of this unique relation is the first principle of the tract.

In summary let us define Mariology as that *integral part of Theology which treats of the Blessed Virgin Mary under the formality of her unique relationship to God.* Before ending this discussion on the nature of Mariology, we must explicate that which is implicit in the definition.

Since Mariology is not an independent science, but a part of Theology, then it has not only a scientific character, but

[5] *I Sent.*, q. 1, prolog., a. 4.

[6] . . . quanto aliquid magis accedit ad veram rationem Divinitatis, principalius consideratur in hac scientia. *Ibid.*

also a sapiential character. Theology is not just a science; rather it is a science which is at the same time wisdom.[7] There are three speculative intellectual virtues: Wisdom, Understanding and Science. The object of understanding is the principles of knowledge, while science is concerned with conclusions.[8] In a more eminent manner wisdom is concerned with the objects of both and thus in a certain sense includes both. Wisdom, then, has two diverse functions: 1) to explain and defend principles, and 2) to infer conclusions. The application of this to Mariology is summarized schematically as follows:

The functions of Scholastic Mariology.
- in regard to the principles of faith concerning Mary. (Sapiential work)
  - to explain these
    - by analogy with nature.
    - by indicating their interrelation.
    - by indicating their relation to the ultimate end of man.[9]
  - to defend these principles of faith.
- in regard to conclusions—to deduce these from the principles (Scientific Work).

Mariology, being part of Theology, has the same objects as Theology. The *material object* of this tract is all revelation concerning the Blessed Virgin Mary. The *formal object quod* is Mary's relationship to God, since the formal object of Theology is God precisely as He is God. The *formal object quo* (i. e., the light by which these truths are attained) is the light of natural reason under the positive direction of faith.[10] Since the objects of Mariology are the same as those of Theology,

[7] *Summa Theol.*, I, q. 1, a. 6.
[8] *Ibid.*
[9] Council of the Vatican, session iii, cap. 4 (Denzinger 1796.)
[10] Muñiz, *op. cit.*, p. 22.

it would be much better to give this tract the title of *Marian Theology*. For the name, *Mariology*, is misleading, inasmuch as it seems to imply an independent science with distinct objects. Its use is permissible only if its relation to Theology as part to whole is always kept in mind. Its object is the same as that of Theology, indeed it is Theology dealing with Mary, consequently its principles are theological. This leads us to the next prenote.

2. Theological Principles

St. Thomas, following the lead of Aristotle, defines a principle as that from which another proceeds in any manner.[11] Obviously this is an analogical term (by reason of analogy of proper proportionality), since a principle of quantitative measurement (e. g., the first point of a line), a principle of becoming, a principle of being and a principle of knowledge are realities simply different and only proportionally alike. Our concern here is centered about the principle of knowledge.

Truth is found in the judgment and therefore a principle of knowledge is a judgment externally expressed through a proposition. However, not all propositions are principles. Only those propositions may be called principles, from which other truths proceed. Such propositions are of two types: those which are necessary for all human thought and those which belong to a science. The former are called *common* principles and the latter *proper* principles. Everyone, who has the use of reason, at least in exercise makes use of the common principles of knowledge. Presupposed to all our thinking are such propositions as " nothing can be and not be at the same time and under the same aspect "; " everything must have a sufficient reason for its being," etc. Since we are dealing with the question of the principle of a scientific tract, the proper principles of a science are our concern.

Proper principles are propositions productive of conclusions in a science. In any science an order exists between such

[11] *Summa Theol.*, I, q. 33, a. 1.

principles, thus we have the first proper principle of a science and secondary proper principles. The secondary principles are conclusions in regard to the prime principle, which in its turn may be the conclusion of the principles of another science, but in its own order it must be indemonstrable.

What proposition holds such an eminent position in a science? St. Thomas tells us that it is the proposition which expresses "what a thing is" ("*quod quid est*").[12] The definition of the subject of a science is the first principle in that science. The definition of a thing expresses its essence, which is its first constitutive element in the substantial order, that by which the thing is distinguished from all else and finally the foundation or root of all its other perfections. For instance, the first proper principle of Theology is to be found in the fourth article of the third question of the first part of the *Summa*. In this article we find the assertion that God is His own existence, which is equivalent to saying that He is Pure Act. According to our knowledge this is an expression of what God is; it is our feeble definition of Him.

We find a very enlightening statement of St. Thomas in the *Secunda-Secundae* about theological principles. He asserts that the articles of faith are the proper principles of Theology.[13] The very first, "I believe in God" indicates the unity of God, the unity of His essence and His existence in the supernatural order. This is the first principle of Theology, as we explained above. The articles of faith are the proper principles of Theology; they are the definitions of the various material objects, which are united through a common relationship to God. Properly to understand the function of these principles, let us examine them as they are in the sapiential office of Theology and then in its scientific office.

The sapiential office of Theology is twofold: it is defensive and explicative. When Theology defends the articles of faith, it makes use of principles that spring from the light of natural reason. Certainly no attempt is made to demonstrate matters

[12] *III Cont. Gent.*, c. 97.

[13] *Summa Theol.*, II-II, q. 1, a. 7.

of faith, but principles of reason are used to refute all the possible objections that can be brought to bear against faith. This is a unique characteristic of a sapiential science; it rightly uses inferior sciences in defense of its own principles. In defensive Theology, consequently, the proper principles of the science play a passive role; they are defended.

The explicative function of theological wisdom is performed in a threefold manner. First, the individual principle is explained; second, its logical connection with the other principles is sought; finally, its relation to man's ultimate end is elucidated.

In the first case the proper theological principles are explained, not so that they become evident, for then they would no longer be of faith, but rather through the use of analogy with natural things the precise meaning of the terms of the proposition are understood (more in a negative sense, rather than positive), so that we know precisely what is the mystery. In other words, the terms are negatively understood, while the connection between them is unseen.

In connection with this sapiential function of Theology, we must not neglect the fact that many of the articles of faith express facts, which are above nature and at the same time are established by God's free choice. That the Word became flesh lacks absolute necessity; it is only hypothetically necessary, presupposing the ordination of the Divine Will. In relation to created things, even in the supernatural order, God can be compared to an artist, and the creature is His handiwork. Thus an article of faith, which expresses a fact of a supernatural reality, includes within itself all the circumstances, particularly the circumstances of purpose, as established by divine ordination. Thus the article of faith, which expresses the Incarnation, does not stand for the abstract notion of the Incarnation of God, which could be applied equally as well to all sorts of possible Incarnations of God, but rather for the Redemptive-Incarnation, which God actually willed. Therefore, the proper principles of those theological tracts, that deal with supernatural objects, are to be understood in the concrete

order in which God willed them. The importance of this point will become evident as we proceed further.

The explicative function of Theology is also perfected through the interconnection of the theological principles. In this particular function it is a question of the logical sequence of one article of faith after another. The question quite naturally arises, how an article of faith can be a conclusion and also a principle. There is no contradiction here, because it would be a conclusion of a superior theological tract and still the first proper principle of its own. This interconnection of the articles of faith is achieved through argumentation, which is twofold: arguments of metaphysical necessity and arguments of convenience. The conclusions of the former are strict theological conclusions, while the conclusions of the latter are only probable. An example of the first type is the argument which proceeds from Christ's human nature to the existence of a human will in our Savior in virtue of the principle that a human will is a necessary property of human nature. The important point to note is that this conclusion is itself found in revelation and therefore is of faith. Thus we have two matters of faith being connected by an apodictic argument. Matters of faith can also be connected by reason of arguments of convenience or fittingness; indeed among the contingent matters of faith very often this is the only connection possible. Arguments of convenience of themselves produce probable conclusions. From the revealed fact of Mary's cooperation in the acquisition of grace we could argue from convenience that like the humanity of her Son she is a physical instrumental cause of the production of grace in the individual soul.[14] Unless it can be shown that this conclusion is revealed in Scripture or Tradition (in this particular case most theologians deny that it is), then the conclusion remains at best probable. However, when we argue through convenience from one matter of faith to another, then the conclusion is probable by reason of the argument, but

[14] Cf. Roschini, *op. cit.*, tom. II, pp. 263-350. Here Father Roschini treats the proofs (scriptural, traditional and from papal authority) for the fact of Mary's cooperation in the acquisition of grace.

certain by reason of revelation. Should Theology even bother with such argument? The master theologian, St. Thomas, constantly makes use of them in the *Summa* and we should suspect, therefore, that the argument of fittingness is a valid theological instrument. Remembering that Theology is " faith seeking understanding," to use Augustine's terminology, we must admit that it is the theologian's duty to establish the interconnection between matters of faith, whether by arguments of necessity or convenience. Arguments of fittingness are essential instruments in the performance of the sapiential work of Theology. In such arguments there it a real procession from principle to conclusion. The articles of faith used in such arguments are truly theological principles.

The explicative function of Theology is perfected finally by means of ordering the principles of faith to man's ultimate end. The order to be found in the *Summa Theologiae* is a perfect example of this. " Since the principal purpose of this sacred doctrine," says the Angelic Doctor in his introduction to the second question of the First Part of the *Summa,* " is to lead to a knowledge of God, not only as He is in Himself, but also as He is the principle of all things and their end, especially of the rational creature, we intend to expose this doctrine, 1) by treating of God, 2) of the motion of the rational creature to God, 3) of Christ, who according to His humanity, is the way for us to reach God." Thus Thomistic Theology involves a knowledge of God, as He is in Himself and as He is the Alpha and Omega of all creatures, particularly the rational creature. A procession of creatures start out from the tract on Creation and these creatures find their end in the tract on the Last Things. In the function of interconnecting the principles of Theology, our attention was directed more to the instrinsic nature of each mystery, whereby we sought to see the dependence of one upon the other. In this function of relating the mysteries to the ultimate end we look rather to the ultimate purpose of these mysteries expressing supernatural realities, rather than their inner natures.

The scientific office of Theology produces the theological

conclusion, strictly so-called. The theological mind must draw out what is virtually contained in the articles of faith. The arguments used in this function are metaphysical arguments, producing theological certitude concerning the conclusions. Here we apply reason to faith, not so much for the purpose of understanding the proper principles of Theology, but rather to give birth to new truths which are virtually contained within them.

Having seen the use of theological principles in each function of Theology, let us now turn to the subject of our discussion.

3. The First Principle of Mariology

From the aforesaid we can lay down certain conditions that must be verified of the first Mariological principle. From revelation we can find many propositions about the Blessed Virgin, either formally or virtually contained therein. Among these we must find one that is the first. This principle must be:

1. *Formally revealed.* This is so because the first principle must be the most certain of all the propositions of the tract. The highest degree of certitude in Theology comes from the authority of faith; thus this principle must be *de fide.*

2. *A definition (or a quasi definition) of the subject of the tract.* This is evident from the nature of the scientific method. The first scientific step is to seek through observation the definition of the subject under consideration. Once it is found, then through deduction one proceeds to its properties. The first principle is not demonstrated, at least not in its own order, for definition is the product not of demonstration, but rather of observation. Therefore, the first principle of a science is the definition of the formal object of that science. In our case it will be a quasi definition, since, being the primary principle of a theological tract, it must express that primary, distinct relationship of our Lady to God. Thus it will not be that which specifies her in the natural order, but rather in the supernatural order.

3. *The source of all other judgments concerning Mary.* This

follows from the very nature of principle itself. A cognitive principle is that from which another proceeds in the order of knowledge and thus a first principle must be that from which all other propositions come. In regard to this condition it is important to remember that the first principle of Mariology, being a theological principle, will be the source of all others not only through arguments of metaphysical certitude, but also by means of arguments of physical and moral certitude. As was explained previously, the sapiential character of Theology makes use of arguments of fittingness (i. e., physical and moral arguments). In Mariology, then, the first principle will be directly linked through such arguments to the other cardinal principles of the tract (which are certain by reason of faith) and indirectly to the conclusions flowing from these principles.

In the light of these principles of solution let us now consider the various theories, proposed by Mariologists, in regard to this question.

4. The Dual Principle Theory

Chief among the proponents of the " dual principle " theory is the late Father Bittremieux of Louvain University. His position is presented in his Mariological text and in two magazine articles.[15] Briefly his arguments are the following.

1. The notion of mother and that of associate are formally distinct and therefore two fundamental principles are in order in Marian Theology.

2. The existence of two fundamental principles in Mariology has a perfect parallel in Christology, in which the propositions: " Christ is God " and " Christ is Redeemer " serve as two fundamental irreducible principles for the whole science.

3. " A principle, if it is fundamental, ought to be most firm and not merely one of convenience," but the Divine Maternity demands Mary's association in the Redemption only by reason of convenience. Therefore, it cannot serve as the

[15] Bittremieux, *Marialia*, Brussels, 1936, pp. 16-29; " De Principio Supremo Mariologiae," *Ephemerides Theologiae Lovanienses*, VII, (1931) 249-251; *ibid.*, XII, (1935), 607-609.

only fundamental principle of Marian Theology; consequently we must resort to two principles.

Father Bittremieux was one of the most eminent Mariologists of our age; consequently his arguments deserve our respectful consideration. The premise of the first argument can be denied by none and is, in fact, explicitly admitted by the opponents of his theory. This distinction between motherhood and association is of vital importance in Mariology, since it is all too easy to reduce Mary's Compassion, the central act of her Association, to a mere mother's sorrow caused by the suffering of her son. True, this is involved in it, yet, if we neglect the fact of her office of Associate, the efficacy of her Compassion is entirely missed. Bittremieux clearly saw this and so insisted upon the distinction to the extent of dividing Mariology into two distinct tracts. We humbly suggest that he went too far by reason of this distinction. To be the Mother of God the Redeemer is not formally the same as being the Associate of the Redeemer; nevertheless, can we not say that the second is virtually contained in the first and thus related to the first as to a principle? We feel that Bittremieux's mistake consisted in the confusion of the implicit presence of one thing in another with virtual presence. A conclusion need not be implicitly contained in its principle (i. e., actually present); it is sufficient that it be present virtually (i. e., as in its cause). An analogy to this exists in Natural Philosophy, in which we admit the distinction between the faculties of the soul and the soul itself and yet assert that these same faculties come from the soul as from a root, a source and a principle. Admitting, therefore, Father Bittremieux's premise, namely the distinction between mother and associate, we feel obliged to deny his conclusion, that is, the necessity of two Mariological principles.

His second argument is a confirmation of the first. Christology is divided into two distinct parts dependent upon two irreducible principles. Most theologians consider first the person of Christ and then His work. " Cannot the authority of St. Thomas," he asks, " be invoked; in the Third Part of the

Summa he first considers the person of Christ and then after this considers those things which Christ did and suffered? "[16]

At first glance this argument seems very convincing. Yet a closer examination of the Third Part of the *Summa* will show that a unity of principle does exist in Thomistic Christology. St. Thomas lays down this principle, which is the foundation of the whole tract, in the very first question, where he treats of the motive of the Incarnation. He there shows that this Incarnation is redemptive. Further, the principle that Christ is Redeemer is used in the first section, for example, in the question treating of the defects of Christ's body. "It was fitting for the body assumed by the Son of God to be subject to human infirmities and defects . . . first, because it was in order to satisfy for the sin of the human race, that the Son of God, having taken flesh, came into the world" (III, q. 14, a. 1). Also the divinity of Christ is used by the Angelic Doctor to explain the efficacy of Christ's passion, since His condign merit presupposes as a principle His theandric acts, which flow from His divine personality. St. Thomas' Christology is not based upon two irreducible principles. Rather, it enjoys a unity of principle, based upon the Redemptive Incarnation. Far from being a confirmation of Father Bittremieux's theory, the Angelic Doctor can be invoked as a refutation of it.

The third argument offered by the eminent Louvain theologian is based upon his insistence that the consequence between principle and conclusion must be of necessity and not merely of convenience. Father Bittremieux felt that the argument of fittingness is by nature weak. If Theology were merely a science, then we would be obliged to follow his lead in this. However, as we insisted in the earlier pages, Theology is not only scientific but also sapiential. Therefore, the necessary link between the Divine Maternity and Mary's Redemptive Association, which flows from the highest Principle, through His eternal decree, cannot be ignored by Theology. We feel that Father Bittremieux has excessively limited theological argu-

[16] *Loc. cit.*

mentation; indeed we believe he has overlooked in this instance the sapiential character of Theology.

As was indicated at the beginning of this article those theologians who hold for a single Mariological prime principle are divided as to which doctrine fulfills this office. Some assert that the doctrine of the New Eve is primary in Mariology; while others place the Divine Maternity in this position.

5. The New Eve Principle

The New Eve doctrine has a Scriptural origin in the Woman of Genesis, in St. Luke's account of the Annunciation and in the Pauline doctrine of the New Adam. Its original development is by St. Justin, Tertullian and St. Irenaeus. A full explication of this doctrine, however, is only now in the process of development. Briefly we can express it in the following proposition: what Eve lost for the human race by reason of her cooperation with the sin of Adam, Mary regained through her cooperation with the redemptive activity of Christ, the New Adam. This antithetical parallelism is the scriptural-traditional expression of Mary's mediatory office. Since Mary's mediatory activity is certainly an object for the consideration of Mariologists, this principle is of the greatest importance in Marian Theology. Indeed, the tremendous growth of Marian Theology is a direct effect of the labors of theologians with reference to this principle. Without it Mary's mediation would be for us a confused and nebulous notion. However, even granting its importance in Mariology, we feel that it cannot be accepted as the prime principle in the tract. We propose the following three reasons in support of our position.

1. The first principle of Mariology must be a truth which enjoys the greatest certitude, that is, it must be formally revealed. Is the New Eve doctrine such? The very most we can say about this doctrine in the order of certitude is that it is proximate to faith. As yet the Church has not exercised its extraordinary magisterium with reference to it. Granting that someday it may be defined, its certitude is still dependent

upon the Divine Maternity. This is true both in its Scriptural and patristic arguments. As we noted previously, its Scriptural foundations are in Genesis, St. Luke's Gospel and in St. Paul, It seems to us that the keystone of these three is Luke's narrative of the Annunciation. The Woman of Genesis and St. Paul's New Adam are meaningless as far as the New Eve goes, except in the light of the Annunciation. Quite obviously the primary truth contained in the Annunciation is the fact of Mary's motherhood. Looking to the context of the New Eve of St. Justin, Tertullian and St. Irenaeus [17] in each instance we discover that these Fathers are talking primarily about the Divine Maternity. Since, then, the New Eve doctrine is dependent upon the Divine Maternity for its certitude, we cannot accept it as the prime doctrine of Mariology.

2. The first principle of Mariology must be a quasi definition of Mary in the supernatural order. Now a definition should express the static element rather than the functional element. The most obvious thing about the New Eve doctrine is its concern with Mary's operation. The Divine Maternity, on the other hand, expresses Mary's place in the order of supernatural being. The New Eve doctrine relates Mary to the redemptive activity of her Son; while the Divine Maternity establishes her place in the hypostatic order. The New Eve doctrine, then, lacks that static element which is necessary for the first principle of Marian Theology.

3. The prime Marian principle must be the source of all other Mariological truths. Now, since Mary's association is in the order of activity and the Divine Maternity in the order of being, we must conclude that the second is the source of the first, inasmuch as action follows being. It is true that in the cognitive order we do proceed from action to being, but this is by way of invention. Cognitive invention is not a procession from principle to conclusion, rather it is the seeking after the principles of a science. The product of cognitive invention is

[17] Migne *PG* vol. 6, col. 710 (Saint Justin), *PL* vol. 2, col. 827 (Tertullian), *PG* vol. 7, col. 958 (Saint Irenaeus).

the prime principle. Even though, by way of invention, we may use the New Eve doctrine to understand fully the Divine Maternity, nevertheless, it would be erroneous to assert that Mary's assocation is thereby the principle of the Divine Maternity. The right scientific order is to proceed from the first principle, which has been established by way of invention, to the properties of this principle. This is the deductive process and its starting point is the first principle. On these three counts, therefore, we believe that the New Eve doctrine must be rejected as the solution to our problem.

6. The Divine Maternity

The Divine Maternity does seem to fulfill perfectly all the conditions necessary for the first principle. At the outset let us precisely define what is meant by the Divine Maternity. It is that relationship of Mary to the Second Person of the Trinity that arose due to her generation of His human nature. The principles of faith express real facts, thus we are not restricting this principle to the abstract notion of Divine Maternity, but rather we are considering this relation as it exists in the concrete order of redemption. The principle, thus considered, can be expressed in the following proposition: Mary is the Mother of God the Redeemer as such. She is the mother of that divine person who became incarnate for the precise purpose of redeeming mankind.

This principle has the certitude of faith. Implicitly it is found in those passages of Scripture that assert the facts that Mary is the mother of Christ and that Christ is God the Redeemer. It is contained in the Fathers and was defined by the Church in 431 A. D. at the Council of Ephesus.[18] It fulfills, therefore, to an eminent degree the demand of certitude that must be found in a first principle.

This principle is, moreover, a definition of Mary's place in the supernatural order. A definition is that which expresses the proper element of the defined; it is that element by which

[18] Denzinger, *Enchiridion symbolorum*, n. 113.

the defined is distinguished from all other beings in the same order. In the supernatural order the genus of any definition will be relationship to God and the specific difference will be the type of relationship involved, since the dignity and distinction of creatures in this order is dependent upon their reference to God. The relation of mother, terminated by the divine person of the Word, establishes her *primum esse* in the supernatural order and distinguishes Mary from all other creatures. The Divine Maternity, concretely considered, is the theological definition of the subject of our tract; consequently it is its first principle.

Finally the Divine Maternity is the source and root of all of Mary's privileges. The truth of this assertion becomes clear, when we view Mariology in its proper theological setting. St. Thomas tells us that all the articles of faith are reducible to two. "All the articles of faith are contained implicitly in certain primary matters of faith, such as God's existence and His providence over the salvation of men. . . . For the existence of God includes all that we believe to exist in God eternally, and in these our happiness consists; while belief in his providence includes all those things which God dispenses in time. . . ." [19] Theology is simply the working out of these two principles. In Marian Theology the theologian develops the mystery of Mary which is one of "those things which God dispenses in time."

Remembering that providence is the divine plan whereby all things are ordained to their ultimate end,[20] the theologian must seek out the purpose of providential supernatural beings. Purpose is the most important aspect in all actions, even divine; consequently these providential beings must be viewed from the aspect of means to end relationship. This is verified in Marian Theology, for when we speak of the Divine Maternity as the source and root of all Marian privileges, we mean that this supreme privilege is the end to which all the others are related as means. Our task, then, is simple: to show that such a relationship does exist among Mary's prerogatives.

[19] *Summa Theol.*, II-II, q. 1, a. 7.

[20] *Ibid.*, I, q. 22, a. 1.

In order to prove the existence of such an order in Mariology, we must show that the Divine Maternity has the nature of end among the Marian privileges. There are two characteristics of an end. First, the end is the reason why the means are willed; [21] and secondly, the end is related to the means as form is to matter.[22] Applying this to Marian Theology, we must show that God would not have decreed Mary's other privileges, if He had not decreed the Divine Maternity and, further, that the Divine Maternity in a certain sense informs all Marian prerogatives. Would Mary have been the Immaculate one, the perpetual Virgin, full of grace or the Coredemptrix, if she were not the Mother of God? This question is similar to that raised by St. Thomas: whether God would have become incarnate, if Adam had not sinned. Thus the principle, which St. Thomas used to solve his question, should be the same, which we must employ to solve ours. " Such things as spring from God's will and beyond the creatures' due, can be made known to us only through being revealed in the Sacred Scripture, in which the Divine Will is made known to us. . . ." [23] Searching the Scriptures, St. Thomas could find for the Incarnation only one reason, man's salvation; so he concluded that God would not have become incarnate, if man had not sinned. We feel that a search of Marian Scriptural texts will show that the ultimate reason for Mary's prerogatives is the Divine Maternity. We cannot deny, of course, that many of her prerogatives were willed because of her association in the Redemptive activity of her Son, but this in its turn was decreed because of her maternity. Thus ultimately all were divinely ordained to the Divine Maternity.

If we consider all the Marian Scriptural texts in which Mary's prerogatives are either formally or virtually revealed, we must admit the Divine Maternity as the central theme. The Woman of Genesis, between whom and the serpent enmity exists, enjoyed such a divinely given gift only because of *her seed* and

[21] *Ibid.*, I-II, q. 8, a. 2.
[22] *Ibid.*, q. 4, a. 4.
[23] *Ibid.*, III, q. 1, a. 3.

His victory over the serpent.[24] Could such exist, if she were not related to the seed? Obviously not. Isaias predicts that the Virgin will *conceive* and *give birth* to Emmanuel.[25] Micheas says she will *bear* Him (the Ruler of Israel).[26] Her plenitude of grace and her vow of virginity are revealed by St. Luke in his narrative of the Annunciation, the central theme of which is Mary's motherhood.[27] It is the "mother of my Lord" who, is greeted by Elizabeth and surely the "great things" to which Mary refers in her Magnificat are the miraculous workings of God by which she became His worthy mother.[28] Luke describes the very central act of her maternity: His coming forth from her womb at Bethlehem.[29] "Simeon said to Mary his *mother*, ". . . thy own soul a sword shall pierce . . .," because of her maternal union with Him.[30] The fulfillment of this prophecy we find in the gospel of St. John: "Now there were standing by the cross of Jesus his *mother*," and when He spoke to her and to the beloved disciple, He talked of motherhood.[31] If we are to admit, as many Catholic Scripture scholars do, that the Woman in the Apocalypse is Mary, then we ought to notice that this woman is set apart from all other women inasmuch as "she brought forth a male child, who is to rule all nations with a rod of iron."[32] In every text about Mary, from Genesis to the Apocalypse, she is always described as the mother of Jesus and anything else contained therein is merely an ornament to this, the greatest of her prerogatives. If God had not decreed her Divine Maternity, is it possible to say, from what the Scriptures tell us, that she would have received any other extraordinary gifts? The answer must be negative, for remove the Divine Maternity from the Marian Scriptural texts, little or nothing is left. It would seem, then, that God has ordained all Marian prerogatives to the Divine Maternity as means to an end. The very reason for the existence of these prerogatives is the Divine Maternity.

[24] Gen. 3:15.
[25] Isaias 7:14.
[26] Micheas 5:1-2.
[27] Luke 1:26-38.
[28] *Ibid.*, 1:39-56.
[29] *Ibid.*, 2:1-20.
[30] *Ibid.*, 2:33-35.
[31] John 19:25-27.
[32] Apocalypse 12:1-18.

Certainly Sacred Tradition teaches the same. Pope Pius XII expressed that tradition, when he wrote, "Indeed from this sublime office of the Mother of God seem to flow, as it were from a most limpid hidden source, all the privileges and grace with which her soul and life were adorned in such extraordinary manner and measure." [33] Before him Pope Pius XI noted the same in his Encyclical Letter, *Lux Veritatis;* as also did Pope Pius IX in the Apostolic Letter, *Ineffabilis Deus,* in which the dogma of the Immaculate Conception was defined.[34] Papal doctrine it is, then, that the Divine Maternity is the principle, the root and the measure of all Marian graces and privileges.

To say that it is the measure of all her gifts, a term frequently used by Mariologists, brings us to the next step in our proof of the Divine Maternity's central position in Mariology. We asserted above, using the words of St. Thomas, that the end is to the means as form is to the matter. This is a puzzling statement at first glance. Most certainly the Angelic Doctor did not mean to identify final and formal causality. In what sense is the analogy true? The key to the analogy can be found in another statement of the Angelic Doctor: "the exemplary for min a certain way has the nature of end." [35] A thing is an end inasmuch as it motivates activity and the materially same thing is an exemplar inasmuch as it specifies the means. Purpose or end, then, give the means a certain uniqueness; the means assume a certain distinctive characteristic from their end by which they are distinguished from all other means. This idea is verified on all levels of activity. On the level of craftmanship it is true; for example, a baker uses flour for the production of most of his products and yet the quality of the flour will differ depending upon the purpose for which he uses it. For cake he uses a fine flour, while for bread his flour will be coarse. In the military the end gives a distinctiveness to the means. In

[33] "Fulgens Corona Gloriae," in *Papal Documents on Mary,* compiled and arranged by Wm. J. Doheny and Joseph P. Kelly, Milwaukee, Bruce Publishing Company, 1954, p. 256.

[34] *Ibid.,* "Lux Veritatis," p. 175; "Ineffabilis Deus," pp. 9-10.

[35] *De Veritate,* q. 3, a. 1.

World War II strategic bombing was fully employed since the purpose of the war was the unconditional surrender of Germany; while in the Korean War our bombing was frustratingly limited since the war was purely defensive in purpose. In society this truth is also verified. The exercise of family authority differs from that of civil authority inasmuch as the end of the family differs from that of the state. In religious society we find a different use of the choral office in the Order of Preachers from that of the Order of St. Benedict, since the purpose of both Orders is so different. This idea is not strange in Theology. We say that charity specifies the other virtues. The objects of the other virtues are related to the object of charity as means to an end. This accounts for the difference between human virtues and Christian virtues. We say, too, that the ends of the Sacraments modify sanctifying garce, which modification is called sacramental grace.

Now if we can show that the Marian prerogatives have a certain maternal modification, coming from their end, her motherhood; then we can be certain that they are related to her maternity as means to an end. All of these prerogatives can be reduced to four general classifications: 1) those which have primary reference to God; 2) those which are related to her own person; 3) those relating her to men; 4) those which relate men to her. In the first class we must place the Divine Maternity itself, together with the affinity to the Trinity which results from it and also her Association with God the Redeemer. In the second class we have her plenitude of grace, which includes her gifts of body and soul. In her body she had the grace of perpetual virginity and an anticipated glorification in the Assumption. In the soul this plenitude can be considered negatively in the doctrines of her Immaculate Conception and her freedom from actual sin. Positively considered, it includes her plenitude of habitual grace, the gifts and the virtues. In the third class we have the doctrine of the Mediatrix of all graces and her Queenship. In the fourth class the hyperdulia worship men owe to Mary is the subject of consideration. Taking each in its turn let us seek a certain uniqueness resulting from the Divine Maternity.

Mary's relationship to the Trinity: Because of divine generosity all men will have or have had the opportunity to be related to the Trinity as adopted children through sanctifying grace. Mary is so related and yet over and above this she is also related by affinity to the Father and the Holy Spirit. Obviously the only explanation for her unique position with reference to the Trinity is her maternal relation to the Son, inasmuch as one who is related by blood to another person becomes related by affinity to those who are naturally related to this person.

To God Incarnate the Redeemer all men are related as the redeemed to the Redeemer. Since Mary was redeemed due to the foreseen merits of her Son, she too is so related. Yet God has seen fit to grant her the relationship of Associate to the Redeemer, one who actively participates in the redemptive act. Why was she so chosen? The Divine Wisdom usually grants such privileges for some reason intrinsic to the one to whom it is granted. Since in the natural order God ordains that there should be friendship between mother and son and that a consequence of friendship is concord, i.e., a union of wills, which is the very heart of human association; then it is fitting that in the supernatural order He should grant to the Mother of the Redeemer, the office of Associate of the Redeemer, particularly in view of the fact that she was the closest blood relation to Christ. When we come to the consideration of Mary's office of Mediatrix, we shall then see the fulfillment of this office and that this fulfillment is decidely maternal.

The supernatural perfection of Mary's soul and body: The sanctification and justification of a soul is the result of habitual grace. There are two aspects of habitual grace, namely, the absence of sin and the positive aspect of sanctification, together with the supernatural operative habits of the gifts and the virtues. Most men initially receive sanctifying grace by means of the sacrament of baptism; some men, like John the Baptist, were sanctified while still in the womb; but only Mary received grace at the very instant of her human conception. Thus she was immaculately conceived; original sin touched her not. It

is morally possible for a person to go through life without losing sanctifying grace, but it is morally impossible, except due to a singular privilege from God, to remain free from ever committing a venial sin.[36] Mary, however, never committed an actual sin, either mortal or venial; indeed, most theologians assert that she had the privilege of impeccability. Add to this distinctive freedom from sin, a positive degree of grace, the gifts and the virtues, which is difficult to describe except by means of comparison with others, and we get a faint picture of her unique perfection in the supernatural order. Why is it so? Because God so willed it is a correct answer and yet Divine Wisdom must have placed something in Mary, which makes her unique among men. Once again, that something is the Divine Maternity. The maternal-filial relation is the basis for friendship in the natural order and certainly, then, in the supernatural order the Divine Maternity, by which Mary became Christ's only blood relation, demanded this friendship, which is achieved through sanctifying grace. It must be a unique degree of grace, since this is a unique relationship.

Mary's perfection was not limited to her soul; it extended even to her body. Thus she had the privileges of perpetual virginity and a bodily assumption into heaven. Because of both these privileges, Mary enjoys a unique position in the human race. Two states are possible under the divine order to women: that of perpetual virginity and that of maternity; but to no woman, except Mary, are both states possible. Only Mary, due to the miraculous power of God, was situated in both states in a perfect degree. Why was Mary so uniquely blessed among women? The answer is obvious: Mary temporally generated Him, whom the Father eternally generated. It would have been completely out of place for Him to have a human father; thus, His mother gave birth to Him at the same time preserving her virginity. Furthermore, motherhood together with wifehood very often demands a divided loyalty in a woman. Mary's virginity, therefore, made it possible for her

[36] Denzinger, nos. 106, 833.

to be *all mother* with her complete attention directed to her Son.

Mary's glory is unique. All the redeemed, she being the sole exception, are glorified in their souls first and the beatification of their bodies will come on the last day. Only Mary's body received an anticipated glorification. This privilege was hers, because God would certainly not permit that flesh, from which the body of His human nature came, to become corrupt. It is true, of course, that this privilege is implicit in the doctrine of her Association with the redemptive activity of her Son; but remembering that the New Eve doctrine is a result of her maternity, we must say that the ultimate reason for Mary's assumption is the Divine Maternity.

In summary, Mary received a plenitude of grace in both her soul and likewise in her body because of her proximity to God. In regard to the plenitude of grace in the humanity of Christ, St. Thomas uses the principle that the nearer any recipient is to an inflowing cause, the more does it partake of its influence.[37] Since the Divine Maternity relates Mary closer to God than any other human person, then it follows quite logically that she should enjoy a unique position in the order of grace.

Mary's relationship to men: Mary is related to us as our Mediatrix and our Queen. By reason of the first title she has dependently on Christ reunited us to God and by reason of the second she has a participated dominion over our lives. As Mediatrix our Lady had to be in possession of an aptitude for the office and also she had to actually exercise mediatory activity. An aptitude for the office of mediator is that the one mediating must stand between those who are to be joined. The actual exercise of the office consists in the bringing together of the extremes. Christ, of course, is pre-eminently the Mediator between God and men, because He had the aptitude for the office, being distinct from God in His humanity and distinct from men by the dignity of His grace and glory; because, too, He actually exercised this office by uniting men to God through

[37] *Summa Theol.*, III, q. 7, a. 1.

the efficacy of His death, by which God was appeased and men received sufficient grace for redemption. As St. Thomas points out, the fact of Christ being mediator does not rule out the possibility of others sharing in His mediation.[38] Tradition teaches that Mary shares in His office of mediation. Of course, there are certain qualifications that the analogy of faith places upon Mary's mediatory office. 1) Only Christ's mediation is in itself sufficient; Mary's is of itself insufficient and receives its total efficacy from Christ. 2) Christ alone is the absolutely necessary mediator; Mary's mediation is only hypothetically necessary inasmuch as God has so willed it.[39] 3) Christ is the absolutely universal mediator; Mary's mediation is universal only in the sense of being for all men except herself.[40] But even with these qualifications she can be truly called a mediatrix.

The Divine Maternity plays a very important role with reference to her mediatory office. As was noted above, the person who mediates must in some sense stand between the extremes who are being joined together. Mary is distinct from God, since she is a creature and she is distinct from men by reason of the eminent dignity of her Divine Maternity, which, to use the words of Cajetan, " approaches the very borders of Divinity." [41] Mary, then, would not have the aptitude for the office of mediatrix, if she were not the mother of God. Now

[38] *Ibid.*, q. 26, a. 1.

[39] Perhaps a word of explanation is in order here. Christ's mediation is absolutely necessary, not in the sense that it was outside the divine power to restore men to grace without Christ the Mediator, but rather in the sense that presupposing the divine decree that man was to be restored to grace by means of condign merit, Christ, who alone could produce condign merit and satisfaction (condign here taken in the absolute sense of the word), was necessary to achieve this end (cf. *Summa Theol.*, III, q. 1, a. 2, ad 2.) We cannot apply the same sort of necessity to Mary's mediation, since hers was necessary only because God deemed fit that she should share in the activity of her Son.

[40] Lebon asserts that Mary's mediation extended even to herself (cf. *Ephem. Theol. Lov.*, II (1939), 129-159). His conclusion is based upon the principle that Mary's mediatory activity and that of Christ were united *per modum unius*. Since, however, this question is not under discussion, we have followed what seems to be the opinion of the majority of Mariologists. (cf. Roschini, *op. cit.*, tom. II, p. 261.)

[41] Cajetan, *Commentarium in Summam Theologicam*, II-II, q. 103, a. 4.

even the very exercise of this office has a distinctive maternal modification.

Mary, the Mediatrix of grace, exercised her office in a two-fold manner: 1) she mediated for us by cooperating in the acquisition of the graces of redemption; 2) she is mediatrix by cooperating in the distribution of all graces to all men. By reason of the first she is called the Coredemptrix; while the title of Dispensatrix of grace is hers because of the second function.

The function of coredemption and its modifications resulting from the Divine Maternity have been treated elsewhere.[42] An understanding of Mary's coredemptive activity can be obtained from an analogy with the redemptive activity of her Son. This activity was beautifully analyzed by St. Thomas in his tract on the passion of Christ.[43] Christ's passion was meritorious action and further it was satisfactory, sacrificial and redemptive in the strict sense of the word. Mary's compassion had similar modalities. Yet her coredemptive activity was distinct from that of Christ and that of men. Mary's merit was specifically distinct from Christ's merit, in that her merit was completely dependent upon His and that her merit was only congruent, while His was condign.[44] Yet her merit is specially distinct from that of other men. Some men can merit for others some grace, but only Mary merits all grace for all men. By reason of this fact her merit is distinct in extent from that of other men. When we say that some men can merit for others, we mean that they merit the distribution of grace to others. But Mary's merit was not limited to this; she merited the very acquisition of grace for men. Because of this fact her merit is

[42] Cf. Thomas U. Mullaney, O. P., "The Meaning of Mary's Compassion," *American Ecclesiastical Review*, CXXV 1-6, 120-129, 196-207.

[43] *Summa Theol.*, III, q. 48.

[44] Here and later in the text we propose that Mary's merit and satisfaction are only congruent. This point is disputed. Some, like Fernandez, O. P., Cuervo, O. P., Balic, Lebon and others, assert that her coredemptive merit and satisfaction were condign in a relative sense (cf. Roschini, *op. cit.*, tom. II, pp. 364-372.) Since, however, those who hold this opinion admit the dependence of Mary's merit and satisfaction upon Christ, the uniqueness of Mary's activity is still preserved and thus our point is proved.

unique in kind. How do we explain this unique quality of her merit. God's Will is the ultimate explanation, yet Divine Wisdom demands an intrinsic reason. The principle of merit is charity and consequently Mary's fullness of grace and charity explains why her merit is distinct in extent. Since her merit is specifically unique, we need to seek out some other intrinsic reason for its being so. The difference between Mary's grace and charity and that of other men is only a matter of degree. Therefore there must be something unique in species in Mary, which explains the uniqueness in species of her merit. Quite obviously the Divine Maternity is that something. God gave her a distinctive merit, because He had ordained her to a distinctive position in the supernatural order. Her coredemptive activity was not only meritorious but also satisfactory. Satisfaction limits the notion of merit to mean only meritorious works that are done to balance the offense of sin and consequently they must be penal in character. Many of Mary's acts were of such a nature. She intended that her sorrows would be a reparation for the sins of men, for in the very act of her consent at the Annunciation she willed to become the mother of the Man of Sorrows. These sorrows were distinctively hers; they differed from those of Christ and from those of other men. Christ's sorrows were of infinite value and He is united to all men by reason of the Mystical Body, thus He offered to God condign satisfaction. Mary's satisfaction for the sins of others was only of congruent value. Further her satisfaction received its total worth from Christ. Although it is inferior to Christ's satisfaction, it is specifically superior to the satisfaction of men. When we say that one man satisfies for the sins of another, we mean that he satisfies not for the sins themselves but the penalties due to these sins. Mary, however, satisfied by her compassion not only for all the penalties due to the sins of all men, but also for all sin, actual or original, of all men. To understand why it is so, we must penetrate the nature of satisfaction. A work is satisfactory because it is of such dignity and worth that it balances off the offensiveness of the sin for which satisfaction is made. Now a work is of greater value and

dignity according as the doer is of greater dignity. Thus Christ, who is the infinite Son of God, producing works of infinite value, performed works of infinite satisfaction. Therefore, Mary's works were specifically unique in their satisfactory value, because she had a specifically distinct dignity in the supernatural order, the dignity of the Divine Maternity.

Mary's coredemptive activity is also sacrificial. Sacrifice is an act of religion, involving the offering and the immolation of a victim, for the purpose of placating God. The sacrifice of Christ is the only acceptable sacrifice, for He is the divinely appointed perfect Priest and Victim. What did Mary contribute to this sacrifice? Her contribution was unique; it was a twofold contribution: remote and proximate. Remotely by exercising her maternal office she prepared the victim, bearing Him, nourishing and protecting Him. She performed these functions with full knowledge that He was ordained to offer a bloody sacrifice and she consented to this. Proximately she cooperated in His sacrifice by immolating Him insofar as it pertained to her to do so. This immolation consisted in the abdication of her maternal rights over her Son for the salvation of men.[45] Notice that her cooperation in the sacrifice of her Son, both remote and proximate, was unique because of the Divine Maternity.

Our Lady's Compassion was redemptive in the strict sense of the word. Redemption, strictly taken, adds to meritorious, satisfactory and sacrificial activity the note that this activity is a price acceptable to God to free men from the bonds of sin, the devil and the punishment due to sin. Christ, by shedding His blood, paid the price demanded by God for our liberation. Mary cooperated in this act and so she is called the Coredemptrix. A Coredemptrix is she who *de jure* can and *de facto* does cooperate in the very act of paying the price demanded by God. Our Lady, and she alone, *de jure* could, and *de facto* did so cooperate. Now in both instances she could do so only because of the Divine Maternity. To have the capacity to pay the price, it was necessary that Mary in some sense own that

[45] Benedict XV, Encyclical letter, "*Inter sodalicia.*"

which was offered. It was because she was His mother that she had maternal rights over the victim, Christ, and consequently the capacity to pay the price with something that was her own. She exercised this capacity by surrendering those rights; this surrender was begun at the very moment that she acquired the rights at the Annunciation in view of her intention to give up the Man of Sorrows at the appointed hour. At the foot of the Cross she exercised her redemptive activity by co-suffering with her Son. Now only a mother could do this. For St. Thomas points out that normally a person *suffers* evils inflicted on himself and *commiserates* at the evils inflicted on another; but he adds " if there are some persons so bound to us as to be, so to say, something of us, for example children or parents, at their evils we do not commiserate, rather we *suffer* as on account of our own injuries." [46] Mary is Coredemptrix because she is the mother of the Redeemer-God.

Certainly she, who cooperates in the very act of acquiring graces for men, must also play a cooperative part in their distribution. Theologians dispute whether our Lady's role in this matter is by means of efficient causality or moral. That Mary is the physical instrumental cause of the production of grace in the souls of men is at most a probable opinion. There is no difficulty about the possiblity of such being the case; rather it is a problem of finding it revealed in Scripture or Tradition. The safer opinion seems to be that her cooperation in the distribution of grace is not in the physical order but rather in the moral order of intercession. Since it is intercessory activity, it does not differ from that of the saints. Yet there is a twofold uniqueness in Mary's intercession. First, other saints intercede for the bestowal of some graces in the souls of some men; while the intercession of the Queen of Saints extends to all graces for all men. This could be explained by the plenitude of her grace and glory, which ultimately has its explanation in the Divine Maternity. Further, it is unique in another way. Mary's intercession has the note of infallible

[46] *Summa Theol.*, II-II, q. 30, a. 1, ad 2.

power. She is never refused. How else can we explain this except by reason of those maternal rights over her Son. Thus once again we find a uniqueness in Mary's privileges due to her Divine Maternity. She is the unique Coredemptrix, the unique Dispensatrix and the unique Mediatrix, because she is singularly related to God as His mother.

Mary participates in Christ's dominion over men and thus she enjoys the title of Queen. She is Queen not in the sense of a Queen who exercises kingly rights nor in the sense of a Queen-Mother. She is Queen in the sense of being the consort of Christ the King.[47] The Queen-Consort is one who by law is uniquely associated with the person who is King. Others partake in the function of dominion in the kingdom of Christ: angels, Pope, bishops and priests; but none enjoy the position that Mary holds. She is the closest associate of the King. Once again we must appeal to the Divine Maternity in explanation of her unique position, for by that maternity she entered into the royal family of the Trinity. Her queenly function consists not in command, for this is an act proper only to the King, but rather like all Queen-Consorts her role is one of intercession. It is said that the Queen's request is never refused; she is all powerful with the King. How else can we explain this all powerful, never failing intercession except by reason of the rights she gained over her Son in her maternity. This is the thought so beautifully developed and drawn to its logical conclusion by the Apostle of Mary, St. Louis Marie de Montfort.[48]

Men's relation to Mary: We are overwhelmed with the Theology of Mary, since it presents to us so many sublime truths, expressive of her glory and of her tremendous love for us. Mariology would hardly be complete if we did not consider our obligations to her. She is our Mediatrix and our Queen and these two notions are summarized in the popular title of "our Blessed Mother." How better could we express her re-

[47] Thomas U. Mullaney, O.P.. "Queen of Mercy," *American Ecclesiastical Review*, CXXVI, 415.

[48] Cf. St. Louis Marie de Montfort, *Treatise on True Devotion to the Blessed Virgin Mary*, (Montfort Fathers, Bay Shore, N. Y., 1941).

lationship to us than by the analogy of a mother to a child. We are her children and consequently we owe her filial reverence. This brings us to the subject of the hyperdulia worship owed by us to Mary. Worship is an act of the virtue of religion by which we pay honor to God and those closely related to Him. It is of three kinds: latria, dulia and hyperdulia. Latria worship is that which is paid to God Himself; while dulia and hyperdulia is that paid to those related to God. Quite naturally the degree of dulia worship is dependent upon the proximity of the one honored to God. Thus St. Joseph, who was the foster father of our Lord, enjoys the very highest degree of dulia worship. Mary's proximity to God differs from that of the other saints not just by reason of degree; rather her proximity is specifically distinct from that of the saints because of her Divine Maternity. Therefore she deserves a type of worship that is distinct in species. " The Church pays to the Queen and Lady of the angels a worship more eminent than that granted to the other saints," reads a document of the Congregation of Rites, " to which Queen is owed not dulia worship, but hyperdulia, inasmuch as she is the Mother of God." [43] Devotion to Mary includes many elements besides worship, but its foundation is worship. We owe her confidence, since she is our Mother; we owe her thanks for her mediatory activity; we owe her sorrow for our sins, since she is the Queen of Sorrows; we owe her admiration for her plenitude of grace; but we owe her worship of a hyperdulia type for her eminent dignity as the Mother of God.

We have seen that all the Marian prerogatives and the distinctive modality that is theirs is due to the Divine Maternity. That maternity is truly, then, the form of these prerogatives. The Divine Maternity gives to Mary's privileges a life that is uniquely Marian. This, being so, we can say without doubt that the Divine Maternity is the principle, root and measure of all Mary's graces and gifts. Therefore, it fulfills that third condition necessary for the first principle of Marian Theology.

[43] Decree of the Congregation of Rites, June 1, 1884.

All Mariology is summarized in the statement: Mary is the Mother of God the Redeemer.

Conclusion

The benefits that result from constructing Mariology in the manner above described are manifold. Let us note but three of these reasons.

We must never forget that Mary would have no place in Theology or indeed in the supernatural order itself if it were not for her Son. To make the Divine Maternity the first principle of Mariology brings out this truth clearly. For by this means we see that a truth that is but a conclusion in Christology is the first truth of Mariology. Thus from this single point of departure in Christology we have the whole Theology of Mary. Likewise, this first principle gives us a similarity between the two tracts. Just as all Christology, which treats principally of the mysteries of the Incarnation and the Redemption, is reducible to the principle of the Redemptive Incarnation, so all Mariology is reducible to a like principle. As in life, so in Theology, Mary and Jesus are inseparable.

Secondly, this principle is fitting for a theological tract. The aim of Theology is to see things with a vision approaching the simplicity in which God sees them. God sees all things with one act of knowledge and therefore, the theologian should try to see Mary with the greatest simplicity possible. Our principle gives us such simplicity and it unites this tract with the rest of Theology. It is a foreshadowing of the vision of the blessed, who see Mary as that beautiful united being, the first masterpiece of God.

Thirdly, this principle clearly brings out the omnipotence and mercy of God. The Divine Maternity could not be merited either condignly or congruently; it is a divine gift in the most absolute sense of the word.[50] Now since all the gifts and

[50] The absolute gratuitousness of Mary's predestination to the Divine Maternity in the order of divine intention is clear from the fact that merit presupposes grace which in its turn presupposes, in Mary's case, the Divine Maternity. However, in

privileges of our Lady come from this one as from a principle, God's mercy is manifested. Mary, who having a human nature, by the rights of nature deserved nothing from God, received the greatest possible gift conceivable. It should serve to remind us that all good comes from God. It is perhaps the most beautiful application of that profound truth, so often and lovingly repeated by St. Thomas: God does not love one because of the creature's goodness; rather one is made good because of God's love.

PAUL MAHONEY, O.P.

Loretto Heights College
Denver, Colorado

the order of execution we can admit a certain qualified meriting of the Divine Maternity. Certainly it is not condign merit, since there is no proportion between Mary's meritorious activity and the hypostatic union to which she is related by the Divine Maternity. It is possible, however, that she could have congruently merited the office of Mother of God; indeed, Tradition seems to assert that such was the case, since the testimony of Augustine, Bernard, Peter Damian, Epiphanius, Chrysostom, Basil, Thomas and Albert the Great can be invoked in proof. (Cf. Friethoff, O.P., *De Alma Socia Christi Mediatoris*, pp. 81-86.

PROTESTANTS AND THE MARIAN DOCTRINE

IN this study an important place is accorded the comparison between sixteenth century and contemporary Protestantism. At the very outset it will be noticed how different these positions are. This difference is all the more evident from a comparison of the thought of Luther with that of contemporary Calvinism. I believe that on this point Hebert Roux represents the average contemporary Calvinist attitude. He writes: "To the question, 'What place does the Virgin Mary hold in reformed piety?,' we can and must reply with firmness, 'None whatever.'"[1] This position, moreover, may be considered as the logical outcome of the very principles of the Reformation. We shall see, however, that at the beginning of the Reformation the position was less radical, especially in the mind of Luther. Indeed, we may speak of Luther's Marian devotion, despite his denial of fundamental elements of Catholic theology concerning Mary.

Luther

In his commentary on the *Magnificat,* in the explanation of the verse, "The Almighty has done great things for me," Luther writes: "These *great things* are just this, that she has become the Mother of God. So great and numerous are the blessings which have been bestowed upon her by this event, that no one can comprehend them. All honor and happiness flow from it, as likewise the fact that in all mankind, one person alone is above all others, to whom no one may be held equal, since a unique Child, and what a Child, is the Son of the Heavenly Father and also her very own. Therefore, the honor due her can be summed up in a single word, by calling her the

[1] Jean Bosc, Pierre Bourguet, Pierre Maury, and Hebert Roux, *Le protestantisme et la Vierge Marie,* Paris, 1950, p. 8.

Mother of God. . . . No one could say to her anything more grand. Nothing greater can be said of her." [2] The tone of this passage is striking, so far removed is it from the reserve of the average contemporary Protestant position.

As far as Luther is concerned, Mariology is shaped by two principles, *Christus solus* and *Scriptura sola.* But within this framework Luther seeks to give Mary a real place. In the name of his Christological principle Luther rejects the cult which acknowledges Mary as "Queen of Heaven." For this reason he cannot tolerate the *Salve Regina.* How could one possibly say that Mary is "our Life, our Sweetness, and our Hope"? The *Regina Caeli* ought also to be discarded. To call Mary "Queen of Heaven is to attribute to a creature that which belongs to God alone." [3] Speaking of Mary, Luther continues, "I accept the fact that she prays for me, but that she is my consolation and my life, this I cannot admit." [4]

Mary's merits may not even be considered. According to Luther the angel's salutation, "Thou hast found grace with God," does away with the idolatry of placing Mary on a level with God Himself. All that Mary has is grace, not merit. No confidence may be placed in Mary or in her merits, but in God alone. In the devotional order we must reject the distinction between *dulia* and *hyperdulia,* which is "man-made thought without basis in Holy Scripture." [5]

Attributing to a creature the exercise of divine mercy is, on Luther's part, cause for great indignation. The rebuff at the wedding of Cana serves precisely the role of stressing that Christ alone is Mediator. With polemic excess, Luther does not hesitate to say that all Christians are of the same rank. Peter is no greater than the thief on the cross, and the Mother no higher in dignity than the sinner, Mary Magdalene.[6]

[2] Cf. R. Schimmelpfennig, *Die Geschichte der Maienverehrung im deutschen Protestantismus,* Paderborn, 1952, p. 12.
[3] Cf. Schimmelpfennig, *op. cit.,* p. 9.
[4] *Ibid.*
[5] Cf. Schimmelpfennig, *op. cit.,* p. 10.
[6] Cf. Schimmelpfennig, *op. cit.,* p. 11.

In accord with his Scriptural principle, Luther remarks that Holy Scripture is purposely silent concerning Saint Ann, precisely in order to avoid our going elsewhere to find what we ought to find in Christ alone. "Today we are running in all directions, and are thereby losing the true Savior, Jesus Christ." [7] If Holy Scripture has nothing to say on the birth of Mary, this is to prevent our exalting her beyond measure. The same care to reverence the message of the Bible and not to stretch its meaning unduly makes Luther suspicious of certain allegorical interpretations, which introduce into the text things which the simple mind is not able to discover there. Granted, Christians ought to venerate Mary, but in an authentic manner. "I concede veneration to her, but such as does not warp the meaning of the Scriptures." [8]

As to the positive aspects of his doctrine, it is to be noted that many of Luther's texts on Mary may be drawn from his sermons on the Virgin. Indeed, we must not lose sight of the fact that Luther, right up until his death, preached on the occasion of Mary's feast days. First of all, then, let us investigate Luther's view on those points which constitute for us today Marian dogma.

Luther vigorously defends the *Divine Maternity* in opposition to the "obscure innovator, Nestorius." [9] For support in his unreserved adherence to this dogma, the Reformer relies on the message of the Annunciation; also on the praise uttered by Elizabeth, and on the Pauline text, "God sent His Son made of a woman" (Gal. 4:4). "These words show that without doubt Mary is the Mother of God." [10]

He also accepts her *Perpetual Virginity* in the traditional sense, *ante partum, in partu, post partum.* Luther, whose convictions are often embodied in very colorful language, treats Helvidius, the adversary of the Perpetual Virginity, as a "vulgar fool." [11] These heretics err in claiming that Mary had other children after Jesus. Even if St. Matthew's text

[7] *Ibid.*
[8] *Ibid.*
[9] Cf. Schimmelpfennig, *op. cit.*, p. 12.
[10] *Ibid.*
[11] Cf. Schimmelpfennig, *op. cit.*, p. 14.

(1:25) says merely, "He did not know her until she brought forth her firstborn son," this does not imply that after the birth Mary and Joseph lived as a normally married couple. It is stated this way only because the Evangelist does not concern himself with Mary after the Savior's coming into the world. Afterwards he treats of Jesus alone.

Astonishing as it may seem, Luther also defends the *Immaculate Conception.* In the theological controversy which at this time separates the Thomists from the Scotists, Luther takes sides with the latter school. If Mary is "freed and purified from original sin, it is because of her dignity as Mother of God."[12] Mary was purified from original sin the very moment that her soul was united to her body. "At the first moment of her existence, when she began to live, she was without stain."[13]

Certain traces of the dogma of the *Assumption* may be found also in Luther's thought, but the texts are quite ambiguous. In a sermon on the occasion of this feast in 1522, Luther declares that the Gospel says nothing about "how Mary is in heaven." Moreover, it is not a matter which must necessarily be known. It suffices for us to know that the saints are living.[14] Schimmelpfennig believes that from this the conclusion may be drawn that Luther did not exclude faith in the Assumption. In any case, it is true that Luther was in favor of retaining this liturgical feast for a little while longer.

Friedrich Heiler, who wrote a critical review of Schimmelpfennig's work, does not agree with this appraisal.[15] He is convinced that Luther rejected the dogma of the Assumption. The text quoted above, he thinks, cannot be interpreted otherwise. Heiler produces, in addition, another text: "We know nothing about any Assumption . . . save that of our beloved Lord Jesus Christ."[16]

[12] Schimmelpfennig, *op. cit.*, p. 15.
[13] *Ibid.*
[14] *Ibid.*
[15] Cf. F. Heiler, *Theologische Literaturzeitung*, 1954, t. LXXIX, col. 49.
[16] Erlangen edition of Luther's works, 3^2, 418, Sqq.

The *intercession of Mary* is a point upon which stress must be laid, since later it will be discussed more at length. At the beginning of his commentary on the *Magnificat,* Luther has recourse to Mary's prayer: " May the sweet Virgin Mary obtain for me the light necessary for a profound and useful interpretation of her canticle." [17] Further on in the same commentary Luther adds, " God does everything. It is important, nonetheless, to invoke Mary, in order that God, for her sake, will give and bring to accomplishment that for which we ask. Likewise, it is necessary to invoke other saints, but always in such a way that the whole work remains God's and His alone." [18] The Christian, who, throughout his life, has contemplated the work of God in His saints, and who has sought to imitate them, in his last hour will also call upon " all the angels, and in particular his guardian angel, the Mother of God, the apostles and the blessed," and will ask them to help him, in union with Christ, to overcome death, sin, and hell.[19] One may still continue to recite the Hail Mary. After all, this is not a prayer, but rather a simple salutation, simply an act of praise.

In his doctrine on the intercession of Mary, Luther distinguishes between *Fürsprache* (*speaking* for someone) and *Fürbitte* (*praying* for someone). Rejecting the former, he admits the latter. Mary cannot be our advocate. The saints are, like ourselves, poor and weak. Let us not make idols of them. Yet Mary prays for us—which is not the same thing.[20] Luther ends his commentary by asking God for a true understanding of this canticle, that he may be able not only to enlighten and teach, but also to be inflamed with it and to live it, body and soul. Luther's closing words are, " May God grant us this through the intercession of His Blessed Mother." [21]

In determining Mary's place in cult and devotion insofar as

[17] Cf. Schimmelpfennig, *op. cit.,* p. 16.
[18] *Ibid.*
[19] *Ibid.*
[20] *Ibid.*
[21] *Ibid.*

she is our Model, Luther puts strong emphasis on her helpfulness in regard to her cousin, Elizabeth, but he glorifies especially her humility. Once again a passage from the commentary on the *Magnificat* bears this out: " I have translated the word *humilitas* by *baseness* or *state of wretchedness*, and have conceived Mary's sentiments as follows. ' God has deigned to look upon me, poor, frail maiden, scorned and unattractive. He could very well have found queens, or daughters of princes and great lords, who were rich, well bred, noble and powerful. He could very well have chosen the daughters of Annas or of Caiphas, who hold first place in the land; but out of pure goodness He deigned to cast His gaze upon me. Thus He has made use of a humble, lowly girl, so that no one will exalt himself in His sight for having been or presently being worthy of such a favor. And I must also declare that this is out of sheer goodness and grace, in no way due to my merit or my dignity. . . .' She glories neither in her worthiness nor her unworthiness, but only in the divine favor, which surpasses all conceivable goodness and grace." [22]

It can be gathered that Luther is glad that the *Magnificat* is sung every day at Vespers. As for the Marian feast days, Luther's position is this. He wishes to retain the Purification and the Annunciation, for, as a matter of fact, these are Christ's feasts, just as much as are the Epiphany and the Presentation in the Temple. Indeed, for Luther the Annunciation is one of the most important feasts.[23] Regarding the feasts of the Assumption and of the Nativity, Luther says that " they should be preserved for a little while longer." [24]

[22] Bosc, Bourguet *et al.*, *op. cit.*, pp. 93-94. The text quoted here was translated into French by Pastor Bosc, who presents large extracts of Luther's commentary (pp. 91-101). Concerning these extracts, however, I must make a somewhat severe criticism. The choice of texts is unilateral, i.e., only a single aspect of Luther's thought is presented. Luther's appeals for the Virgin's intercession are passed over in silence. Of course when it is a question of isolated passages, each author chooses according to his intent. But it is unfortunate that in the only existing French translation of Luther's commentary, greater care was not taken to give the work a more balanced perspective.

[23] Cf. Schimmelpfennig, *op. cit.*, p. 34.

[24] Schimmelpfennig, *op. cit.*, p. 18.

Iconoclasts receive no encouragement from Luther. On the contrary, images can be kept and put to good use. The crucifix and images of the saints ought to be more than tolerated. They are signs which should incite us to reverence and imitation. Did not even the pagans carve the likeness of the emperor on their coins? [25]

Evidently, therefore, Luther's Mariology is conditioned from start to finish by the two principles noted above. But in contrast to the Mariology of contemporary Protestantism, which retains but the negative aspects of these principles, Luther sought further to interpret them positively. For Luther there is room for devotion to Mary in the purely Christological perspective, and likewise from the purely scriptural point of view.

Luther acknowledges, besides, that the veneration of Mary is " inscribed in the very depths of the human heart." [26] But this praise of Mary ought not to distract us from Christ. We must go on further to the Savior Himself. " Honor the Mother of God, but in such a way as not to be detained by her; rather push on to God and fix your heart on Him. Thus you will be keeping Christ in the center." [27]

Zwingli and Calvin

Regarding the two reformers, Zwingli and Calvin, we shall indicate only the points in which they differ from Luther. Zwingli holds views quite akin to those of Luther. The Divine Maternity and the Perpetual Virginity do not trouble him. He too considers Helvidius to be a " mad wrestler." As for the Immaculate Conception, it is impossible for us to infer anything conclusive from his own statements. Because the *Ave Maria* is not a prayer, Zwingli considers its recitation quite legitimate. It must be kept in mind, however, that in those days only the first part of the salutation, which is composed entirely of scriptural texts, was in question. Indeed, Zwingli disapproves of the invocation of Mary and the saints. This is

[25] *Ibid.* [26] *Ibid.* [27] *Ibid.*

really Zwingli's main departure from Luther. In his view invoking the saints is putting them in the place of God. Neither is it necessary to call upon God through the saints, for the only thing that matters is to come into God's presence. Likewise, concerning images Zwingli does not follow the path traced out by the German Reformer. He forbids their retention, for they are not and ought not to be for us a means of instruction. Teaching is the function of the Bible alone.[28]

In concert with the other reformers, Calvin admits Mary's Perpetual Virginity. "Helvidius plainly showed himself to be ignorant by affirming that Mary had several children merely because occasional mention is made of Christ's brethren."[29] Calvin, therefore, translates *adelphoi* as "cousins" or "relations." As regards the Divine Maternity, Calvin's position is recognizably more reserved. Whereas Luther ordinarily describes Mary as "Mother of God," Calvin never uses the term *theotokos,* or any equivalent expression. True, he does not dispute the term, and we even find him condemning Nestorianism rather sharply; nevertheless, he avoids the word even where it seems that its use is called for almost necessarily. For Calvin Mary is simply the "Mother of the Lord."[30] As for honor rendered Mary, Calvin does not hesitate for a moment in a denial, which is pure and simple. Neither can we find in Calvin or Calvinism any support for the Marian feasts. The rejection of any invocation of the saints is based upon the sufficiency and unique character of Christ's mediation.[31]

In Calvin, therefore, progress in the Protestant idea is per-

[28] Cf. Schimmelpfennig, *op. cit.*, pp. 19-21.

[29] Cf. M. Thurian, "Mariology, (d) Reformed," *Ways of Worship, the Report of a Theological Commission of Faith and Order,* London, 1951, p. 312. Portions of the original French appear in *Dialogues sur la Vierge Marie* (Ronds-Points, I), Lyon, 1950, pp. 102-130. In the study of Calvin, the Geneva Reformer, we cannot use Schimmelpfennig's excellent book, limited as it is to a treatment of German Protestantism. However, even though up to the present time the Mariology of Calvin has been the object of very little study, from the information at our disposal we may give an approximate outline of his thought on Mary.

[30] Cf. J. Hamer, "Mariologie et théologie protestante," *Divus Thomas,* (Frib.), 1952, p. 351-352.

[31] Cf. Hamer, *ibid.*

ceivable. The tendency towards a more resolved attitude, evident here, can be noted in other main themes of the Reformation. It is particularly striking in the doctrine of the Holy Eucharist. It seems evident that it is Calvin's desire to follow to their final conclusion the master-ideas of the Reformation. This movement with regard to the subject now under consideration is only accentuated in the subsequent generations of Protestantism.

Declarations of Faith and Ecclesiastical Constitutions

We shall quote here only one text of particular importance from the *Confession of Augsburg*.[32] One especially cannot be passed over in silence, article twenty-one of the *Confession* which is Lutheranism's first systematic presentation. The article is entitled *De Cultu Sanctorum*. "We teach that the saints should be remembered, so that our faith may be strengthened, by the sight of how they obtained grace and how faith has helped them. Moreover, each according to his state ought to take their good deeds as an example, just as the emperor in good conscience may follow the example of David, when making war on the Turks; for both of them hold a royal position, which obliges them to protect and defend their subjects. But it cannot be proved by *Holy Scripture* that we must invoke the saints or implore their help. 'For there is but one reconciliator and mediator between God and man, Jesus Christ,' who is the only Savior, the only Sovereign, *sacrificator*, and mediator between God and man."[33] In summary, then, the saints 1) present for our consideration the gift of grace, 2) are our example, 3) ought not, however, to be invoked. All things are based upon Christ's unique mediation. It is known, of course, that the *Confession of Augsburg* was drawn up by Melancthon, with Luther's approval. Nonetheless, it is evident

[32] In treating of the declarations of faith and ecclesiastical constitutions, use is made again of the valuable data furnished by the work of Schimmelpfennig, especially regarding Lutheranism.

[33] *La Confession d' Augsbourg*, 1530, trilingual edition (German, Latin, French), Oberlin, Strasbourg, 19 rue des Francs-Bourgeois, p. 86.

that the position taken is much more reserved than Luther's own. We cannot examine here individually the other confessions of faith. They contain, moreover, substantially the same doctrine.[34]

The *Ecclesiastical Constitutions*, documents concerned with the discipline of the churches, are interesting especially as testimony of the cult rendered Mary throughout the liturgical year. Here Luther's idea reappears, sc., the necessity of retaining the feasts of the Virgin, which are also Christ's feasts, namely, the Annunciation, the Purification, and the Visitation. In a text dated 1569, which affects the territory of Pomerania, an indication is given that the feasts of the Assumption and the Nativity are to be celebrated no longer. This is again quite in conformity with Luther's view. The suppression, however, was not accomplished overnight; and it can be proved that these feasts, in accord with the desire of Luther, disappeared only progressively. In the statutes of the city of Görlitz, in 1565, the following feasts are still provided for: the Assumption, the Nativity, and the Conception of Mary.[35]

In the Lutheran districts care was taken not to offend popular piety by too radical and sudden reforms. This is a sign of the more steadfast attachment of these regions to the Marian cult.

Contemporary Exegesis of Biblical Texts Concerning Mary

As far as present-day Protestant exegesis is concerned, it may be said that in general Mary appears in the New Testament as a character of secondary importance. Granted, Mary does occupy an important place in St. Luke's account of Christ's infancy; but all this is necessarily modified by the affirmation of the words of Christ Himself, "Rather, blessed are they who hear the word of God, and keep it" (Luke 11: 28). The only meaning of the scene at the foot of the Cross is that which is

[34] Cf. Schimmelpfennig, *op. cit.*, pp. 32-34.
[35] Cf. Schimmelpfennig, *op. cit.*, p. 36.

in harmony with the Virgin's most unassuming attitude at the wedding feast of Cana. Mary has access to her Son only insofar as she is a member of the Christian community. The ties of blood confer no special privilege upon her. She, too, lived in the anguish of faith, sharing the same conditions as many of Jesus' early followers. At the beginning of the Acts of the Apostles Mary is mentioned as one of those who " persevered in prayer "; but here again no intimation is given that Mary occupied a place in the least conspicuous in the midst of the community of Jerusalem.[36]

Although this merely suffices as an outline, one other point needs to be stressed. It concerns a new and rather strange interpretation of the κεχαριτωμένη of Luke 1: 28. Pastor Pierre Maury, followed on this score by Pastor Hebert Roux,[37] not only asserts that the translation, " full of grace," is incorrect, but also—and his exegesis seems hazardous—claims that the term " in reality signifies *pardoned* . . . that is to say, an object of an act of divine mercy. . . . This grace is granted as a gratuitous favor from a declaration of goodwill, i. e., *pardon*." Since this " grace " is opposed to the " fear " mentioned in verse 30, Pastor Roux comments, " What fear, therefore, could she (Mary) have, if not the fear of every *sinful* creature before the Holy God? " [38] Further on the same writer adds, " That this grace is in no way a special grace, but truly the total grace which is in Jesus Christ *for the remission of sins, reconciliation with God,* and the establishment of His kingdom, all this is quite evident from the very content of the account of the Annunciation." [39] (The italics in these passages are the present writer's).

This general interpretation corresponds rather well with the position of contemporary Protestantism, which denies Mary a privileged place, and therefore ranks her purely and simply among the members of sinful humanity. But the problem is

[36] Cf. Hamer, *art. cit.*, p. 349.
[37] Cf. Bosc, Bourguet *et al.*, *op. cit.*, pp. 44 and 77, respectively.
[38] *Ibid.*, i. e., p. 77.
[39] *Ibid.*

not this precisely. Rather it is, can this conclusion be the result of an exegesis of this text? [40] It might be added, however, that the interpretation of Pastors Maury and Roux has no support from the history of exegesis.

For others the sinfulness of Mary is linked with the ceremony of the Presentation in the Temple and the Purification. In the words of Max Thurian, "According to the law of Leviticus (12: 6-8) every woman, after the birth of a son or a daughter, had to appear in the temple and present to the priest (an offering) in sacrifice for sin. Therefore, . . . Mary brought a pigeon as a sacrifice for sin. So it was necessary for her to be purified, just as any other woman here on earth. She is a sinner even as others are." [41]

Contemporary Protestant Systematic Theology

With a view toward doing justice to the thought of the various authors, I have deemed it better to expose separately the work of three important Protestant theologians, without proceeding to too hasty syntheses. The three who are to hold our attention in this matter are Karl Barth, Max Thurian, and Hans Asmussen. It goes without saying that Barth, because of the importance of his work, occupies first place.

Since Barth accepts the two dogmas of the Virginal Birth and the Divine Maternity, we are going to center our exposition of his thought around them. Barth, then, affirms that the Virginal Birth is a fact; but what precisely is its significance? First, it is a *miracle accessible to faith alone.* It is not, therefore, a miracle which may serve as an argument of credibility. Neither is it a fact which can be proved, escaping as it does rational investigation of any kind. This miracle, however, really belongs to *the essential mystery,* the Incarnation. Doubtless no causal relationship exists between the miracle and the

[40] Here I simply state the question with no intention of solving it. Cf. the article by P. Lyonnet in *Biblica,* 1939 (XX), pp. 131-141, "Kaire kekaritomene." The expression under consideration, κεχαριτωμένη, should be rendered as "privileged one," understood as a proper "prophetic" name.

[41] Thurian, *art. cit.,* p. 311.

mystery. The Virgin Birth is not a " technical " explanation of the Incarnation. The mystery could have been realized just as well through a normal birth, the result of the consummation of a marriage. On the other hand, a Virgin Birth need not necessarily have brought into the world a God. A prophet might very well have been born of a Virgin. The relation is not " ontic " (ontological), but " noetic." The Virgin Birth is a sign of the Incarnation. Between these two realities there is an existential link. As a sign, therefore, the Virgin Birth has for its object to call attention to the Incarnation. But does it reveal to us the mystery? At the instant " *ex Maria Virgine* " is announced to us, do we know thereby the dogma of a God made man? Of course not! The " noetic " role of the sign is simply to attract attention, to single out the mysterious character of the Incarnation. The Virgin Birth, a sign of the mystery of the Incarnation, makes known to us some general characteristics of the Incarnation as mystery. It emphasizes the divine initiative by showing that man is only present there as object, and in no way as agent.[42]

Secondly, we must determine what in Barth's mind is the essence of the *dogma of the Divine Maternity*. The answer is, nothing more than a sign of the authenticity of the Incarnation. The *theotokos* signifies two things: first, that Christ has come into history, second, that the Son of Mary and the Son of God are one and the same. Catholic theology, he says, has succeeded in diverting our attention, creating out of the dogma of Ephesus a Mariological dogma, whereas it is essentially Christological. Indeed, Mariological doctrine is that which is distinctive of the Roman Church. It typifies and sums up the doctrine affirming the cooperation of the human creature in the work of Redemption. It is this cooperation which is the Roman " heresy " *par excellence*. Thus it is not in the least astonishing that the Church occupies a similar place in the unfolding of salvation. Catholic ecclesiology, like Mariology, is, in effect, but an echo of this " heresy." It is no coincidence,

[43] Cf. Hamer, *art. cit.*, pp. 353-358.

therefore, that during the same pontificate both the Immaculate Conception and Papal Infallibility were defined. It is the duty of Protestant theologians once more to proclaim far and wide the sovereignty of God. There is but a single mediator, other than whom no other is conceivable. Revelation and reconciliation are exclusively the work of God.[43]

We shall consider two of Max Thurian's articles, the first written for the volume on Ways of Worship,[44] the second on the occasion of the definition of the dogma of the Assumption.[45] He deals with two separate aspects of Reformed Mariology, namely, the relationship of Mariology with the doctrine of grace (quite similar to Barth's concern), and the presence of Mary in the Church.

Thurian's emphasis on the link between Marian theology and that of justification is helpful for the understanding of the Protestant position. For *Catholicism*, he says, "being is physically (according to its very nature, which changes) in communion with Christ." For Protestantism "it is a question rather of the dwelling of the Holy Spirit in a nature which remains itself sinful, but which serves as an instrument for God's work of sanctification, allowing itself to be conquered by and subject to Him, all the while being drawn away from Him by the revolt." [46] Thus there exists a tremendous difference betwen Protestant and Catholic Mariology. For *Catholicism* "Mary, the physical Mother of Jesus, becomes the Mother of the faithful in a concrete and direct sense." [47] "The doctrine of the Immaculate Conception means simply this physical preparation of Mary, which enables her to become the Mother of God, since she is only capable of receiving Him into her womb as into a dwelling place which is quite intact." [48] The Protestant position may be summed up as follows. Mary plays

[43] Cf. Hamer, *art. cit.*, pp. 358-361.
[44] *Art. cit.*
[45] For a summary, cf. Hamer, *art. cit.*
[46] Thurian, *art. cit.*, pp. 310.
[47] *Ibid.*
[48] Thurian, *art. cit.*, p. 311.

a role that is elevated, even sublime; she is the *instrument* of an extraordinary mission. But Mary is not interiorly adapted for this role. She remains what she is. " Mary, predestined from her mother's womb, was not conceived immaculate, but was directed infallibly by God, *in spite of her sin*, to the accomplishment of her role in the mystery of the Incarnation." [49] (italics added) We may say, therefore, that Mary is an instrument, which is not psychologically adapted for the role which it must fulfill.

The Catholic doctrine on Mary's presence in the Church, according to Thurian's interpretation, tends to separate Mary from the body of the Church, from sinful men such as ourselves. He thinks that this tendency is particularly marked in the two dogmas of Perpetual Virginity and the Assumption. Furthermore, reformed theology must emphasize the presence and the testimony of Mary in the Church. To look for Christ only in the Trinity and in biblical history is an attitude which leads necessarily to a narrow and individualistic piety.[50] Christ must be sought in the Church and in the witnesses of every age. This does not compromise " the love due to Christ alone; to the adoration and obedience which are His alone; nor even to His Sacrifice and His intercession. It is He Who is loved in His saints, adored when they are venerated, obeyed when their example is followed." [51] On this score we may summarize Thurian's position as follows. Mary is present in the Church *to be loved* and to lead us to the love of Christ; *to be imitated* and to lead us to the imitation of Christ; finally, *to be praised* and to lead us to the praise of God. For this reason Thurian judges that Mary should be included in reformed piety and worship.

He winds up with an appendix, rather hesitant in tone, on the legitimacy of intercession in reformed theology. His preceding discussion did not go this far. Thurian was satisfied merely to ask the question. It seems, however, that his personal

[49] *Ibid.*
[50] Cf. Thurian, *art. cit.*, p. 313.
[51] *Ibid.*

reply would be affirmative. Intercession constitutes one of the most solid ties of the Christian community. " If we can invoke the intercession of our living brethren, why . . . should we not be able to ask the saints departed to pray for us." [52] On these various points concerning the presence of Mary in the Church, it may be remarked that Thurian attempts to assert and show the value of certain doctrinal points within twentieth century Calvinism, which were quite familiar to Luther, but which the average Calvinism of our era passes over in silence, if not attacking outright.

Next we shall outline Thurian's thought regarding the definition of the Assumption and the problem of mediation. First, he says that in the Catholic Church there is a distinctly " doketist " tendency. Catholic theology compromises the authenticity of Christ's mediation. The Catholic Church is actually being carried irresistibly towards " doketism." Her theology grows weaker in the confession of Christ's Humanity. In a progressively spiritualised framework Christ moves further away from us and gives place to Mary. Mary is becoming the Humanity of Christ. She is assuming the role which belongs to Christ's Humanity in our salvation. The perfect balance established by the definition of Chalcedon is thus destroyed. Christology is becoming Mario-Christology. But this evolution continues. Mary, in her turn, is carried upward by this movement. Her Immaculate Conception and her Assumption are but two stages in this process. Almost imperceptibly, therefore, Mary is alienated from the level of common humanity. So much so is this true that sooner or later it will be necessary to provide for and prepare other substitutes.

Mediation as such, nevertheless, must not be condemned. On this point Thurian differs sharply from Karl Barth. He asserts unhesitatingly that Catholic doctrine is a doctrine of mediation (Word, sacraments, witness, intercession). He goes still further: " The denial of all mediation other than Christ's even though this is a mediation by Him and in Him, results . . . in

[52] Thurian, *art. cit.*, p. 317.

the denial of the real mediation of the Christ-God." [53] Thus, according to Thurian, there is no authentic mediation of Christ unless it be extended into time and space.

Hans Asmussen, like Thurian, belongs to that group of Protestant theologians who are trying to bring back into prominence the entire positive content of the sixteenth century Reformation, and who are not satisfied by negation alone. It is necessary to recognize, moreover, that in this movement they both tend to overestimate the content of the Reformation in its traditional sense. Luther would never have permitted the idea of mediation to be attributed to Mary.

A few years ago Asmussen published in Germany a small book entitled, *Mary, the Mother of God,* a work which attained some notoriety and gave rise to heated controversy.[54] The central idea of the book is as follows. We must take seriously the title, *Mother of God,* and stress its importance. To take seriously the Divine Maternity means to take grace seriously. The simple antinomy, God-Man, does not sufficiently explain everything. Protestantism generally errs on this point. The texts of the New Testament which deal with grace present quite another view of the matter (II Pet. 1: 4; I John 3: 2; John 17: 22). Even though grace is from its beginning divine goodwill, and then a gift of God, it ends up, nevertheless, as something in men's hands, administered by the Apostles. The priest or the minister may find himself at God's side and in the presence of other men. Likewise, in another order God and His saints form together a certain unity, and here Mary occupies a special place. It is the duty of the Church to acknowledge Mary's place and thereby her role. Before the throne of God Mary is not only an *object* of the divine work, but also, in a certain sense, a subject.

Although, according to Asmussen, Mary is Mediatrix, she is such in a different sense than that which he attributes to Catholic theology. Taking up the traditional objection, he deems that Catholic theology compromises the uniqueness of

[53] Cf. Hamer, *art. cit.*, p. 362.

[54] The main ideas are contained in Hamer, *art. cit.*, pp. 362-363.

Christ's mediation. We may gather what his own personal position is from the following passage. " One who is priest and mediator cannot be ranked purely and simply with God, nor, on the other hand, wholly with men. Rather, he represents God before men, and men before God." [55] Now, according to the Scriptures, every Christian life implies a priestly element. This supposes, therefore, the possibility of a mediation *in* Christ, excluding all mediation *alongside* the unique Mediator. Such mediation in Christ shows quite simply that the work of Redemption has not remained without fruit. It is evident how much this position is akin to that expressed by Max Thurian in his second article.

In conclusion, therefore, we may, first of all, essay an evaluation of the importance and relative influence of the authors studied. Of the three, Karl Barth certainly represents best and with the most authority the general Protestant position in its Calvinist purview. On the point at issue here Barth is ordinarily looked upon as representative of a modern system substantially faithful to Calvin. In this regard, of course, because of his fidelity to Calvin, Barth is far away from the position held by Luther. The two others, more closely allied to the Catholic position on many points, are not so accredited in the Protestant world. Thurian and Asmussen, the latter even to a greater extent, in seeking to evaluate and assert the positive element in the Reformation, in a more traditional sense, sometimes even go *beyond* (at least on certain questions) the stand of Luther himself. In the sixteenth century we look in vain for the acknowledgement of a form of mediation which is not strictly and exclusively that of Christ. Here classical Protestantism has been satisfied to affirm Christ's mediation and to defend its absolutely unique character, while rejecting categorically any other sort, whatever its guise.

Next we may sum up the Protestant position in three theses. First, Mary is, before all, the *object* of the grace of the Redemption. Second, she is the *exemplar* by the same right as other

[55] *Ibid.*

witnesses of the faith, who manifest Christ to us. Finally, Mary is, nevertheless, in no way a *subject* (in the causal sense) of the Redemption. Therefore, she is not and cannot be the partner of the Savior, much less His collaborator as Co-Redemptrix. These three theses represent the *via media* alluded to above, of which Karl Barth is an authorized representative. Thurian and Asmussen would refuse to accept the third thesis as such. A good re-statement of this average Protestantism are the words of Jean Bosc, which are concerned mainly with the second thesis. " Mary is first among the witnesses of the grace of God, but she is solely a witness of grace." [56]

Catholic Theological Attitude

Confronted with this Protestant position I believe that the mission of Catholic theology is threefold: first, to determine the extent of agreement; second, to meet by an adequate exposition of our own theology whatever there is legitimate in the Protestant emphasis upon the unique character of Christ's mediation; finally, to show exactly where the disagreement lies, and to uncover its causes and motives.

The three theses just stated facilitate our efforts to appraise the situation. Unquestionably we can assent to the first two, precisely in the way in which they are formulated there. On the other hand, we ought to point out clearly our disaccord with the third. Concerning the first thesis, let us stress again that we understand it in its rigorous sense. Mary, as an object of grace and Redemption, is interiorly transformed by this divine gift. As to the second, the Catholic theologian may recognize as legitimate Barth's developments of the idea that Mary is a sign of the mystery of the Incarnation. Everything about Mary serves to make known to us the Christ. This is a point which must necessarily be emphasized.

The Catholic position does not compromise the unique character of the mediation of Christ. Protestants see in any mediation other than Christ's a threat undermining His mediation, a

[56] An article entitled, " Carême marial," in the journal *Réformé,* April 3, 1954.

desire to show the insufficiency in this unique mediation. One of the most important duties of Catholic theology at this point is to stress how such an interpretation is based on a misunderstanding. In any work on this question (here I give only the bare outline for such a work) it would be of primary importance to show that we have no intention of weakening the force of St. Paul's words, " There is one God, and one mediator of God and men " (I Tim. 2: 5). Christ is our unique mediator. Rather the following course must be taken. " Christ alone is the *perfect* mediator of God and men." [57] If there are other mediators, they compete in no way with this unique mediation. The other mediators can be conceived of only in a subordinate sense. " However, nothing hinders certain others from being called mediators, in some respect, between God and man, forasmuch as they cooperate in uniting men to God, dispositively or ministerially." [58] The mediation of Mary, therefore, is relative to Christ's. As Laurentin says with accuracy, " Mary is not so much Mediatrix beside the Mediator, as in Him and through Him." [59] *In no way, therefore, is the mediation of Mary a supplement of Christ's mediation.* She is not given to us by reason of any insufficiency in Christ's mediation. It is, on the contrary, by reason of the abundance of the goodness of God, Who willed to associate Mary in the economy of divine Providence.[60]

What is the basic cause of disagreement? Evidently, as Thurian himself has well shown, it is the doctrine of grace and justification. Let us recall here, first of all, the essential distinction between the Catholic position and the Protestant position on this central point. For *Catholic theology* the grace of God is not only His goodwill; it is also a *gift* which divinizes us, which heals us of our sin and makes us really and inwardly

[57] *Summa Theol.*, III, q. 26, a. 1, " Solus Christus est perfectus Dei et hominum mediator."

[58] *Ibid.*, " Nihil tamen prohibet aliquos alios secundum quid dici mediatores inter Deum et hominem: prout scilicet cooperantur ad unionem hominum cum Deo dispositive vel ministerialiter."

[59] Cf. Laurentin, *Court traité de théologie marial*, Paris, 1954, p. 102.

[60] On this point, cf. *Summa Theol.*, I, q. 22, a. 3.

children of God. In the Protestant view, on the contrary, grace is an act of God, His favor, which does not bring about a divinization. Here is an authorized expression of this view. " The grace of God is the *act* by means of which a person condemned to death receives reprieve . . . the non-obligatory and unmerited *act* of his acquittal. . . . The word ' justification,' as the antithesis of ' condemnation ' or ' reprobation,' expresses the *decision* by which God acquits those who merit eternal death." [61] (italics added) What was said earlier with respect to Max Thurian must also be borne in mind. For him justification is not a transformation of man by God, but an indwelling of the Holy Ghost in sinful man.[62] We see, therefore, that the Catholic theology of man's cooperation in the work of salvation is wholly subordinated to this theology of grace. Where grace is not a *gift* it is impossible to have any cooperation in the work of the Redemption, since this cooperation has as its sole basis the grace that is in us and given to us continually by God.

The criticism of the Protestant position ought to be both scriptural and theological. Regarding the scriptural criticism, it may first be asked, is the Protestant notion of justification the biblical notion? Exegetes (even Protestants) are more and more coming to agree that Luther's interpretation on this score is biased and, therefore, distorted. Luther passes over all the realism of justification in St. Paul.[63]

[61] " Catholicisme et protestantisme. Lettre pastorale du Synode générale de l'Eglise Réformée des Pays-Bas sur l'Eglise Catholique Romaine," *La Revue Réformée*, n. 11/12, 1952/3-4, t. III.

[62] Another good exposition of the Protestant view of justification may be found in the work of H. Strohl, Protestant theologian and historian, *La Pensée de la Réforme*, Neuchatel and Paris, 1951, pp. 85-91.

[63] For the study of this important subject the following may be of use: S. Lyonnet, " De ' justitia ' in Epistula ad Romanos," *Verbum Domini*, 1947 t. XXV, pp. 23-34, 118-121, 129-144, 193-203, 257-263. This article may be obtained in a separate volume: Rome, Pontifical Biblical Institute, 1947, pp. 52; also a summary containing the main ideas of the work in *Ephemerides theol. lov.*, 1947. t. XXIII, p. 461 (Lucien Cerfaux); by the same author, " De Rom. 3: 30 et 4: 3-5 in Concilio Tridentino et apud S. Robertum Bellarminum," *Verbum Domini*, 1951, t. XXIX, pp. 88-97; some interesting observations also on the part of Bouyer, L., *Du Protestantisme à l'Eglise*, Paris, 1954. This last is a more summary treatment.

The theological criticism ought to revolve around the pivotal notion of grace, and also around that of cooperation. The theologian's role will be to show how Catholic theology has understood better these two notions in the whole of the divine plan as revealed to us.

Concerning the notion of grace, it seems that the direction to be followed is that stated in the *Summa Theologiae*, I-II, q. 110, a. 1, where St. Thomas treats of the creative character of God's love. Protestants rather conceive of the love of God as if it were a human love. In reality the love of God is the cause of the goodness of things. Thus one may say that in Protestantism there is a latent anthropormorphic tendency.

With regard to the notion of cooperation, the background is furnished by St. Thomas in the *Summa*, I, q. 22, a. 3 and q. 103, a. 6. Here we must not lose sight of the fact that for Karl Barth the Catholic thesis of cooperation in the work of Redemption is, according to the expression of Turrettini, which Barth adopted as his own, a substitution of the creature for the Creator. " Quid est creaturam loco creatoris ponere, si hoc non est? " [64] For the Protestant the collaboration of man in the work of God denotes a diminution of divine power. For the Catholic, however, this collaboration is an eminent manifestation of the omnipotence and infinite goodness of God. God governs beings through intermediaries not because He has need of such to complete His power but by virtue of His bounty, which confers the dignity of causality upon His creatures.[65]

The problem posed by the cooperation of man in the work of grace is of exactly the same proportion as that of the relationship of the Mass to the Cross. For Protestants the Catholic conception of the Eucharist is a denial of the " once for all " of Golgotha. [66] Catholics, they say, would add the Mass to the

[64] Cf. " Repercussions du dogme de l'Assomption hors de l'Eglise catholique," *Documentation catholique*, n. 1089, Feb. 25, 1951, col. 135.

[65] Cf. *Summa Theol.*, I, q. 22, a. 3, " Non propter defectum suae virtutis, sed propter abundantiam suae bonitatis ut dignitatem causalitatis etiam creaturis communicet."

[66] Cf. note 61 above.

Cross because Calvary is insufficient. However, according to orthodox Catholic theology the contrary is true. It is from the superabundance of grace effected by the unique Sacrifice of the Cross that the Mass draws all its power. The Sacrifice of the Mass is not an autonomous sacrifice independent of the Sacrifice of the Cross. Evidently the same principle may be applied here too, *propter abundantiam suae bonitatis.*

In the field of criticism of Protestant theology, Mariology is valuable as a *touch-stone.* It is the sign of a theology which has maintained true balance regarding the revealed data. " Thus it is in the cult of the Virgin that today, even as at Ephesus in 431, we shall find the touch-stone of both theoretic and practical attitudes of one Church or another with respect to the most vital problems of the Gospel: What relationship ought we to suppose exists between man and God, between nature and grace, in the authorship and in the work of salvation." [67]

JÉRÔME HAMER, O. P.

Collège théologique
La Sarte (Huy)
Belgium

[67] L. Bouyer, *Le Culte de la Mère de Dieu dans l'Eglise catholique,* Chevetogne, 1950, p. 8.

THE SUBJECT OF METAPHYSICS

IT IS not immediately evident why anyone is interested in the subject of metaphysics. The physical world is so much with us, it contains so much to attract our attention and to excite our wonder and curiosity, that we could be well occupied with it for a lifetime. Particularly in this atomic age which is just beginning, it might seem that the center of attention is and should be focused on physical reality and on physical science.

But even in this age of theoretical and applied physics, men are still human. We naturally desire to understand not only the intimate details of the parts of things, but also the general and ultimate reasons of the whole. An inquiry which is concerned with the whole of reality and its ultimate reasons or causes is called metaphysics—whether we like it or not.

The Problem

Let us suppose that we do not like it. Is it not entirely too pretentious? Where could such an inquiry begin? If it is to be conducted in an orderly way, there must be a reasonable approach to the whole through its parts. Certainly we cannot attain a genuine understanding of everything all at once and nothing first. What part can we begin to consider with the reasonable hope of attaining through it a certain and systematic grasp of the whole?

This is a question of no little importance, and one very difficult to answer. Unless there is a starting point for metaphysics, there simply is no genuine metaphysics. This, of course, is what many persons have said and are saying: there is no room for metaphysics. In physics we are already studying the only reality presented to us. We have begun as best we can with the parts which are accessible to us. Surely we have no

reason to expect that the work will be done and the whole explained in our lifetime.

On the other hand, some persons still insist that there is need for metaphysics, and they believe that such an inquiry is both reasonable and reasonably fruitful. Unfortunately they do not agree on the starting point of metaphysics, nor on how this is to be established. Among recent authors a complete spectrum of opinions has been proposed. Even those who agree in saying that common being is the subject of metaphysics often disagree in their explanations of the term. Some hold it is common to everything which is or can be, whether real or not real; others hold that it is common to all the real, whether Creator or creature; others that it is common to all created things, whether corporeal or spiritual; others that it is common to all sensory things, whether substances or accidents; others that it is common only to the individual self and one's own characteristics.

Where there are so many different answers to a question, it is likely that there is some confusion about the sense of the question itself. Just what do we mean when we ask about the subject of metaphysics? What do we mean by the subject of a science? And what is science?

The Logical Approach

Science, we are sure, is genuine knowing.[1] Whether we have it or not, we know what we mean: knowledge of the reason or cause of something, as the proper cause of that thing and no other, and that it cannot be otherwise. Each one of us thinks he knows some things in this way, and this is what we mean by science in the sense of genuine knowing.

Such knowledge is not attained without certain antecedents or pre-requisites. We must already know that certain things are, and what they are, before we can proceed to know something else in a scientific way.[2] Whether we consider science as

[1] Arist., *Post. An.*, Bk. I, Ch. 2, 71b, 9.

[2] *Op. cit.*, 71a 11.

a single act of reason attaining an object in a scientific way, or as a systematic habit of such knowing, we must have previous knowledge of certain principles, whether general or special, and also a subject of consideration or inquiry. We must be assured that the principles are true,[3] and know that the subject is, and what it is. Without principles known to be true we do not know anything perfectly. We cannot know what a subject is unless we know previously or concomitantly that it is.[4] Furthermore, we do not as a rule attain scientific knowledge by our own unaided efforts, but usually with the help of a teacher or textbook, and so we need to know also the meaning of the words employed to express the facts and reasoned facts of the science.

There are, therefore, three elements which enter into the constitution of every science: the principles, the subject, and the attributes which are proved of the subject.[5] Before we can proceed to the attainment of scientific knowledge in the sense of genuine knowing, we must already know (or reasonably believe) that the principles are true, both the common axioms and the special principles or postulates of the science; we must know that the subject is, and what it is; and we must know at least the meaning of the words by which the attributes of the subject are signified.

Let us consider more carefully what is meant by the subject of a science, in the sense of a habit of conclusions, not just a single act. It is a subject of inquiry; indeed of scientific inquiry: something which is knowable in a scientific way. If it is knowable speculatively, theoretically, it is something which is not under man's power: [6] something which man can neither make nor do, but only understand theoretically. It is something which can be analyzed or resolved into its proper principles,

[3] *Op. cit.*, 71b 25.

[4] *Op. cit.*, 92b 5.

[5] *Op. cit.*, 75a 40.

[6] Speculativarum vero scientiarum materiam oportet esse res quae nostro opere non fiunt . . . et secundum harum rerum distinctionem oportet scientias speculativas distingui (St. Thom., *In Boet. de Trin.*, q. 5, a. 1, c.).

causes or elements,[7] and which can be defined in terms of its own proper principles, whether intrinsic or extrinsic. It is not an individual sensory thing as such, but a nature as such, and not specific but generic: a supreme genus.[8] It is something which is a starting point in a science—the starting point, to be exact, because it is the center which first attracts our attention. It is something which can be pointed out to a beginner without too great difficulty: something which does not presuppose an extensive knowledge of the science, but which allows the development of the whole science.

When we consider the subject of a science before beginning the science itself, we are considering the subject as subject, not the subject as it is in itself. Our question is about the subject as something knowable, not as known; it is about something which is later to be explained, not about something which is already explained or in the process of being explained. We are asking whether there is something knowable in such a way as to specify a special science; we are not yet asking what this thing is in itself. It is like asking whether there is something visible, that is, something sensible in such a way as to specify vision, and to distinguish vision from hearing or smelling; not like asking what it is which is seen or heard or smelled.

Before we can dissect a cat, we must first catch the cat. When we are seeking the subject of metaphysics we are, metaphorically speaking, in search of a metaphysical cat: something which we can analyze rationally and through which we can develop the whole science of metaphysics.

Is there, then, a subject for metaphysics? Is there something which can be known metaphysically, that is, something which can be known in a way which is irreducibly different from the physical and mathematical ways of knowing, and which has its own first principles distinct from the first principles of the physical and mathematical sciences?

[7] In omnibus scientiis quarum sunt principia aut causae aut elementa, intellectus et scientia procedit ex cognitione principiorum, causarum et elementorum (St. Thom., *I Physic., lect. 1, 8,* ed. Pirotta).

[8] *Post. An.,* 87a 37.

One way of solving this question is to consider whether there are genuine problems which are not usually discussed in any of the special sciences. From this point of view it is easy to see that there are many problems which are not solved in the special sciences, and that these are problems which concern the whole of reality. Our most universal concepts and principles: being and not-being; the one and the many; the whole and the part; substance and attributes; cause and effect; the true and the good—concerning all of these things there are urgent and difficult problems which are not usually discussed in any of the special sciences. Indeed there is no more reason to discuss them in one special science rather than another, in physics rather than mathematics.[9] Nor can we say that these things are sufficiently well known, because they bristle with difficulties which challenge our understanding.[10] How can there be any truth if there is nothing stable? How can there be anything stable if everything is in motion or changing? Is not being one, and not-being nothing? How then can there be many beings? How is motion possible if things are infinitely divisible? Is not the part as great as the whole, if each is infinite? How can the present determine the future, if everything is indetermined? Such questions as these are not usually discussed in the special sciences. These sciences treat of particular kinds of things, and they employ the general concepts and principles of reasoning only so far as their own particular subject matters require.[11]

Yet it is a fact both of experience and of history that physicists who think that all beings are sensory or corporeal beings do discuss these general problems about the whole of reality.[12]

[9] Nec iterum in una aliqua particulari scientia tractari debent: . . . pari ratione in qualibet particulari scientia tractarentur (St. Thom., *Prooem. Metaphys.*, ed. Cathala).

[10] Hujusmodi autem non debent omnino indeterminata remanere, cum sine his completa cognitio de his quae sunt propria alicui generi vel speciei haberi non possit (*ibid.*).

[11] *Post. An.*, 75a 37.

[12] Quidam tamen naturalium de his se intromiserunt; et hoc non sine ratione. Antiqui enim non opinabantur aliquam substantiam esse praeter substantiam cor-

Nor can we say that these questions cannot be solved by the methods of the physical or mathematical sciences—at least not before we establish the possibility of some other kind of science. Scientific methods are not prison bars behind which a scientist encloses himself, but rather instruments of investigation which are to be used reasonably for what they are worth, and are to be supplemented as best we can whenever necessary.

The Approach Through Physics

Hence if we wish to proceed rationally and not build upon faith, we have no other choice than to begin our philosophical inquiry by considering natural beings [13] which manifestly have in themselves the proper principles and causes of their own distinctive behavior. Hand in hand with these investigations we can develop mathematics, both in theory and in applica-

poream mobilem, de qua physicus tractat. Et ideo creditum est quod soli determinent de tota natura, et per consequens de ente, et ita etiam de primis principiis quae sunt simul consideranda cum ente. Hoc autem falsum est . . . cum probatum sit in octavo Physicorum esse aliquod ens immobile (*IV Metaphys.*, lect. 5, 593).

[13] *Post. An.*, 72a. We note also the following:

Innata est nobis via ut procedamus incipiendo ab iis quae sunt nobis magis nota in ea quae sunt magis nota naturae. . . . Et quia iste est naturalis modus sive ordo addiscendi, ut veniatur a nobis notis ad ignota nobis: inde est quod oportet nos devenire ex notioribus nobis ad notiora naturae. . . . Nos procedimus intelligendo de potentia in actum; et principium cognitionis nostrae est a sensibilibus, quae sunt materialia et intelligibilia in potentia; unde illa sunt prius nobis nota quam substantiae separatae quae sunt magis notae secundum naturam (*I Physic.*, lect. 1, 15-18).

Magis universalia secundum simplicem apprehensionem sunt primo nota, nam primo in intellectu cadit ens. . . . Sed quantum ad investigationem naturalium proprietatum et causarum, prius sunt nota minus communia; eo quod per causas particulares quae sunt unius generis vel speciei pervenimus in causas universales. Ea autem quae sunt universalia in causando sunt posterius nota quoad nos, licet sint prius nota secundum naturam; quamvis universalia per praedicationem sint aliquo modo prius quoad nos, nota quam minus universalia, licet non prius nota quam singularia; nam cognitio sensus qui est cognoscitivus singularium in nobis praecedit cognitionem intellectivam quae est universalium. . . . Illa enim quae sunt a materia penitus separata secundum esse, sicut substantiae immateriales, sunt magis difficilia nobis ad cognoscendum quam etiam universalia; et ideo ista scientia quae sapientia dicitur quamvis sit prima in dignitate est tamen ultima in addiscendo (*I Metaphys.*, lect. 2, 46).

tion. In physics it can readily be demonstrated that although motion is common to all mobile beings, and each may be mover or moved, still motion is in the mobile as such, not in the mover as such.[14] The mobile requires a mover in order to be moved, and the mover moved (supreme genus) requires a mover unmoved.[15] This in an important conclusion of physical science. It is not the conclusion of a demonstration in the strict sense—not knowledge of a reasoned fact—but simply knowledge of a fact attained by reasoning from an effect,[16] motion in the mobile, to the truth that there is or exists a mover unmoved beside the whole genus of movers moved. The subject matter of physical science requires that we use our most general concepts and principles thus far to determine that there is a first cause or principle of motion which is a mover unmoved.[17] At this point we see at least that not every being is a mobile being, and we know that the science of mobile being is not the science of all reality.

Likewise when we consider man in natural science and determine that the human form is an intellective soul, and that the act of human intellection is subjectively independent of physical matter,[18] we see that this form is separable from matter, and can be apart from sensory matter and motion. But to con-

[14] Non est necessarium quod docens addiscat vel quod agens patiatur. . . . Et ideo, etiam dato quod agere et pati sint idem, cum non sint idem ratione ut dictum est, non sequitur quod cuicumque convenit agere quod ei conveniat pati (*III Physic.*, lect. 5., 612).

[15] Accipiatur igitur aliquid quod movetur secundum locum; hoc movetur ab altero; aut ergo illud alterum movetur aut non. Si non movetur, habetur propositum, scilicet quod aliquid sit movens immobile, quod est proprietas primi moventis. Si autem ipsum movens movetur, oportet quod moveatur ab altero movente; et hoc iterum movens, si et ipsum movetur, movetur ab altero. Sed hoc non potest procedere in infinitum, sed oportet in aliquo stare. Erit ergo aliquid primum movens, quod erit prima causa motus, ita scilicet quod ipsum non movetur sed movet alia (*VII Physic.*, lect. 2, 1782).

[16] *Post. An.*, 78a 22.

[17] In naturalibus oportet semper supremam causam uniuscujusque requirere . . . procedere usque ad causam supremam; et hoc ideo est quia effectus nescitur nisi sciatur causa . . . quousque perveniatur ad primam causam (*II Physic.*, lect. 6, 396).

[18] Terminus considerationis scientiae naturalis est circa formas quae quidem sunt aliquo modo separatae, sed tamen esse habent in materia. Et hujusmodi formae

sider what the form is which is separated from matter, or what the unmoved mover is, does not pertain to physical science.[19]

It is because not all beings are mobile beings that physical science cannot give us the whole story, nor even the principal part of it. In natural science we consider all that is proper to mobile beings as such: their general principles, causes, properties and elements, the various species both living and nonliving, with all their properties and interrelations. But we do not in physics consider the unmoved as such, nor substance as such, nor accident as such, nor cause as such, nor the whole or the part as such, nor the first principles of demonstration.

All these things and many others pertain to a science which is distinct from physics and the other special sciences. This science is rightly called metaphysics,[20] because it treats of those things which remain to be considered after physics and the special sciences.

But in metaphysics we must treat of these things in an orderly way. We do indeed consider common being and its many attributes, its first principles and causes and the immaterial beings. But not all these can be considered as the subject of the science, which is a very special consideration.[21]

A Solution of the Problem

As we have seen from logic, the subject of metaphysics is something which is analyzable in a metaphysical way, that is, in a way which is genuinely scientific yet distinct from the ways of knowing proper to the other sciences. It is something

sunt animae rationales; quae quidem sunt separatae inquantum intellectiva virtus non est actus alicujus organi corporalis, sicut virtus visiva est actus oculi; sed in materia sunt in quantum dant esse naturale tali corpori *op. cit.*, lect. 4, 355).

[19] Sed quomodo se habeant formae totaliter a materia separatae et quid sint, vel etiam quomodo se habeat haec forma, idest anima rationalis, secundum quod est separabilis et sine corpore existere potens, et quid sit secundum suam essentiam separabile, hoc determinare pertinet ad philosophum primum (*loc. cit.*, 357).

[20] Metaphysica (dicitur) in quantum considerat ens et ea quae consequuntur ipsum. Haec enim transphysica inveniuntur in via resolutionis, sicut magis communia post minus communia (*Prooem. Metaphys.*).

[21] Non tamen considerat quodlibet eorum ut subjectum (*loc. cit.*).

which presupposes the knowledge that not all beings are material beings, or that there are both material and immaterial beings.[22] If all beings were material beings, then physics would be first philosophy; there would be no metaphysics, and the reasons of the whole of reality would have to be rendered by physics. But after we know that there are both material and immaterial beings, the subject of metaphysics can be established, or at least pointed out, without great difficulty. It is something which has firm and solid being in itself,[23] without admixture of privation or negation; something neither dark nor dim nor difficult to grasp, but rather bright and stable for the understanding, capable of being rationally analyzed into its own proper principles and allowing the orderly development of the whole science. In Thomistic terminology this subject is called common being,[24] that is, being as such or being as being.

By being we mean that which is.[25] This is the intelligible, the object of intellect.[26] The being which is first known to us is apprehended in a very imperfect and confused way, like a luminous fog before the mind. Yet this first knowledge of being is the beginning of human wisdom, and its light reaches from end to end. In an implicit, confused and virtual way it encom-

[22] Quaedam vero speculabilia sunt quae non dependent a materia secundum esse, quia sine materia esse possunt, sive nunquam sint in materia . . . sive in quibusdam sint in materia et in quibusdam non, ut substantia, qualitas, ens, potentia, actus, unum et multa, et hujusmodi, de quibus omnibus est theologia, id est scientia divina, quia praecipuum in ea cognitorum est Deus, quae alio nomine dicitur metaphysica, id est trans physicam, quia post physicam discenda occurrit nobis, quibus ex sensibilibus oportet in insensibilia devenire (*in Boet. de Trin.*, q. 5, a. 1, c.).

[23] Quartum autem genus est quod est perfectissimum, quod scilicet habet esse in natura absque admixtione privationis, et habet esse firmum et solidum, quasi per se existens, sicut sunt substantiae (*IV Metaphys.*, lect. 1, 543).

[24] Ipsum solum ens commune (*op. cit., prooem.*). Dicit autem "secundum quod est ens" quia scientiae aliae quae sunt de entibus particularibus considerant quidem de ente, cum omnia subjecta scientiarum sint entia, non tamen considerant ens secundum quod ens, sed secundum quod est hujusmodi ens, scilicet vel numerus, vel linea, vel ignis aut aliquid hujusmodi (*IV Metaphys.*, lect. 1, 530).

[25] Hoc nomen ens quod imponitur ab ipso esse, significat idem cum nomine quod imponitur ab ipsa essentia (*ibid.*, lect. 2, 558).

[26] In prima quidem operatione est aliquod primum quod cadit in conceptione intellectus, scilicet hoc quod dico ens (*ibid.*, lect. 6, 605).

passes everything, somehow even God, because the aspect of being is most universal and all-inclusive. Through sensory experience we are presented with many objects for understanding, and we proceed to understand being more explicitly and distinctly: we see and assert that this is not that, that being is not not-being. This knowledge of being and not-being is proper to man: it is the knowledge of being possessed by a human being with the aid of sensory experience.

The proper object of the human intellect is the essence or quiddity or necessary core of sensory being, understood as being or that which is.[27] After we have attained explicit and distinct knowledge of many different kinds of material beings, and have learned also that immaterial beings exist, then we can generalize this knowledge in a universal concept including both material and immaterial beings.[28] Furthermore, by leaving out of consideration all differences of material beings both living and non-living we can conceive substantial being or substance simply as a nature: the nature of that which is, whether material or immaterial. In this concept we express being as the ultimate intelligible in an implicit way, and substance as such in an explicit way: we cannot cut anything off from the ultimate intelligible, but we can conceive many other things explicitly, and with distinct and proper concepts. Substantial

[27] Intellectus cognoscit naturam speciei sive quod quid est directe (*III de Anima*, lect. 8, 713).

[28] In his autem quae secundum esse possunt esse divisa, magis habet locum separatio quam abstractio. . . . Substantia autem quae est materia intelligibilis quantitatis potest esse sine quantitate. Unde considerare substantiam sine quantitate magis pertinet ad genus separationis quam abstractionis. Sic ergo in operatione intellectus triplex distinctio invenitur: una secundum operationem intellectus componentis et dividentis, quae separatio dicitur proprie, et haec competit scientiae divinae sive metaphysicae; alia secundum operationem qua formantur quidditates rerum, quae est abstractio formae a materia sensibili, et haec competit mathematicae; tertia secundum eamdem operationem universalis a particulari, et haec competit etiam physicae, et est communis omnibus scientiis, quia in omni scientia praetermittitur quod per accidens est, et accipitur quod per se est. Et quia quidam non intellexerunt differentiam duarum ultimarum a prima, inciderunt in errorem, ut ponerent mathematica et universalia a sensibilibus separata (*in Boet. de Trin.*, q. 5, a. 3, c.).

being as such has proper accidents and attributes, and it has proper principles and causes, both intrinsic and extrinsic. The extrinsic causes of substantial being are indeed the First Principle, which is itself the Supreme Being.[29] All these things are treated in an orderly way in the science of metaphysics, but to manifest the logical order we must first determine the subject of the science.

At the beginning of metaphysics we do not suppose that we already know the first principles or ultimate causes of things. Rather we are searching for the first principles and causes of everything which we already know in some explicit way, whether distinctly or imperfectly. In a word, we desire to know the first principles and causes of common being as such, whether material or immaterial. But the subject of a science is that which has first principles and causes through which it is knowable scientifically,[30] into which it is rationally resolvable, through which it is definable, which are the reasons for its being and its attributes. The subject of a science accessible in the light of human reason is not the first principles themselves, nor is it one or another of the attributes. Rather it is that which has first principles and causes or elements into which it is resolvable, and it is that which has attributes which can be demonstrated of it. This is the case in all the sciences: in physics and in mathematics. Therefore, the subject of metaphysics is common being as such, not the first principles, nor God, nor the separated substances, nor the attributes of common being.

Common being as such in some way includes both substances

[29] Arist., *Met.*, Bk. XII, Ch. 7, 1072b 11.

[30] Hoc enim est subjectum in scientia cujus causas et passiones quaerimus, non autem ipsae causae alicujus generis quaesiti (*Prooem. Metaphys.*). Nos quaerimus prima principia rerum et altissimas causas, sicut in primo dictum est; ergo sunt per se causa alicujus naturae. Sed nonnisi entis. Quod ex hoc patet, quia omnes philosophi elementa quaerentes secundum quod sunt entia, quaerebant hujusmodi principia, scilicet prima et altissima; ergo in hac scientia nos quaerimus principia entis in quantum est ens: ergo ens est subjectum hujus scientiae; quia quaelibet scientia est quaerens causas proprias sui subjecti (*IV Metaphys.*, lect. 1, 533).

and accidents, whether material or immaterial.[31] But substance is being simply and primarily, explicitly and distinctly known. Considering the order of our knowledge, other things are first called beings by analogy of attribution because of their diverse references to one and the same thing, namely, substance.[32] Substance is one, not merely in the sense of a common form of understanding, but as a certain nature. It is a genus which in a certain way is common to all substances, whether material or immaterial, and it is the subject with respect to which proper accidents and attributes are referred. Hence the primary subject of metaphysics is substantial being as such, common to material and immaterial beings. Common being which is a genus of things is the subject genus of the science of metaphysics.

A substance has proper accidents which are in it or by which it is related to something else, and these are said to be with reference to substance.[33] Qualities and quantities, for example, are said to be inasmuch as they are in a substance; motions and generations are said to be inasmuch as they tend to substance or to something in a substance; privations and negations are said to be inasmuch as they remove substance or something from a substance. Each of these depends upon substance in order to be: substance is their common subject, and they are

[31] Quaecumque communiter unius recipiunt praedicationem, licet non univoce sed analogice de his praedicetur, pertinent ad unius scientiae considerationem; sed ens hoc modo praedicatur de omnibus entibus; ergo omnia entia pertinent ad considerationem unius scientiae, quae considerat ens in quantum est ens, scilicet tam substantias quam accidentia (*loc. cit.*, 534).

[32] Illud unum ad quod diversae habitudines referuntur in analogicis est unum numero, et non solum unum ratione, sicut est unum illud quod per nomen univocum designatur. Et ideo dicit quod ens etsi dicatur multipliciter, non tamen dicitur aequivoce, sed per respectum ad unum; non quidem ad unum quod sit solum ratione unum, sed quod est unum sicut una quaedam natura (*ibid.*, 536).

[33] Ens multipliciter dicitur. Sed tamen omne ens dicitur per respectum ad unum primum. Sed hoc primum non est finis vel efficiens . . . sed subjectum. Alia enim dicuntur entia vel esse, quia per se habent esse sicut substantiae, quae principaliter et prius entia dicuntur (*ibid.*, 539). Et ad hoc sicut ad primum et principale omnia alia referuntur (*ibid.*, 543). Sed substantia est hoc primum inter omnia entia (*ibid.*, 546).

called beings with reference to substance by analogy of attribution, just as diverse things are called healthy with reference to one thing which in this case is the health of the organism. In cases such as these we consider in one and the same science both that which is primary and all that is secondary but which depends upon the first and is named after the first. For example, with reference to the art of medicine we consider primarily the art itself of the medical man, and secondarily his medicines or medical instruments. In like manner the subject of metaphysics includes both substances and accidents, whether material or immaterial, but the substance principally and the accidents secondarily. Common being understood in this way, that is, as including both the substance and the accidents which can be without matter and which are named with the same name by analogy of attribution, is the proper or formal subject of metaphysics.

In regard to this common being, or beings, we desire to know the first principles or causes of being. In metaphysics we consider common being—primarily the substance and secondarily the accidents—as being, that is, as having or manifesting the ultimate reasons to be. This act of existing, this " to be " which is found in everything, yet never twice the same, but diversely in diverse things, which is in both substance and accidents, caused in accidents by their substances, derived by the substance from some ultimate principles and causes of being: this is the formal aspect under which the subject of metaphysics is considered, in the light of which the whole inquiry proceeds. In metaphysics we do not consider the different species of common being: [34] this is the task of the special sciences. But in the most general science we consider common being—substance and accidents whether material or immaterial—and whatever is proper to common being, and we consider it precisely as being or under the aspect of being, that is, inasmuch

[34] Nam omnes substantiae inquantum sunt entia vel substantiae pertinent ad considerationem hujus scientiae: inquantum autem sunt talis vel talis substantia, ut leo vel bos, pertinent ad scientias speciales (*ibid.*, 547).

as it has first principles and causes on which it depends in order to be. We wish to determine the relation of common being with respect to its ultimate reasons to be, both intrinsic and extrinsic. This is the most important and the most difficult problem of metaphysics.

After we have determined the subject of metaphysics, but before we proceed to develop the science itself, we must consider the other prerequisites of the science, namely, the truth of our first principles of demonstration, and the names of the attributes and other elements of the science. We must explain and defend the validity of our knowledge of common being at both extremes, the intellectual and the sensory,[35] and we must determine the meanings of the names for all the elements of the science.[36] This consideration of names is important particularly in metaphysics, because the same name is used to signify diverse conceptions, and in this science things are said to be in many different ways, although in a certain order wherein something is principal and something secondary.

At this point we are ready to begin the science of metaphysics itself.[37] We must manifest the division of our subject both from the subjects of other sciences and in itself also, in order to see what needs to be considered, and in what sequence, and how things are to be defined with respect to their reasons to be.

Metaphysics in Relation to the Other Sciences

From these considerations it is clear that metaphysics as well as physics is solidly based on the realities of sensory experience. Both sciences require a skillful use of reason on the part of the student, and this can be acquired through the discipline of the liberal arts. In the order of learning, metaphysics naturally

[35] Philosophi erit considerare de omni substantia inquantum hujusmodi, et de primis syllogismorum principiis (*ibid.*, 595).

[36] Distinguit intentiones nominum quae in hujus scientiae consideratione cadunt (*ibid.*, 749).

[37] Incipit de ente determinare, et de aliis quae consequuntur ad ens (*VI Metaphys.*, lect. 1, 1144).

follows upon physics, because causes which are nearer to sense are known before those which are remote from sensory experience. Yet this is not to say that metaphysics is intrinsically or doctrinally dependent upon the conclusions of physics. Through physics itself and beyond physics we see the possibility of a higher wisdom, for which we must make a new departure.

Contrasted with physics and mathematics, metaphysics is very simple indeed. Here there is no galaxy of species with their hosts of properties and interrelations to be considered—this is the business of the special sciences. When we are ready to develop metaphysics, we can and should begin without assuming anything whatever. We simply accept the being and not-being which is presented to us through sensory experience. We naturally separate or divide not-being from being by the judgment of the intellect, and we distinguish the intentional being of our knowledge from the being which things have in themselves, which we know directly. We distinguish one and many, substance and cause. We separate or differentiate immaterial beings from material ones, and we abstract the essential from the accidental. We neglect all the individual and specific differences of things in order to concentrate our attention on being as such, which is primarily the generic nature called substance taken together with a few secondary natures such as qualities and relations, each with its reasons to be. We define the nature of substance and accident in terms of genus and difference, matter and form, potency and act, and consider each with respect to its reasons to be. Then we manifest the attributes of common being by orderly explication, not by demonstrating through extrinsic causes as we do in physics. Finally, by reasoning from sensory effect to cause in various ways and according to distinct orders of causality, we arrive at the wonderful truth that there is a first efficient, exemplary and final cause which is the First Principle of being as such, which itself is above common being and all the modes of common being. This is a fortunate discovery on our part, and quite unforeseen, It is attained through effects which are contingent beings, not

necessary ones, and which are utterly insufficient to manifest the proper nature of the First Cause. By many analogies we try to explain a few of the sublime attributes of this First Cause, and of the separated or spiritual substances also, and we try to grasp the teleological order of common being with respect to the inner harmony of creatures and their relation to the transcendent end.

Reply to Some Difficulties

Because metaphysics is simple in comparison with the other sciences and is concerned only with the most general aspects of things, and with their most general principles, one might be led to think that it could or should be learned first, before any of the special sciences.

But what is simple in itself is not therefore easy for us to understand, nor is it always first in the natural order of learning. The immense treasures of ordinary and pre-scientific knowledge are indeed sufficient for human life, if not for our well-being, and they contain sufficient matter for metaphysics itself. But these treasures are held largely in an implicit and confused way, not in an explicit, clear or orderly way. It is difficult for us to put order in our knowledge, because this requires the deliberate effort of reflection and the application of certain guiding principles. Yet it is this logical order of concepts, judgments, principles and conclusions which makes the essential difference between scientific knowledge and mere ordinary knowledge. It is very difficult to learn two things at once, such as the correct or logical method and another science, and so the student should learn logic first, that is, general logic. The special methods of the various sciences should be considered near the beginning of each.

But does not ordinary knowledge together with the help of logic suffice for beginning metaphysics? In metaphysics we consider being and not-being, the one and the many, substance, cause and things of this sort, which are known even by children. Therefore it does not seem necessary to approach metaphysics

through the special sciences. If metaphysics is a science in its own right it must have its own self-evident principles, and it must be independent of the conclusions of the other sciences.

In reply to this difficulty, we must acknowledge that the most universal aspects of things are first known by us, not indeed in a distinct or orderly way, but in an imperfect and confused way. The opposition between being and not-being is manifest to the child, and the multiplicity of sensory beings is most evident to us. But this knowledge is not sufficient to establish the possibility of a science of reality distinct from physics, or the need for such a thing. The general aspects of things are first known as confused and common attributes which are predicable of all subjects which we know explicitly or distinctly. Sensory beings are the only ones which are immediately evident to us, and these things considered as naturally mobile beings with their own natures or proper principles of sensory behavior are considered in natural science. In order to see the need for metaphysics we must know that there is some other kind of being which is not material being.[38]

Each science is essentially related to being of one kind or another, or under one aspect or another. In order to establish the possibility of metaphysics as distinct from physics, we must determine a subject for metaphysics. In order to accomplish this we must know that there are both material and immaterial beings or substances. If there were only material substances, or if we knew only material ones, then physics would be first philosophy. That there are both material and immaterial beings is generally known and is a part of ordinary knowledge. But this is an important point which needs to be clarified by the methods of natural science, both in general physics and in psychology. It is only through our knowledge of material things that we can prove that immaterial things are or exist. After this we see the need for a science distinct from physics which will treat of common being, that is, of substance, con-

[38] Si non est aliqua alia substantia praeter eas quae consistunt secundum naturam, de quibus est physica, physica erit prima scientia (*ibid.*, 1170).

sidered not as sensory or mobile, not even as substance, but of substance whether material or immaterial, and of accidents likewise material or immaterial, under the aspect of being, that is, as having ultimate reasons to be.[39] In relation to common being considered in this way metaphysics does have its own principles which are self-evident. Metaphysics is not formally or doctrinally dependent upon the conclusions of the other sciences, but only materially and in the order of systematic learning.

But can physics be of any service in these matters? Natural science is abstract and conceptual, and it treats of natures as essences or forms without reference to the act of existing. How can natural science establish the existence of immaterial beings?

In reply we recall that natural science is the science of natural things, that is, of things which have in themselves the fundamental principles of their own sensory behavior. These things are material and contingent in themselves, and as such they cannot be known scientifically. Science is knowledge of the necessary and the immaterial or intelligible. Only by abstracting from singular matter and motion can we know natural things scientifically, and for this reason natural science is abstract, and does consider natures as essences or forms. Nevertheless, in physics we do not entirely lose sight of actual existence, but remain very much concerned with the sensory world as it actually is.

The necessary reason to be is not found in sensory things absolutely. Indeed this is found only in the First Principle, at

[39] Principia eorum quae sunt semper, scilicet corporum coelestium, necesse est esse verissima. . . . Et per hoc transcendunt in veritate et entitate corpora caelestia: quae etsi sint incorruptibilia, tamen habent causam non solum quantum ad suum esse, ut hic Philosophus expresse dicit (*II Metaphys.*, lect. 2, 295). Primas enim causas entium generativorum oportet esse ingenitas, ne generatio in infinitum procedat; et maxime has quae sunt omnino immobiles et immateriales. Hae sunt causae sensibilibus manifestis nobis, quia sunt maxime entia, et per consequens causae aliorum . . . sunt causae entium secundum quod sunt entia, quae inquiruntur in prima philosophia. Ex hoc autem apparet manifeste falsitas opinionis illorum qui posuerunt Aristotelem sensisse quod Deus non sit causa substantia caeli, sed solum motus ejus (*VI Metaphys.*, lect. 1, 1164).

the height of metaphysical inquiry. But in the teleological order we do find many hypothetically necessary reasons to be, not only in nature but also in morals and in the arts. Elsewhere there is only the necessity of essence or form, generally speaking. Yet these abstract essences can be considered not only in an abstract way but also in comparison to existing things, in which they are, and of which they are the essential reasons.[40] In this way essences and forms which have been abstracted from sensory things by ourselves can be employed as principles for our understanding of existing things, even in the special sciences. This consideration taken together with the common axioms which are used in every science enables us to establish in physics the existence of immaterial beings, the unmoved mover and the separated souls. Thus by means of the particular sciences the mind can be disciplined to logical and realistic thinking, and can be disposed for scientific knowledge of the whole of reality by study of the principal parts which are closer to sense and easier to understand. Through physics and psychology particularly we learn of immaterial beings which require metaphysical consideration. Even material things have immaterial virtualities or aspects which are distinguishable by the inquiring mind, such as the aspect of being, substance, cause, etc., and these are as windows through which the mind looks out on the domain of the immaterial, which is that of metaphysics.

WILLIAM H. KANE, O. P.

Albertus Magnus Lyceum
for Natural Science,
River Forest, Ill.

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[40] Possunt ergo hujusmodi rationes abstractae considerari dupliciter: uno modo secundum se, et sic considerantur sine motu et materia signata, et hoc non invenitur in eis nisi secundum esse quod habent in intellectu; alio modo secundum quod comparantur ad res, quarum sunt rationes, quae quidem res sunt in materia et motu, et sic (sunt) principia cognoscendi illa, quia omnis res cognoscitur per suam formam; et ita per hujusmodi rationes immobiles et sine materia particulari consideratas habetur cognitio in scientia naturali de rebus mobilibus et materialibus extra animam existentibus (*in Boet. de Trin.*, q. 5, a. 2, c.).

THE NOTION OF CERTITUDE [1]

ETYMOLOGY sometimes helps to suggest philosophical meanings. The Latin verb *cernere*, whence our adjective " certain " is derived, means to separate or sift, and, by extension or transference, to distinguish, decide, determine, and the like. An object therefore can be declared " certain in itself " if it is or has been separated or sifted. But from what? One may reply, in the most general terms: from any admixture with anything else. Accordingly, we obtain the notion of a fixing upon, a determination to, one thing, through the exclusion of all else.

Thus it is legitimate to speak of " certitude " in the natures of things and their operations, inasmuch as a thing by its nature is fixed upon or determined to its proper connatural object. In this sense, natural non-cognitive tendency or inclination has of itself the property of certitude. So likewise has sense appetite. Bodies heavier than air tend downward with ' certitude '; sight is with certitude adapted to the perception of color, hearing to sound, etc.

Certitude in this broad meaning is found also in the virtues. A virtue, especially a moral one, can be said to function in the mode of nature so far as it is determinative with respect to some single end, inclining its possessor toward it. A man enjoying the virtue of justice ' naturally ' tends to be equitable in his dealings with others and with himself; and so in all other

[1] The reader may consult the following texts from St. Thomas Aquinas as illustrative of the fundamental positions represented in this article.

Summa Theol., I, q. 1, a. 5, ad 1; I-II, q. 40, a. 2, ad 3; q. 56, a. 3; II-II, q. 4, a. 8. with ad 3. and q. 4, a. 2; *III Sent.* dist. 23, q. 2, a. 2, sol. 1, with ad 1 and ad 2; *ibid.*, sol. 3 and qcl. 3; dist. 26, q. 2, a. 4, with ad 1 and ad 2; *De Veritate*, q. 6, a. 3; q. 10, a. 12, ad 6; q. 11, a. 1, ad 13; *Contra Gentiles*, II, cap. 4; *In Boeth. de Trin.*, q. 6, a. 1. *II Metaph.*, lect. 5, n. 336 (Cathala edition).

cases; a virtue gives a set to action, channels it, predisposes it to some end, fixes it upon that end, habituating its subject to adhere firmly to it.

This term " certitude," however, is attributed to natural and virtuous orientations, determinations or fixities, only in a secondary sense; it is simply a datum that, in the major Western languages at least, " certitude " denotes primarily a quality or state of knowledge. Of course this mere fact of usage is no philosophical reason for such derivative meanings of the word as have been mentioned; but a good philosophical explanation exists, and it is summed up in the proposition that the operation whereby anything tends toward an end is directed by some intelligent agent. This is manifestly so in voluntary and intellectual agents, such things being the self-directing causes of their actions toward ends. True it is also of natural involuntary, knowledgeless agency; in the field of non-cognitive causality we find determinate operations—operations toward termini or ends. Indeed, to be determinate is to be directed to some end; an utterly indeterminate action is inconceivable, a contradiction. Now a power can be determined to its object, and therefore its possessor can cling tenaciously to it, only if the one is ordered to the other. But the ordering of one thing to another requires intelligence, is an act of directive intelligence. The operations of things totally devoid of cognitive powers manifest intelligence.

Mention may be made, too, of the welding of the senses to their proper objects. Now sense powers are by their nature passive or receptive; and, having the same mode of existence in individual corporeal matter as the senses themselves do, sensible objects are of themselves naturally capable of impressing their likenesses upon the cognate sense powers. For this reason sense-cognition is said to be specifically certain and infallible, the sense power being determined absolutely to its specific and specifying object—sight to color, hearing to sound, etc. The specific certainty of the cognition of specific sense objects follows necessarily from this natural, non-free determination—a determination which, as we have seen, however, exhibits

directive intelligence; the perception of relations is an act of intelligence; the consequent ordering of one term of the perceived relation to another term is an act of directive intelligence. Where is this directive intelligence lodged?

The great classical argument, of course, is that the whole of non-intellectual creation is moved to its proper objects and ends by the intelligent Author of nature. Underlying this doctrine is the consideration that action of any sort presupposes intelligence, because every action is for some end, and the end intended, or tended toward, exists *as such* only as known and willed; for the end intended is the end to be attained, an end which does not yet exist actually, but only intentionally; no agent, intellectual or other, would tend toward an end were it not fixed upon it by *some* prior knowledge of it.

The ' certitude ' found in the realm of non-cognitive operations is easily seen to have as its source, its primary and principal cause, intellectual certitude, namely, a determination in an intellect specified by its object. So too with the ' certitude of virtue '; for a virtue principally so-called can exist only in the will as its subject or in some power so far as it is moved by the will; and will is a faculty set in motion in consequence of an act of reason or intelligence.

Consider that in every case reviewed so far " certitude " has signified that which makes something definite, fixed; a principle of finality, therefore, of finalization, of determination to ends.[2] Now since certitude is primarily and principally in the intellect, let us consider two fundamental modes of intellectual operation, with a view to discovering the kind of certitude appropriate to each—if indeed there is certitude in each.

Fittingly designated as the first operation of the intellect is the immediate apprehension of intelligible objects, e. g., ' man,' ' animal,' ' plant '—the simple grasping of the meaning of terms. In this pre-judgmental, or non-judgmental, act, considered in itself (I speak formally; acts of intellect may entail or carry with them judgments at least implicit), there is no assent or

[2] Cf. the informative article, " *Certitude* in St. Thomas Aquinas," by Francis A. Cunningham, S. J., in *The Modern Schoolman*, XXX, 4 (May 1953), 297-324.

dissent, no affirmation or denial; yet in it the intellect adheres to its object, is fixed upon it, determined to it. Hence, according to the meaning of " certitude " here proposed, it cannot be denied that the intellect in the act of simple or immediate apprehension of an intelligible object does attain certitude, a quality which therefore is indefinable formally, or essentially, by reference to judgment or assent; though it is a cognitive perfection, certitude does not appertain to knowledge only when it possesses the property of truth, if by " truth " we designate a judged relation.

If certitude is not formally defined exclusively in terms of judgment, it would be much less formally correct to speak of " certitude " in regard to the intellect engaged upon a work of inquiry or deliberation. Those philosophers who dialecticize the intellect by considering it as essentially and primarily a faculty of movement are compelled to say that certitude in knowledge is unattainable. And when a person posits this concept in the form of a final epistemological conclusion, he contradicts himself, while at the same time illustrating the fact that certitude in knowledge, in the sense of determination of intellect to some term or object, cannot be rationally denied. Certitude is by its very nature terminative or conclusive.

Now if we attend to what is designated naturally as the second operation of intellect, namely, the act of assent or dissent—judgment—, we find the preceding observation strikingly verified; itself a conclusive act, judgment consists in bringing the terms of a proposition to a close. So one would expect to discover certitude in this act, if anywhere.

The very word " assent " can be instructive; " assent " stems from " sense," and it is the property of sense, as distinguished from intellect and will, to be determined to one object; the sense faculty has by nature no relation to a plurality of objects specifically diverse. In view of this strict fixing upon one specific object, which is characteristic of sense, other facultative determinations have been named from that of sense; the determination of thought to something is appropriately called " *as*sent," implying primarily the intellect's act of agreeing *to*

(*ad*) a judgment as true, that of the will "*con*sent," because it presupposes thought, *with* (*con*) which the will acts simultaneously, while tending to that which the reason judges to be good. The intellect's act of assent is its self-determination to one of two or more alternatives. Let us consider three of the most significant relations in which the intellect can be viewed with respect to this self-determination by way of assent, and the proper modes of certitude resulting from it.

Firstly, the intellect can be regarded in relation to itself; it is then seen to be determined immediately by the very presence of an intelligible object. Such is the case when, by the light of the agent intellect alone, certain forms are illuminated; so also, in the intuitive understanding of first principles. Similarly, in the judgment proper to the sense faculties we find that the immediate apprehension of their kindred objects is due to the fact that the objects are in themselves immediately subject to the faculties. Now the immediate judgmental cognition of the intellect has the classical name of "vision"; a seeing by way of assent; vision (true insight) is by its very nature certain, because the determination to the object is here innately necessary; and necessity is of the essence of cognitive certitude, which, excluding relativity to many, always entails determination to one.

Secondly, the human intellect can be considered in relation to the reason. Reason naturally ends in intellection, or intuitive understanding, by analyzing conclusions into principles essentially evident.[3] When such analysis is correctly made there exists in the intellect 'scientific' certitude, or certitude by way of scientific assent; this, at least, is the root significance of the

[3] I use the expression "essentially evident" in preference to "self-evident," because the latter expression all too often suggests to modern minds a 'subjective,' psychological relativism whereas we wish to convey by the term "essentially evident" an 'objective' property of intelligible relations; thus a "self-evident" proposition is one in which the essential meaning or concept of the predicate is included in the essential meaning or concept of the subject, or vice versa; a person's apprehension of these essential meanings or concepts and the relations between them is entirely irrelevant to the question of their essentially evident, or inevident, character.

act of scientific knowing as the Aristotelians have always understood it.

Thirdly, the intellect can be regarded in relation to the will, which may be capable of determining the intellect to an object neither evident intrinsically in the order of reason nor reducible to anything thus evident. The will could effect such determination by proposing to the intellect something transcendently intelligible to be adhered to as its good—an object not only inevident to the intellect but one incapable of being resolved into any self-evident or self-justified principles. "Faith" (theological) is the name of the intellect's assent to such an object. And, in the Augustinian phrase, faith "captivates understanding" since the intellect is then determined to an object, not by its own proper activity, but by the will's command; in the believer the intellect attains its term not by means of the understanding but by means of the will. Note, however, that in the case of faith the intellect *is* terminated, closed upon an object, 'determined to one,' so that it does enjoy certitude—intellectual certitude; for faith is an act of assent, not of consent. The assent of faith, while certain, is, of course, completely non-evidential; and the believer is said to have assent simultaneously with thought; "to believe," as Augustine well put it,[4] "is to think with assent"—*ipsum credere nihil aliud est quam cum assensione cogitare.* The beliver's intellect remains open to many possible objects, being determined to one only extrinsically, by the will.

To sum up: In the first act of the intellect, simple apprehension, there is always simple or absolute certitude, without there being either assent or reasoning. In the second act, so far as it entails the understanding of principles, there is simple or absolute certitude by way of assent, without discourse or reasoning. In ratiocination, if it terminates in scientific knowledge, there is simple or absolute certitude, by way of assent, with discourse—not discourse with assent, but discourse before assent, since reasoning issues in intellection or intuitive under-

[4] *Liber de praedestinatione sanctorum,* cap. 2, n. 5, *PL* 44, 963.

standing through analysis into principles grasped in their self-evidence or intrinsic, essential intelligibility. Faith is distinct from all these acts in that it involves assent simultaneously with a movement of thought. Indeed faith occupies a middle position between two movements of thought, the one inclining the will toward belief (and this movement precedes the act of faith), the other *tending toward* intellection or intuitive understanding of the things already believed; and it is this latter movement which is simultaneous with the assent of faith—an assent nevertheless, be it remarked, and therefore an *intellectual* act that is of itself absolutely firm, absolutely certain.

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The philosophical meaning of certitude outlined in this article cannot be grasped adequately except in its proper theological context, which is for us primarily the problem of faith.

Now, in general, cognitive certitude—the only certitude principally and strictly so-called—is possessed when the intellect attains to something as it in fact is. The act of knowledge is fulfilled or achieved or completed in the judgment. But primary judgmental knowledge results from knowing causes, namely, principles, whether remote or proximate, which contribute positively to the production or maintenance or movement of being in some mode. (Any more restricted notion of " cause " would be defectively metaphysical). Therefore it is upon the knowledge of the cause or causes of things that the certitude of our knowledge chiefly depends; the cause of the thing known is the prime source and ground of the certitude of our knowledge of it; so that the higher and more perfect is the cause of a thing known to us, so much the greater is the degree of certitude which the knowledge of that thing can have.

It may be supposed that the reference here is to what is commonly called ' objective ' as opposed to ' subjective ' certitude; on the contrary, it is a question of the ' objective ' causes of ' subjective ' certitude. For it should be observed that certitude considered formally and actually is always ' subjective,' always a quality in and of a subject. Obviously, more-

over, no ' subjective ' quality exists or can exist without having causes, ' objective ' as well as ' subjective ' ones. The following remarks about several of these causes may throw some light on the meaning of the existential fact which certitude is.

This rule: The nobler the cause of a thing, the higher the degree of certitude regarding it,—applies to what may be termed the extrinsic material cause, namely, the subject or matter concerning which there is knowledge. For example, among the natural acquired intellectual virtues, prudence (or practical wisdom) and art deal with contingent matters—those which can be otherwise—, while wisdom, science and understanding are devoted essentially to necessary things—those which cannot be other than they are. In the latter three virtues, therefore, we find a higher degree or level of certitude than in the former two; contingency in the subjects or matters of knowledge is of itself a bar to certitude. But of the last three intellectual virtues named, the immediate subjects are natural, or at least in no case are they formally supernatural. If the immediate and direct, as well as primary and principal matter or subject of knowledge is both formally supernatural—supernatural taken precisely as supernatural—and existentially necessary, then the knowledge of which it is the cause will possess a higher degree or intensity of certitude than that whose actual immediate matter is natural, or not formally supernatural. (Understand, of course, that all this is being said only in reference to the extrinsic ' material ' cause of certitude). It follows that faith, whose immediate subject is both formally supernatural and necessary in the most absolute manner—necessary in being, and hence uncreated—, enjoys a greater degree of certitude than natural wisdom, science, and understanding.

The rule stated above applies also to that cause which we shall call the principal intellectual light. Again, in this causal perspective we see that faith is more certain than any of the three intellectual virtues-- wisdom, science, understanding—, since faith is caused by the light of the divine truth—the illumination proceeding from God as self-subsistent Truth—,

while certitude in those virtues results from the created light of human reason; of course, that first light is of itself infinitely more powerful as a cause of certitude than this second one is.

On the other hand, if certitude is considered precisely from the point of view of the receptivity of its inherent subject—shall we say, of its intrinsic material cause—it is clear that the more closely knowledge is adapted to the nature and capacity of its possessor, so much the more certain it can be. As regards this causality, too, God must be said to enjoy the highest possible degree of cognitive certitude; for His knowledge is Himself; the relation of knower to known and of known to knower is in God a simple substantial coincidence.

In this same realm of subjective causality, the next highest rank in the order of certitude would fall to the created intellectual substance, because of its immaterial nature and its consequent pure intellectuality. We shall not argue here concerning the existence of such substances, confining ourselves to the remark that, according to classical Christian doctrine, there are in them no material organs to impede the intellect's immediate self-determination to its objects, or to necessitate, as in man, the discursive movement of reason; angelic intellectuality being by nature more perfect than the human, angelic certitude is purer and more intense.

As to the competence of the human subject for intellectual certitude, is it not clear that the same principle is the determining, explanatory, one? That is to say, the human intellect will, in a certain sense, possess the maximum certitude about these things to whose knowledge it is most perfectly proportioned. In what sense? Is the measure of this adequation the prime criterion of certitude? This problem will be taken up later.[5] Suffice it for the present to observe that, since the things of faith transcend man's intellect, they are said to be less certain to him, precisely because of this disproportion between intellect and object (and the resulting inevidence of object to intellect), than things known through the natural intellectual virtues of wisdom, science, and understanding.

[5] See below pp. 534-538.

Further, viewed in a different perspective of 'subjective' causality than heretofore, we discover the same order in certitude: the most perfect certitude is God's, because His intellect is infinite and one with Himself; next, the angelic intellect, though finite, is not even extrinsically dependent upon matter, and hence is a more powerful and free cause of certitude than the human one, which is thus dependent.

The same hierarchy of certitude exists in the world of the formal intelligible cause, which, for God, is the infinite intelligible Species that He Himself is; for the angel, finite intelligible species or forms derived from God; for man, finite intelligible species abstracted from creatures.

Lastly, considering the final cause or end of certain knowing, one sees that in God this cause is His infinite knowledge of His own divine truth; in the angel and in man, a finite intellectual participation in the divine truth—much more perfect in the first than in the second.

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The outline is hardly complete; but at least it suggests something of the complexity of the problem of certitude. "Certitude," except in God, is the name of an effect—and no effect can be understood sufficiently apart from its cause or causes; but this axiom holds throughout: the greater the cause, the greater the certitude it can lead to or produce. Among all the causes of certitude so summarily reviewed above, which one is humanly speaking the most significant, the most determinative of actual, subjective, certitude in man's knowledge? Is it not that cause which we have named the *principal intellectual light?*

Now from what has been said certitude clearly may entail two things: firm adherence to an object, and the evidence or 'visibility' of the object to an intellect. Actual certitude is a quality or perfection of a knowing subject; 'evidence' is a property of intelligible objects in relation to knowing subjects. Actual certitude then is measured according to the power and degree of the subject's adherence to the object, and is defined most essentially or formally, therefore, in terms of this ad-

herence, not in terms of evidence. (I speak only of genuine, truth-founded adherence).

As regards the subject's firmness of adherence to the object, faith is more certain than any natural knowledge, because the divine Truth, which principally causes the assent of faith, is more powerful—infinitely more powerful—as a cause of certitude than is the light of human reason, effecting the intellect's assent in natural types or ways of knowing. And yet if certitude is taken to imply intellectual evidence of vision, then, of course, faith must be said to have no certitude whatever.

Bear in mind that it is with reference to the principal productive cause that an effect is considered in the most primary and absolute way, while it is viewed in secondary and relative fashion with respect to the passive potency or capacity of the subject in which it exists. Thus knowledge is judged ' absolutely ' in terms of its prime objective cause, ' relatively ' in terms of the passive potency or capacity of the subject possessing it. Since faith is maximally certain by virtue of its principal effective cause, namely, the light of God's truth, it is said to be ' simply ' or ' absolutely ' more certain than the most certain natural knowledge, despite the fact that natural ways of knowing are more certain ' relatively to us '—more certain, that is to say, in the order of intrinsic subjective causality, being adapted to, or not incommensurate with, our natural cognitive powers. For example: the certitude of scientific knowledge consists both in the evidence of the object to the knower and in the firmness of his adherence to it, whereas the certitude of faith lies wholly in the believer's adherence to the object believed. Nevertheless the certitude of faith is ' absolutely ' greater, by virtue of the nobility of its cause, and greater actually and formally, by virtue of the strength and intensity of the adherence proper to it.

In brief: certitude, according to the doctrine of this article, is primarily and principally intellectual; the power and nobility of every certitude and mode of certitude is commensurate with the power and nobility of its causes, and especially of the ' principal light ' productive of it; certitude necessarily involves

firm adherence to something, but not necessarily vision or evidential knowledge of it. These considerations, we believe, provide a meaningful background for the distinction, not only of all kinds of natural, cognitive certitude from one another and from the certitude of faith, but also of both these varieties of certitude from opinion, doubt, suspicion and nescience.

An introductory and exploratory study leaves no room for any detailed treatment of subsidiary problems, but at least it may be usefully remarked that, in its non-evidential character, faith shares something in common with opinion, doubt and suspicion, since, as in those three, the natural tendency of the believer's intellect toward the vision of its object remains unterminated. Hand in hand with a perfectly firm assent there is, in faith, the continued natural movement of thought toward intuitive understanding—a movement which, when terminated in the beatific vision, at once eliminates faith. And perhaps it is well to emphasize again that by faith things are not known with any certainty at all, if certainty be understood to require the intellect's repose in its object, and that therefore such a requirement cannot enter the essential, formal definition or concept of certitude.[6] Thus, although the natural modes of certitude exceed the certitude of faith as regards 'evidence,' they do not exceed it as regards firmness *or* certainty of adherence.

I say "*or* certainty" because it is a central thesis of this article that certitude consists formally in the intellect's steady attachment to an object, not in the intellect's vision thereof. Now certitude is indeed found first of all in the realm of intellectual cognition, consisting as it does primarily and principally in the intellect's determination to something one. But the point is that true firmness of adherence *presupposes* the determination of a cognitive power to a unitary object, and that this

[6] While faith is immediately an intellectual not a voluntary act, the believer's intellect nevertheless is determined to its object, not by virtue of its own vision of it—for it has none—, but solely by the will's intervention. Yet the fact bears insisting upon, that were the act of faith immediately voluntary, it could not be said to be "certain," if certainty is (as here maintained) a quality of intellect.

determination principally or in its source is brought about by *intellectual* cognition.

For the correct appreciation of this entire doctrine, what is of key importance (as I see it) is the fact that the degree, measure and order of actual certitude in human as well as angelic knowledge are determined principally and absolutely by the prime intellectual cause involved, and only secondarily and relatively by the subject's dispositions, aptitudes, or competencies. Let us try to make this point quite clear.

It is not seldom said that what is more certain " objectively," or considered in itself, can be less certain " to us." But we are maintaining that there is no actual certitude ' in itself,' or apart from cognition. The dictum just cited merely illustrates the fact that actual, cognitive certitude can be viewed in two different relations, namely, in relation to its subject-matter, or material object, and in relation to its human intellectual subject. Moreover, the statement is not to be taken as expressing an ' absolute ' consideration of certitude, for it is not with regard to its material object, but to the principal intellectual light productive of it, that certitude is so considered.

That the primary measure of the degrees and levels of certitude lies in the principal intellectual cause is strikingly illustrated by the doctrine of the eminent position of revealed theology in relation to other sciences. One speculative science is said to be higher than another, not only as regards the status of its subject-matter, but also its certitude. Now in both respects theology is superior to all other speculative sciences; its subject, of course, is uniquely transcendent, and in certitude it surpasses the other sciences because they derive their certitude from the natural light of human reason, which can err, while it is from the light of God's own knowledge or 'science,' which cannot err, that theology acquires its certitude. Because the quality of actual, subjective, certitude is determined principally by its intellectual cause, and is exactly proportioned to the power and eminence of that cause, theological certitude is, precisely as certitude, existentially and not only essentially greater than all other certitudes in this life; more

intensely than they, it enjoys the character of *firm adherence*. True it indeed is that, judged in terms of evidential cognition, the certitude of theological knowledge must be declared inferior to all our natural intellectual certitudes—sapiential, scientific, intuitive. Yet it is difficult to overstress the point that certitude is being regarded in derivative and relative fashion when measured in relation, not only to its cognitive subject and its essentially evidential or non-evidential quality, in the realm of reason, but also to its subject matter.

The firmness of adherence (grounded upon truth) of a cognitive power to its object is what constitutes certitude formally and actually. The intellectual light primarily causing this well-grounded adherence is what constitutes certitude principally and absolutely.

Again the background of this doctrine, what is to be made of the famous theory that mathematical knowledge is the 'most certain' of all?

Let the salient features of the theory be represented as follows. Because mathematics is situated midway between natural philosophy and metaphysics, it is said to be more certain than either of them. Firstly, in mathematics abstraction is made from physical matter and physical motion, whereas natural philosophy is about things existing in matter and subject to motion—impermanent, variable things—, the knowledge of which is naturally less firm than of permanent things. Generally speaking, in natural philosophy, as in all the natural and operative sciences, there is *de jure* less certitude and less possibility of attaining certitude than in mathematics, both because of the multiplicity of objects that have to be considered in those fields—the primary objects of theoretical mathematics, on the other hand, are comparatively few in number—, and because of the variability of those objects. Secondly, *the mathematical way of proceeding in the acquisition of knowledge*—the expression "mathematical knowledge itself" ought not to be used here—is more certain than that of metaphysics, because the objects of the latter are more remote from the senses, whence all our knowledge ultimately takes rise—more

remote both in the case of separated substance (to the knowledge of which things derived from our senses cannot adequately lead us) and in the case of the common or transcendental principles of metaphysics, which, being maximally universal, are the furthest removed from the particulars falling under sense cognition. On the other hand, the material objects of mathematics are things capable of being sensed, and they are therefore imaginable; consequently, the human intellect, abstracting from all sensible factors, acquires knowledge of them with greater *ease and certainty* than it does of a separated substance, or even of such objects as the essential nature of substantial being or of such metaphysical principles as potentiality and act. Mathematical thought, in short, is by nature easier and more certain than the cosmological, the metaphysical, and that proper to the operative sciences.

Consider the linking here of ' ease ' with ' certainty.' This I believe is significant. For there exists an important distinction between the conformity of the intellect to its object—between the mutual adaptability of intellect and object—, and the power or intensity of the intellect's attachment to its object. Given this conformity or adaptability, the intellect enjoys an immediate aptitude to cling to its object and a consequent natural ease in its ability to know it. But the integral quality of the adherence—its true strength, intensity, constancy, reliability, lastingness—, this is determined and measured, not primarily by such conformity or adaptability, but by the power of the principal intellectual light that causes it. That which is the more easily known is the more certainly known, where certainty is understood to imply, not so much firmness, strength, constancy, reliability, lastingness of adherence, as strictness of cognitive adaptability or conformity. The latter is not, we have maintained, the primary formal requirement of certitude, still less the object of an ' absolute consideration ' of it.

Relevant to our problem is another basic element in the doctrine of mathematical certitude with which we are presently concerned, namely, the notion that in mathematics we find the

' most certain ' method of *reasoning*; the notion that it pertains to the very nature of mathematics—the classical variety, at any rate—to proceed demonstratively, by way of explanatory, as distinguished from factual, demonstration.[7] There is no need to enter here into a discussion of this distinction; suffice it to point out that the doctrine under review does not claim that mathematical knowledge is simply the most certain *knowledge*, but that the mathematical way of demonstrative reasoning is the easiest and most certain *to us*, namely, the adult human intellect functioning normally. Now the ease and certainty of this kind of reasoning is due both to the invariability of its objects (abstracted as they are from the hylomorphic flux which is their natural milieu), and to the natural conformity of the human intellect to them, inasmuch as they are forms taken out of matter, and hence do not exceed, indeed are inferior to the intellect's own level of being, yet are adapted to it because of their immaterial state. In short, man's proper object as knower is form in matter, but not his proper object as certain, scientific, demonstrative knower, because matter is a principle of indeterminacy, mutability, variation, while certainty in knowledge demands permanence and constancy—a stable ground, a fixity, a ' determination to one.' Certitude then is to be sought, not in the world of matter, but of form. What form? Form abstracted from matter is that which is most commensurate with man's natural competency for scientific-demonstrative knowledge.

Observe, however, that although this natural commensuration of the human scientific intellect with the mathematical object guarantees the highest degree of cognitive *facility*, it does insure the loftiest grade of truth-founded intensity in the intellect's attachment to its term; and it is in this intensity, strength, tenacity of intellectual adherence that the quality of certitude formally consists. Of course mathematical certainty, like all certainty, follows from the intellect's conjunction with its objects; but the qualitative character of this union stems

[7] Called by the Scholastics, respectively, *demonstratio propter quid* and *demonstratio quia*.

primarily from its principal intellectual cause. No slightest suggestion is being made that mathematical certainty does not entail a firm, an unwavering, attachment of intellect to object; assuredly it does, yet it is the quality, the distinctive character of this adherence that marks the mode and degree of actual (subjective) certitude.

Clearly, therefore, no contradiction exists between the doctrine (1) that divine faith is more certain than any natural knowledge, and (2) that the mathematical way of proceeding in rational demonstration is more certain than any other kind of scientific discourse. Here, as everywhere in this problem, it is simply a question of different causal perspectives in which certitude is being viewed. Indeed the problem of certitude, in common with every existential one, is first of all a problem of causality, and if it is to be sufficiently understood, and perhaps in some measure resolved, it must be studied in the full complexity of the causal factors and principles actually involved.

The complex, however, always flow from the simple, and the many from the one. Concluding, then, let us indicate briefly the ultimate causal explanation (as it appears to us) of the existence of certitude in created knowledge.

In good classical doctrine it is a commonplace that the whole certitude of scientific knowledge arises from the certitude of the cognition of principles, since conclusions are known with certainty when, and only when, they are analyzed into principles. The Christian metaphysicians added that something is known with certainty because of the light of reason with which we are endowed by God and through which God speaks in us; that the certainty of our knowledge is not caused by a human teacher except insofar as he instructs us by resolving conclusions into principles, and that we would never attain the certitude of scientific knowledge were there not present in us certain knowledge of principles into which the conclusions are resolved. Evidently, then, the certitude of scientific knowledge a person possesses is only from God, who bestows upon him the light of reason through which he knows principles, from which, in turn, the certitude of scientific (demonstrative) knowledge derives.

Obviously, too, what has just been remarked concerning the certitude of scientific knowledge applies to all human natural certitude, being in fact only a particular application of the principle that all created intellectual certitude, angelic as well as human, supernatural as well as natural, is participated from the uncreated intellectual certitude which is God's knowledge of Himself. The uncreated light of God's own certitude is the creative source of all other certitude and the primary measure and criterion of it.

James F. Anderson

Marquette University
Milwaukee, Wisconsin

NOTES ON OUR CONTRIBUTORS

Paul Mahoney, O. P., S. T. Lr., Ph. L., is professor of theology at Loretto Heights College, Denver, Colorado.

Jérôme Hamer, O. P., S. T. Lr., S. T. D. (Fribourg), is professor of dogmatic theology and Lector Primarius at the Dominican College of La Sarte, Belgium. He has taught also at the Angelicum in Rome. His work, *Karl Barth,* was published in 1949. He has written numerous articles in the field of Protestant theology in European journals.

William H. Kane, O. P., S. T. M., is professor of philosophy at the Dominican House of Studies, River Forest, Ill., and director of the Albertus Magnus Lyceum of Physical Science.

James F. Anderson, Ph. D., is professor of philosophy at Marquette University. He is the author of *The Bond of Being* and *The Cause of Being.* He previously taught at Loyola University in Chicago and the University of Notre Dame.

Charles A. Hart, Ph. D., LL. D., professor of philosophy at The Catholic University of America, is National Secretary of the American Catholic Philosophical Association and a frequent contributor to The Thomist.

David A. Dillon, Ph. L., S. T. D., is professor of dogmatic theology at the St. Paul Seminary and a contributor to The Thomist.

John A. Oesterle, Ph. D., author of the text, *Logic,* is a former Fulbright Research Scholar and a member of the Department of Philosophy at the University of Notre Dame.

Edward T. Smith, Ph. D., is assistant professor of philosophy at De Paul University, Chicago.

BOOK REVIEWS

God and Polarity. By WILLIAM H. SHELDON. New Haven: Yale University Press 1954. Pp. 712 with index. $8.00.

This vast work by the emeritus Sheldon Clark Professor of Philosophy at Yale University is a most ambitious attempt to reconcile the chief perennial disputes among the various opposing schools of philosophy as they have developed in the history of philosophy and as they now present themselves, including the thought of both East and West. It is the author's conviction that historically these various systems may be arranged in counterpart pairs, each member of a pair providing what the other member lacks. Thus idealism is compared with materialism, Thomism with process philosophy, monism with pluralism and rationalism with irrationalism. In this way there is created a graded system of polar opposites ranging from inanimate matter to the Deity. In reality this graded polarity is a protest against the pure intellectualism inherited from Greek philosophers which reaches its extreme in Hegelianism. Actually reality cannot be comprehended by intellect alone but only by a union of intellect with feelings and will.

Professor Sheldon is moved to write his *opus magnum* by the vast futility of opposing systems of philosophy, each of which avows that it alone is right and the others wrong. Yet as Aldous Huxley writes: "Men live in accordance with their philosophy of life, their conception of the world. This is true even of the most thoughtless. It is impossible to live without a metaphysics. The choice that is given us is not between some kind of metaphysics and no metaphysics; it is always between a good metaphysics and a bad metaphysics."

Professor Sheldon suggests that perhaps all systems of metaphysics are in the main correct except where each thinks it has refuted the other. Each may have shown its truth and all can pool their results without any one being relegated to an inferior grade, "in short that philosophy has succeeded to a high degree; that its manner, not its matter, has caused its downfall. Well, such is the case as the following pages are to set forth. . . . The situation of man today is unique, unique because it is critical as never before in recorded history. To meet it man must have a firm assurance of the powers that control his universe, powers good, bad, or indifferent, to which he must adapt his living if he would survive or perhaps progress—yes even if those powers are only his own. So does the moving finger write *Philosophy* in these days, giving it an opportunity, a task, a momentous choice to integrate itself or die in its seclusion, and perhaps man with it." (p. 3)

After one of the longest and best reviews of idealism, covering nearly a third of the text, Sheldon concludes that this philosophical approach in its three major forms has indeed done mankind great service in keeping man's mind fixed on the highest values, those of the spirit, proving as it does that law and order are to a high degree present in the universe and necessary for the best human life, that social order is no more than a means to the needs of individual persons where progress first must be rooted; " that there is an absolute personal spirit or God in some sense ubiquitous; that the deeper personal values are powers, real entities, upon which man may rely in guiding his life. However, the idealist experiment has *not* proved its clear exclusions: that matter, time, space and other categories of the physical and mental reality are to a degree unreal, that the Deity is in any way limited, etc., as detailed above. But how vague! say the modern precisians. What is person? Define mind! How much law and order do we need? Define your absolute personal spirit. All this long and dreary argument for so slim a result." (p. 360)

Polar to idealism will be materialism, which the author disposes of in a relatively short discussion. Materialism is considered as rightly insisting on the ultimate reality of physical being insofar as we can at present see. It is wrong in denying that consciousness, mind, spirit exists in its own right by reducing it to a physical function however complex. Both minds and bodies are ultimately real and ultimately different in their nature; mental and physical are irreducibly other. The way is pointed to a synthetic perspective.

After a brief glance at some of the Eastern philosophies which exhibit some degrees of realistic dualism, Sheldon finally settles upon scholastic philosophy, as expressed in Thomism, as incorporating within itself all that is true and positive in the polar philosophies of idealism and materialism. After observing that " there probably never was so much hostility today as toward this age-old type . . . though few of its critics have understood the system," the author affords a long analysis of Thomism as it is expressed primarily by one of its contemporary interpreters, Professor Etienne Gilson, and that in a single introductory work of Gilson, namely, " The Philosophy of St. Thomas Aquinas," admittedly such a method has its limitations but if it had to be used, for whatever reasons Professor Sheldon might give, it is fortunate that so reliable a spokesman has been selected. Sheldon's conclusion is that " Thomism, with the earnestness of the religious motive and the breadth of view furnished by the maturity of the speculative Aristotle, combined to produce the greatest synthesis in history; greater in ordered articulation, in wealth of detail, and panoramic vision. . . . Without question it is the fullest synthesis as yet offered to thinking man." (p. 441) Of all the other systems that have survived, materialism, monist and pluralist idealism, becoming or process philosophies, mysticisms, even the

new irrational existentialism, each of these, says Sheldon, is scarcely more than a single thesis. Each may have certain truth in what they include. They are in error in what they exclude. Thus do they war upon one another to the confusion of the rank and file. Scholasticism alone is a system. Says Sheldon, " Scholasticism today is Thomism." (p. 444) The author is himself at pains to answer effectively the chief charges against this most inclusive of philosophies.

Nevertheless, despite his acceptance of most of the synthesis of Thomism as an integration of what truths are contained in the polar philosophies of idealism and materialism, Thomism itself contains an important limitation even if it may not be classed as a definite error. This may be said rather to be overemphasis on the purely intellectual—the Greek; and not the Christian inheritance—on the intelligibility of being, and a corresponding underrating of the significance and value of the active phase of man's mind and of certain extrarational factors of being which should rather be co-ordinated with the purely intellect and intelligibility. The affective-conative contribution to reality should have greater stress. Far from lowering the dignity of reason, it gives man's intellect a far wider scope than is assigned to it. An example of this underrating of what is not purely intellecual is the Thomistic rejection of the so-called ontological argument for God's existence. " In making action, volition; process-life in general inferior to still contemplation the Thomist has, to a degree, treated certain phases of being as other systems have treated certain beings." (p. 502) Being here is polar Neither intellect nor will is superior, still less supreme, in full actuality, over the other. The Bergsonian injunction is here in order: " Act as men of thought, think as men of action." Thus the Thomist existential intellectualism neglects the realm of the purely possible for the quiet contemplation of the permanent unchanging substances.

Here enters the polar philosophy of modern process philosophy which is only now reaching its maturity, especially in the West where it pervades to a high degree the outlook in the sciences and arts, education, morals, and religion. Its general notion is that " in this universe of constant change is a principle favorable to advance towards the better." (p. 531) To quote one of its great exponents, Bergson: " It is a creation that goes on forever in virtue of an initial movement. This movement constitutes the unity of the organized world—a prolific unity of an infinite richness, superior to any that the intellect could dream of, for intellect is only one of its aspects or products." It is generally materialistic and atheistic though not necessarily so. Progress is the key word. For purpose substitutes a more neutral word—impulse, drive, élan—purpose savors of idealism or theism.

Sheldon, however, cannot accept process philosophy as a final solution. Process is a growth toward the better in the sense that progress may be an opportunity. That it is more than an opportunity, that it is inevitable

or even probable, is not proven. It cannot refute the positive teaching of other types of philosophy. Its denial of such bifurcations as spirit and matter is erroneous. The Thomistic argument for First Cause, which is rejected by process philosophy, is established by a compelling argument. Evolution is by no means a universal upward thrust. "Most variations" to quote J. S. Huxley, "have been deleterious." The course of evolution goes sidewise or forward or ceases to go at all. Process is still too overcast with the old Greek inheritance to go further and turn irrationalist as has been the case of the practical metaphysics of the East.

Thus arises the polar type of irrationalism against all rational philosophies. This is represented by Mysticism and Existentialism. Perhaps, says the author, the term extra-rationalism would be better but irrationalism is the more familiar title. With it the last of the outstanding types is complete. In this return to a search for the good over the search for the true and knowledge for its own sake the circle is closed. Man has no other access to reality than through his intellect or through his valuations; thus are the alternatives exhausted. Mysticism, generally, both Eastern and Western, seeks a consummate union with the source of Being, and immediate experience that God is spirit. On the positive side the presence of the Divine is certainly indubitable, the more specific teaching is at least in some degree true inasmuch as it is vouchsafed with something of the authority of the experience of the One. Too frequently, however, it tends to exclude the reality of the many, especially in its Eastern expression.

Existentialism is a much more extreme form of irrationalism. Philosophers of most diverse stripe from atheists to Roman Catholics have been so labelled. It is not so much existence generally as existence of man that is its concern. Even more particularly it is by way of man's will, his free decisions, that we have the clue to reality. Thus its appeal is more to the conative, as distinct from the affective appeal of the mystic. Both feel certain of the failure of the traditional report of intellect. Since reality is determined by man's choice it obviously can be as varied as his phrases within such extremes as the religious supernaturalist wing choosing absolute dependence on God as in the case of the Danish theologian, Soren Kierkegaard, who has often been regarded as its founder, or of Gabriel Marcel of France or the three American Protestant theologians, Reinhold Niebuhr, Richard Kroner and Paul Tillich, to the complete denial of God which characterizes the position of Jean Paul Sartre of France and Karl Jaspers of Germany.

With irrationalism the picture is complete. In its positive aspect, like the other systems preceding in its various forms, it possesses certain truth. And like the others it is false in its exclusions. It rightly emphasizes the affective-conative approach to reality. It is wrong in its almost total rejection of the intellectual approach. Apparently mankind is doomed forever to

gyrate between these poles never arriving at anything which might be called a fundamental fulness of truth. The history of philosophy is called upon to establish the truth of this law of polarity. Apparently the case seems quite complete. The panorama presented in this work is a vast one with almost no end of confirming details, the richness of which can only be slightly suggested in this brief account.

Leaving aside scores of minor points upon which we might wish to enter demurrers, what may one say who acknowledges openly a Thomistic point of view, of a study which by all standards must be admitted to be a vast achievement? We must say that Professor Sheldon has not established his case. True the history of philosophy does indicate that we may conveniently use the so-called principle of polarity to dramatize the limitations of man's mind in his search for an ultimate understanding of reality beyond that of the appearance of things presented to the senses. To raise it to the dignity of a principle governing man's mind one must ignore the fact of absolutely contradictory disagreements on the most fundamental of issues concerning reality. In the principle of polarity this is not admitted. It is the very freedom of polarity that furnishes the key to the settlement of the great perennial quarrel of types. Polarity lets each type say: " I am right in and by myself, so are you my opposite. If I never heard of you, nor you of me, each of us would have just as true, though not as full a system. Let us then gladly recognize the truth of each other and cooperate to gain a broader though not a truer view." (p. 677)

The disadvantage of this approach may be well seen in the case of Thomism. Under his principle of polarity Sheldon must regard the principles of being as paired things or opposite counterpartagents. This leads to a definite misrepresentation of the very nature of Thomistic metaphysics which by its principles of being is not a polarity of opposites but a gradation of Creator and creature. Sheldon readily grants, indeed insists, there is here no polarity. As he says: " Creation is a free act; there is in God no need of the creatures in the sense that He requires their cooperation for His own full being." (p. 678) This Thomistic position leads of necessity to the analogical predication of being without which reality cannot be grasped in its most ultimate character. The author has readily granted that Thomism is " without question the fullest synthesis as yet offered to thinking man." As we have seen, his chief criticism of this synthesis, which alone seems to cover the whole range of reality, is that it has not sufficiently emphasized the affective-conative approach to reality. It has overemphasized the intellect and underrated the significance and value of the active phase of man's mind. However, it is granted that there is nothing in Thomism which in any way excludes such approach. If this be true, then there seems to be no ground for requiring a polar philosophy for Thomism in a philosophy of becoming or process philosophy except the necessity of somehow finding a universal application of the author's general principle.

Indeed Sheldon readily grants there is nothing in Thomism which excludes the influence of the affective-conative approach to reality. Rather it is a matter of overemphasis on the power of the intellect. It may be admitted that there is some truth in this criticism. But it must be pointed out that St. Thomas certainly never denied the role of the will in aiding the mind as a whole in its effort to get in touch with reality. At the very beginning of his *Summa Theologiae* he grants the proper role of knowing by just such appetency, his so-called *vis inclinationis*, the peculiar knowledge of the lover of God. He simply denies it as being the sole source of knowledge This knowledge by connaturality or congeniality has been emphasized by such Thomists as Rousselot, Vann, Maritain and Gilby and others, particularly in relation to the aesthetic experience. St. Thomas himself may not have explored its full possibilities but he has certainly provided for it. For a philosopher who was so constantly under the influence of revelation such an influence would hardly be avoided.

In the light of the high commendation Sheldon has expressed of Thomism as " without question the fullest synthesis as yet offered to thinking man," we believe that it is only the author's own preoccupation with his so-called principle of polarity that prevents him from advancing further in his understanding of the relative completeness of the Thomistic synthesis. We suggest that for the moment he set aside his principle of polarity and explore, preferably at first hand, the key Thomistic doctrine of participation, to which the principle of potential existence or essence limiting existence leads. By this doctrine the human mind moves to the existence of an Infinite Creator with an inescapable conviction. It is within this framework that such truths as may be contained in other systems can be incorporated while avoiding their exclusions, of which Professor Sheldon so rightly complains. Philosophical systems, as we have said, present us not merely with polar opposites but real contradictions, the resolutions of which certainly seem to have been more successfully accomplished by the principle of participation which is the key to the unity of Thomism. This is true even by the criteria which this author has himself established. Having come thus far we suggest that most of the minor difficulties Sheldon has found in this relatively most perfect synthesis will disappear if he will abandon his doctrine of polarity for that of Thomistic participation. With all its limitations the human intellect is really capable of a much more complete and final philosophical synthesis than Professor Sheldon seems to think possible. This is in no way to detract from the high value of his great study which may be considered a kind of philosophy of the history of philosophy. Its always sympathetic, yet most trenchant criticisms and sound evaluations of all the important systems of philosophy that have engaged the minds of philosophers through the centuries will stand as an accomplishment of the first rank.

The Catholic University of America
Washington, D. C.

CHARLES A. HART

Scheeben's Doctrine of Divine Adoption. By Edwin Hartmann Palmer. Kampen: J. H. Kok, 1953. Pp. 202.

This study of Matthias Joseph Scheeben's theology on grace, presented as a doctoral thesis at the Free University of Amsterdam (Protestant), is evidence that a surprisingly new quarter that interest in his theological work is still alive. The purpose of this study, Dr. Palmer states, is to make Scheeben and his place in Catholic theology better known in Protestant circles. This review will consider only those chapters in the book which explain and evaluate Scheeben's theories on grace and divine adoption.

In three well-documented chapters Dr. Palmer sets forth the Catholic doctrine on grace, and Scheeben's theories on the indwelling of the Holy Spirit and 'fuller' adoption of Christians. In his comparatively short career Scheeben wrote three works which treated in whole or in part the Catholic doctrine on grace. In his first work, *Natur und Gnade*, written shortly after the completion of his studies, he presented the traditional theological doctrine that habitual grace gives the Christian a participation in divine nature and makes him an adopted son of God. He placed special emphasis on the fact that Christian adoption is not a mere moral act on the part of God raising a man to the legal and external rank of son, but is a 'real' adoption in which grace confers on the soul a new nature and life. In his later works, *Mysterien des Christentums* and *Handbuch der katholischen Dogmatik*, especially in the latter, Scheeben altered his position somewhat. From a long study of the Greek Fathers, especially St. Cyril of Alexandria, he, like Petavius before him, was led to conclude that the traditional doctrine on grace was insufficient to explain the intimate supernatural union of the soul with God. If the Christian is to be called a true son of God, he argued, account must be taken not only of grace which gives him a likeness of divine nature, but also of another element: the personal connection between God and the soul. This latter element is supplied in sanctification by the Holy Spirit dwelling substantially in the soul of the Christian. In natural generation there is not only a similarity of nature, but there is also a substantial connection between father and son. Hence, the definition of generation: *origo viventis a vivente conjuncto in similitudinem naturae.* Likewise, in the spiritual rebirth of adoptive sonship there is present both *gratia creata*, a participation in divine nature, and *gratia increata*, the substantial indwelling of the Holy Spirit. The new element in the theory is evident, namely, that in sanctification there is a twofold formal cause: grace, whereby a man is made holy and pleasing to God, capable of merit and worthy of eternal life; and the Holy Spirit dwelling substantially in the soul, making the Christian worthy of eternal life *as the son of God.* Scheeben called this theory 'fuller' adoption.

This theory of the twofold formal cause of sanctification was the point of Scheeben's theology most severely attacked by the theologians of the time. In a debate carried on in theological journals, the German theologian, Granderath, maintained that it was pure contradiction to say that the Holy Spirit is the formal cause of a human being. The Holy Spirit, he said, is indeed the efficient cause of sanctification and the term to which the soul is joined in the union of grace. But the Holy Spirit could never be called the *forma constituens* of the supernatural life of the soul. In reply to this charge Scheeben declared that the Holy Spirit is evidently not an inherent physical form constituting a nature as such. Nonetheless, He is *causa formalis*, as a subsistent form bestowing a new nature. It is not impossible, he thought, for one person to be the formal cause of another, provided this is understood to mean *forma subsistens insubsistendo informans* and not *forma inhaerens inhaerendo informans*. Scheeben admits, rather weakly, that this is not the usual signification of *formal cause*, but he thinks it is a legitimate one.

In the three final chapters Dr. Palmer turns from an exposition of Scheeben's theories to an evaluation of the doctrines on grace, the indwelling of the Holy Spirit and divine adoption. And in this task, it must be said, the critic is much less successful than the expositor. Understandably, Dr. Palmer may choose to criticize Scheeben from the viewpoint of Calvinist theology. In doing so, however, he makes very difficult the task of judging adequately such a profound problem. By cutting himself off from the long tradition of Catholic theology he runs the danger not only of failing to see the problem in its proper perspective, but also of misunderstanding the problem and even the language in which it is expressed. This initial weakness may be observed in each of the point he treats.

His criticisms of Scheeben's treatment of grace is summed up in the following manner: "But it is exactly here, at the heart of Scheeben's theory of grace, that we must be critical of his theory of *gratia sanctificans*. For this whole system of ontology is foreign to the Bible, and by no stretch of the imagination can it be derived from it. It is Aristotelian in origin, and not Christian. . . . If one considers, as Scheeben does, that outside of the Bible there is another, additional source which is also authoritative, and that this source teaches the Greek-originated form-matter theory, then it is logical that one interpret the two sources by each other and harmonize them . . . we frankly reject this extra-Biblical norm, and going to the Scriptures themselves, find absolutely nothing from which such an ontology can be derived. It is non-Biblical." (p. 116)

This is not only an unwarranted charge against Scheeben, but it also betrays a lack of knowledge about the work and function of the speculative theologian and the use he makes of terms and propositions drawn from philosophy. This fundamental misunderstanding is, in fact, at the basis of

most of his criticisms of Scheeben's theories. It is evident in such statements as these: (in criticizing the Catholic doctrine on grace) " a grace that is shackled to a pre-Christian philosophy " (p. 126); " The Bible describes God as good, holy, invisible, self-existent, immutable, simple, spiritual, etc., but no inkling is given that He is a substance composed [*sic*] of pure actuality as opposed to potentiality " (p. 148, n. 73); (after citing some examples used by Scheeben) " when Scheeben speculates in this manner, we would rather remain by the things revealed in God's Word and go no further." (p. 162) His frequent criticism of Scheeben as " un-Biblical " can be partly accounted for by the fact that he himself is not familiar with the background of Catholic theology. In a highly speculative analysis (not an apologetic), the theologian may legitimately presume that the reader is familiar with the texts.

The principal objection to Scheeben's theory of indwelling is the following: " we consider the theory of form-matter to be invalid, and therefore we reject Scheeben's description of our relationship to the Holy Spirit in these terms." Dr. Palmer expresses his own ideas on indwelling in such statements as: " It is the Spirit who first of all comes in contact with the soul "; " it is the Holy Spirit who chiefly and directly indwells man." (p. 162) But, nowhere does he analyze precisely what this indwelling is. And, having taken the problem out of the context of formal causality, he is unable to evaluate the distinctive features of Scheeben's theory of indwelling. In the discussion of adoption the difficulties only increase. Here the author consistently identifies the terms *source, ground, basis,* and *formal cause.* Consequently, when he finds Trent (or Scheeben) calling sanctifying grace the formal cause of justification, he feels that such a notion is " demoting Christ to only a meritorious cause," that " Christ is no longer deemed necessary as the *immediate* ground for adoption, but is supplanted by a fictitious spirituality (*gratia sanctificans*)." (p. 185) From these and other statements one can only conclude that Dr. Palmer has misconstrued the problem of adoption as Scheeben presented it, and, in some respects, has not even understood the terms Scheeben used. Fundamentally, the critical part of the work is not an evaluation of Scheeben's theories at all, but a simple restatement of the Protestant position on grace versus the traditional Catholic doctrine.

This criticism is not meant to detract from the fine work of exposition done in the earlier part of the book. In the compass of a few chapters Scheeben's theory with numerous quotations is presented in a form not elsewhere available. It must be said, however, that while there are serious objections to be made against Scheeben's theory of adoption, Dr. Palmer has not made them.

David A. Dillon

St. Paul Seminary
St. Paul, Minn.

Aesthetics and Criticism. By HAROLD OSBORNE. New York: Philosophical Library, 1955. Pp. 348 with index. $6.00.

" The present enquiry is concerned with the nature and functions of criticisms. Its intention is factual and empirical, not dogmatic. We shall not presume to dictate to the critics what sort of things they should be about, what the task of criticism ought to be; but our study will more modestly be to elucidate the aims which the critics themselves profess and the purpose which are apparent in their works." (p. 7)

It is necessary to keep the author's aim in mind in reading his book, for the tendency is to look for more than the book provides. Indeed, the title *Aesthetics and Criticism* would lead one to expect that as much attention would be given to aesthetics as to criticism; aesthetics, however, enters in only because " criticism of necessity uses overt or tacit assumptions which belong to the field of aesthetics." (p. 7) Within the limits of this aim, the author, in general, is not only highly successful, but extremely readable and stimulating. To provide the full setting for the appearance of this book, it should be remarked that Professor Osborne has written a separate book on aesthetics, *Theory of Beauty*, upon which he leans and to which he presumes the reader will turn if he wishes to make explicit the position of Mr. Osborne on aesthetics itself.

The opening chapter is on " The Craft of Criticism." There seems to be no question in Mr. Osborne's mind—and indeed there should not be—of the legitimacy of the role of the critic and his distinction from the artist, but there is considerable difficulty about defining criticism. Mr. Osborne faces the difficulty fully.

The opening chapter summarizes as follows: Presumably criticism can be defined only in terms of function. Is interpretation a main function? Or is the principal function one of facilitating in others the appreciation of literature and the arts? Or is the function both interpretation and appreciation, and other elements as well? The problem is further complicated by the fact that various schools of criticism exist; some maintain that art and therefore criticism is basically sociological or psychological, while others hold that art and therefore criticism is " aesthetic " and hence independent of any other discipline. Mr. Osborne's conclusion reduces to the following: " Unlike the critics themselves, however, it will not be our concern to argue that any one type of writing is alone ' true ' criticism or ' deserves the name of criticism ' . . . Our quest will be to uncover some hidden core of agreements, if such there be, and to expose common and tacit assumptions about the nature of criticism which are rarely articulate beneath the clamor of controversy." (p. 14) Nonetheless, the concluding sentence of this first chapter states: " Criticism as such stands or falls by its profitableness as an ancillary to direct appreciation." (p. 23)

The last chapter of the book is on "Anatomy of Criticism." I shall refer to it now to pursue one point the opening chapter raises. By the end of the book it is clear that for Mr. Osborne the main task of criticism is the assessment and description of works of art in terms of aesthetic principles and values. I think there is no question but that the author is right in this main contention. It might seem a truism to state it. However, in this final chapter, Professor Osborne lists schools of criticism which rest primarily upon non-aesthetic principles. Thus, we have psychological criticism and the approach via psychoanalysis, historical criticism, exegetical criticism, and so on. There is no doubt that such approaches offer interesting observations on art and the artist, but I should like to stress even more than Professor Osborne their extrinsic connection both with the work of art itself and the work of criticism. Both artistic making and artistic criticism have suffered much from psychologists who are neither artists nor critics; the sociologist and the historian have done similar damage. The just remark of Ezra Pound, which Mr. Osborne approvingly quotes, is relevant: "You can spot the bad critic when he starts discussing the poet and not the poem."

Presumably Mr. Osborne would not have written his book had he not held the position that the critic has a distinctive function to perform, and that there is a legitimate, not to say honorable, distinction between the critic and the artist. I should think in a book of this dimension there could have been a facing of the issue between the artist and the critic, particularly a facing of the fact that artists generally have a somewhat less than enthusiastic view of the critic. A positive and basic analysis of the function and role of the critic as such would have added to the already considerable depth of this book. The skill of the critic is not the skill of the artist, and both perfections are needed for the mature development of the sensitive viewer and listener of art. I suppose that the prevalent blind spot artists have about critics (apart from the understandable point that there are a lot of bad critics) arises from the fact that extremely few artists are also critics. The artistic habit and the critical habit are quite distinct and there is no reason why they should be found in the same person; they are, in point of fact, rarely found in the same person. There is need, then, for explicit development of the distinction between these two abilities in man, an analysis which provides the basis both for a sympathetic understanding of the artist by the critic and of the critic by the artist.

In conformity with the main purpose the author has, the book centers on delineating the main assumptions which underlie methods of criticism. It is worthwhile summarizing these main assumptions for, so far as possible, such a summary will give the gist of the book.

The Realist assumption in criticism emphasizes that the excellence of a work of art depends upon the veracity with which it copies or symbolizes

something not itself. Mr. Osborne spends more time on this assumption than on any other; it forms the primary topic of Chapters III, IV, and V. To avoid an initial confusion of terms, it is well to note that " realism " as a critical view in art criticism is different from " realism " as a philosophical position, although it appears that " realism " in art criticism (but not " naturalism ") derives from realistic philosophy.

Mr. Osborne recognizes the importance of mimesis in the realistic assumption, but by and large his grasp of artistic imitation is imprecise and weak. He does not understand adequately imitation as developed by Aristotle, so much so that he types Aristotle's doctrine of imitation as one of " naive realism." His failure to see imitation as an artistic principle of imaginative representation of reality in the broadest sense possible of the term (but quite removed from " copying " reality) leads him to miss altogether how music, for example, in its manner and object of presentation is just as much an art of imitation as drama or poetry or painting. Taking into consideration the many other penetrating remarks the author puts forward about the realist assumption in art, I have the impression that with a more analytic and profound grasp of artistic imitation, Mr. Osborne would have come to see that the realistic assumption provides the best as well as the most objective approach to understanding and criticizing art.

The Emotional assumption makes the excellence of a work of art depend on the intensity of the emotion which it arouses in the observer. This view is the basis for the romantic conception of art that held sway so long and still affects many critics and observers, though not so much now the artists themselves. The important kernel of truth in this assumption is the fact that worthwhile art does involve distinctive emotional response, but the acceptance of any sort of emotional upsurge as an infallible sign of the excellence of a work of art would lead one to accept, as Mr. Osborne notes, such things as dentist's chairs and mink coats as aesthetic objects. Even the refined theory of emotionalism in art, as developed by Mr. Clive Bell or by Mr. A. E. Housman, who seek to establish the existence of a specific aesthetic emotion, does not escape the basic flaw in the emotional assumption, the flaw that emotional reaction as such constitutes excellence in the appreciation of art. Such an assumption, furthermore, is inescapably subjective.

The Expressionist assumption makes the excellence of a work of art depend upon the exactness with which it causes to be reproduced in the observer an experience previously had in the mind of the artist. Professor Osborne brings out well the difficulty of this position by stating that no objective comparison is possible between the experience in the mind of the artist and the experience in the mind of the observer. A derived view not explicitly mentioned by Mr. Osborne, is the position of self-expression in art. It is perhaps the most barren of all positions in art criticism since it

offers nothing at all by way of significantly analyzing or describing a work of art. A hiccup, for example, is self-expressive.

The Transcendental assumption, as understood by Mr. Osborne, consists in making the excellence of a work of art depend on the intensity with which it arouses a special type of mystical emotion, which he calls " Revelatory." The exposition of this assumption seems to me the least satisfactory. There are instances to warrant the author's treatment of transcendentalism in this fashion, but the association of this assumption with the Emotional assumption seems to do some violence to a transcendental position. Historically, it does not seem to be primarily an emotional assumption; it is an assumption, rather, that art reaches an object over and beyond what is given in normal, rational experience. It need not involve a quasi-mystical experience, although it may.

In any case, it is curious to find the author stating that one system of philosophy which alleges to provide a foundation for the claim of aesthetic transcendentalism is " the scholastic theory of St. Thomas Aquinas as reinterpreted by Neo-Thomists such as Jacques Maritain and Thomas Gilby." (p. 207) It is hard to see how anyone who is at all acquainted with the thought of St. Thomas would understand St. Thomas as a transcendentalist, especially in Mr. Osborne's meaning of the term. Perhaps Mr. Osborne has been swayed by the following sentence which he quotes from Maritain, regarding poetic knowledge: " I believe it to consist in a knowledge by means of *affective* connaturality with reality as *non-conceptualizable*, because awakening to themselves the creative depths of the *subject* " (italics Maritain's). I am inclined to agree with Mr. Osborne when he says " I am unable to believe that anyone who finds St. Thomas hard to understand will gain enlightenment from language of this sort." But I do not see how Mr. Osborne is justified in presuming that the little he has on St. Thomas directly establishes his approach as a transcendentalist one. If St. Thomas belongs in any one of the assumptions listed, it would be in the realist assumption, even though this view is not fully exposed.

There is, finally, the Configurational assumption, which makes the excellence of a work of art depend upon the compactness with which it is organized into an organic unity. As Mr. Osborne rightly notes, this position affords an objective standard of criticism, and critics who use it tend to be consistent and logical. In my judgment, perhaps the best chapter in the book is Chapter IX on " Beauty in Configuration," where the author appears to be more positive in his analysis than in other sections, where his emphasis is rather negative and his observations often inconclusive. It would seem to me, however, that the configurational assumption is not really separate from the realist assumption, provided the latter is not taken quite so narrowly as Mr. Osborne does. Indeed, the organic unity of a work of art is central to its excellence, and this organic unity flows from a realistic approach to art.

The author's principal aim in the book, to return to this for emphasis, is "to elucidate the aims which the critics themselves profess." Professor Osborne does not believe that it lies within the province of criticism to justify these aims and assumptions, although this belief does not prevent his making a certain number of critical evaluations about various features of the different assumptions. I should like to repeat that within the limits the author lays down, he admirably succeeds, by and large. There is a wealth of information and comment in the book and a rich acquaintance with what artists and critics have said and held. Presumably the author thinks that the more definitive and positive evaluation of assumptions in criticism belongs to aesthetics rather than to criticism, a separation that he may press too absolutely. Nevertheless, the author makes it clear that the task of aesthetics and philosophy of art is important and needs to be done. What he has well done here is to show how criticism is significant and intelligent when it proceeds consistently from original assumptions. Since relatively few critics are successful in this respect, Mr. Osborne's book is valuable and useful for aiding critics to write intelligibly. The larger and more basic issue of aesthetics itself can then be faced more successfully.

JOHN A. OESTERLE

University of Notre Dame
Notre Dame, Indiana.

Concepts of Space. By MAX JAMMER. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1954. Pp. 212 with index. $3.75.

One of the major problems occupying the attention of modern Philosophy, particularly that of American Philosophy, is that of integrating the results of modern empiriological disciplines with a knowledge of the underlying natures of things. This problem is especially difficult in the area of experimental Physics. The other phenomenal sciences retain a solid anchor in the natural principles of human knowledge, but experimental Physics is a strange discipline in which proficiency depends on an ascetic renunciation of the normal tendencies of the mind.

It is possible, of course, to overstate the problem, and to insist that natural philosophy be so altered that it is deduced from experimental Physics, or at least that it assimilate the physicists' conclusions without change. An analysis of the principles and methods reveals experimental Physics as more of a conceptual substitute for reality than an immaterial assimilation, more art than science.

But Physics is such a successful art that it seems absurd to suppose that this conceptual framework is a purely arbitrary construction. If we can

manage qualitative data by treating them as though they were essentially species of quantity, we must suspect, at least, that the two are so closely related that their interdependence is not adequately expressed by the usual insistence on locomotion as the basic type of motion and on quantity as the first material accident, the foundation of the sensible qualities.

A discerning comparison of the philosophic notion of place and the physicist conception of space certainly seems one approach to the problem in consideration of the basic part these two ideas play in the different accounts given of local motion. Yet oddly enough there are few enough works that undertake such a task on more than a textbook level. Max Jammer's book, *Concepts of Space*, may not unravel the enigma of the relation between the philosophical and the empiriological views on these issues, but at least it is a step in the right direction.

Dr. Jammer lectures on Physics and on the history of science at the Hebrew University in Jerusalem. On the evidence of this book, he seems much more sensitive to man's achievement in the realms of theology and philosophy than is usually the case with most historians of science. This book, *Concepts of Space*, Dr. Jammer wrote while Visiting Lecturer at Harvard University.

The contents of the book are well described by the subtitle, "The History of Theories of Space in Physics." The story begins with the concepts of place and space in ancient Greek Philosophy, with the major emphasis on Aristotle and his influence. Some reference is made to the presence within Greek culture of a method of studying reality not entirely compatible with Aristotelian natural science, namely the Euclidean geometry.

Dr. Jammer devotes the next section of his work to certain theological considerations tending to the identification of space with a divine attribute. Stressed particularly are the cabalistic identification of space with divine immensity, and the unity of space with light and light with God by way of the neo-Platonic light metaphysics. These influences are seen as being funnelled through Henry More into the fundamental conceptions of Newtonian Physics. Other better-known influences on Newton are found in the Renaissance reaction against Aristotle, a revolt which Dr. Jammer traces all the way back to the commentators of the Peripatetic school itself. Some exceptions among the Arabian philosophers to the prevailing adherence to Aristotle are noted besides the more familiar examples of Crescas, Cusanus, Telesio, Giordano Bruno, Gassendi, and the other European thinkers who formed the transition from Aristotelian to modern trends in philosophy.

The last two chapters are devoted to the analysis of absolute space particularly as embodied in the Newtonian conceptual scheme, and to the development of the more relative ideas of space at the foundation of modern science. In the section dealing with the Newtonian scheme Dr. Jammer emphasizes the fact that, although Newton considered the con-

cept of absolute space a theoretical necessity for the principle of inertia, and found some satisfaction of his religious feelings in the famous identification of this space with the "Sensorium of the Godhead," it is Newton's treatment of relative space that fulfills the important operational functions in his system. Some of the important philosophical reactions to the Newtonian analysis are explained, especially Kant's elevation of Euclidean space to an *a priori* form and Leibniz's reaction in favor of a more relative notion of space.

In the last chapter Dr. Jammer undertakes the enormous task of laying bare the whole modern revolution in Physics from the point of view of its impact on spatial theories. In spite of the difficulties of explaining such a complex reaction, the author does an outstandingly successful job in dealing with all the relevant issues, both from the operational point of view and from that of the mathematical contributions of Euler, Gauss, Riemann, and others. He even manages to indicate such fine points as the problems of measurement originating from the abandonment of the Euclidean notion of congruence by modern mathematics, and the theoretical considerations involved in using quadratic equations instead of those of a higher power in determining the value of an infinitesimal line element in an n-dimensional continuum. Finally Dr. Jammer gives a short resumé of historical attempts to determine the number of dimensions in space on *a priori* grounds, and discusses the current difficulties concerning the continuous nature of space in relativity Physics and its discrete nature in quantum mechanics.

In evaluating Dr. Jammer's competence as a historian I feel that it is only fitting to pay homage to the rare erudition and scholarship that Dr. Jammer displays. Particularly impressive is the breadth of his acquaintance with medieval Jewish, Arabian, and Christian thinkers. His willingness to report what these thinkers actually said is in marked contrast to the somewhat diffuse disquisitions on servile acceptance of authority and on the evil influences of theology that usually pass for the medieval section of a history of science.

Generally speaking, Dr. Jammer manages to avoid the charge of being on the wrong side of controversial interpretations of the men he treats by giving alternative explanations from different sources. For instance, he goes to considerable trouble to present divergent views on Newton's identification of space with the divine Sensorium. He does, however, depart from this mode in connection with the Atomistic notion of the void, which he presents as relative to and dependent on atoms, apparently in accordance with a theory that all early philosophical inquiries can treat of space only relatively. He also tends to carry the parallels between the Aristotelian view of place and the spatial theories of modern relativity Physics to the point of attributing to Aristotelian places a kind of efficient causality. Inas-

much as many of the criticisms of Aristotle by later thinkers are based on this same assumption, perhaps Dr. Jammer can be forgiven this lapse.

Dr. Jammer's work does not pretend to any completeness in recounting the various philosophical theories of place or space. For instance, he barely mentions the philosophy of Spinoza, in whose thought the analysis of space is a key issue, and he does not do much better with Descartes, whom he mentions principally by way of contrast to Newton and Henry More. However, the principle of selection used in the work in the influence brought to bear upon modern empiriological views by philosophers, and the triumph of Newtonian concepts perhaps justifies the neglect of the Cartesian movement, whatever may have been its influence in its own time. I suspect that from time to time the emphasis is guided less by the relevance of the theories from a modern viewpoint than by the personal interests of Dr. Jammer; but I for one found these bypaths more diverting than the more pertinent issues.

But if this is an eminently satisfactory book from the aspect of a scientific history, what is its value from a philosophic view? Of course it would be remiss of anyone primarily interested in philosophy to feel himself so self-sufficient as to neglect familiarizing himself with the thought of contemporary scientists. As a means to acquiring such an acquaintance, the book is excellent. Although written for a general audience, the work avoids the easy distortions usually found in explanations of Physics to the non-scientific public. It avoids the peculiar non-mathematical expositions of non-Euclidean and four dimensional space, for instance, by presenting these elements within Physics correctly as the result of the operational type of mathematics required by that science. The explanations, on the whole, are clear and require little of specialized knowledge of their comprehension. One exception might be mentioned: some acquaintance with non-Euclidean geometry is presupposed in the last chapter, but even this acquaintance does not have to exceed the most primitive sort.

As a book that relates the changes in space to one of their ultimate sources in the variations of fundamental attitudes toward science and its methods, Dr. Jammer's book falls short of providing what a philosophical reader might desire. This is possibly not a criticism, for there is no sign that Dr. Jammer intended to write a book especially for philosophers. Besides, it is misleading to say that Dr. Jammer is unaware of the philosophical, or at least the logical foundations of the theories which he records. Like most modern scientists he is acutely conscious of the limitations of the method of experiental Physics and of the external and substitutive nature of the reconstruction of reality to which it leads. My point is simply that one of the most important reasons for the development of the Newtonian and relativity views of space is precisely the evolution of new logical and epistemological attitudes, and that Dr. Jammer alludes to this relation only vaguely and

accidentally. Thereby he leaves out of account a factor without which his subject is only incompletely understood. Moreover it is solely by understanding how much of the results of experimental Physics is simply a projection of the technique of the physicist that the philosopher will eventually be able to decide which aspects of these results are an embodiment of the real, and use those aspects to enrich his own understanding of nature. For this purpose there are many works both within and outside the Thomistic tradition that give greater insight into the relation between the philosophic problem of place and its quantitative cousin space and into the principles on which our knowledge of them begins than does Dr. Jammer's historical treatment.

EDWARD T. SMITH

De Paul University
Chicago, Ill.

BRIEF NOTICES

The Nature of Sympathy. By Max Scheler. Translated by Peter Heath. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1954. Pp. 328 with index. $5.00.

Philosophical Essays. By A. J. Ayer. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1934. Pp. 298 with index. $4.50.

Max Scheler (1874-1928), who along with Brentano and Husserl must be counted among the founders of Phenomenology, completed the first edition of this book in 1912 and it was published the following year in Halle. A second and greatly revised edition appeared in Bonn in 1922. The present translation is based on the fifth edition, substantially identical with the second, edited by Maria Scheler and published at Frankfurt-am-Main in 1948.

This book is of moment not only because the two significant editions—the first and the second—span the most productive decade of Scheler's career, but also because it contains most of the themes characteristic of Scheler's philosophy. This translation is of moment not only because it is the first of Scheler's works in English, but also because of the lucid and balanced "Introduction" by Prof. Stark. This really *is* an introduction to Scheler's general philosophical and religious positions.

The root problem raised here by Scheler is how we know other human persons. Much of the book is a criticism of two theories which hold that our knowledge of other men is indirect. The first of these theories is to the effect that we know others by reasoning from analogy based on our experience of the self. The second theory is that we know others by feeling ourselves into them, by empathy. Both theories, apart from their individual falsities, agree on a common principle which Scheler holds is especially false, namely, that self-knowledge precedes and is more fundamental than knowledge of others.

Scheler's own view is that our knowledge of the psychic life of others is direct, because originally experience of self and of others is undifferentiated; consciousness is originally common and contains in principle the experience of others as well as the experience of the self. Both the ego and the non-ego are originally given in a common life-experience. Later *self*-consciousness supervenes and gives rise to egocentrism which in metaphysics is named "relative solipsism" and in ethics is nambed "selfishness." This egocentrism is destroyed only through love and sympathy, which enable us to perceive that each human person is as real and as valuable as we are.

Of these two, love is the more fundamental. For sympathy is a response

to the experience of others based on and limited by an underlying love. Love, not knowledge, enables us to penetrate into the innermost recesses of the person. In love, the perceived value realized in the person is but a starting point. For the lover has a double vision of the beloved: he is seen and loved just exactly as he is, for himself; yet he is seen also in all that he might be. Love, then, is itself the force which strengthens the beloved to move from the lower to the higher state, from potency to act. It is a motion, as well as an emotion.

It is impossible to read anything of Scheler's without being saddened by the tragedy of the personal life of this gifted, restless, wilful man. The personal problems which darkened the last seven years of his brief life darkened too the light of his intellect. It is to Prof. Stark's honor that his "Introduction," which so vigorously calls attention to Scheler's genius, does not flinch from acknowledging the gradual decay of that genius. *The Nature of Sympathy* is not without shadows anticipating the later darkness, for the second edition was published at a crucial time in Scheler's personal life. But it is not without brilliant truth, either. It is, like its author, mixed; but as yet the brilliance, the insight, the simple truth, predominate.

Professor Ayer's *Philosophical Essays* is, in spirit, as far removed from Scheler's *Sympathy* as two books in philosophy can be. Professor Ayer, of course, is no phenomenologist; he is an analyst. He is probably closer in method to G. E. Moore than to Bertrand Russell, and the disagreements between Moore and himself seem, to one who is not an analyst, less significant than the agreements as to methodology.

The present volume is a collection of essays each of which was published previously, either in periodicals or in symposia. The essentially linguistic approach of Ayer to philosophy is illustrated by contrasting his treatment of our knowledge of others in the essay "One's Knowledge of Other Minds" with Scheler's. Ayer concludes (1) that I am not any other person because "I could not conceivably satisfy all the descriptions that some other person satisfies" (p. 214); (2) to ascribe an experience to another person is to asert that a given property (the experience itself) is co-instantiated with certain others (all the other properties which collectively describe the subject having the experience); (3) hence I am not inferring his experience from my own experience, but merely affirming that certain properties conjoined in one context will still be conjoined in another context; (4) this affirmation is an inductive argument based on analogy. All of Ayer's conclusions are equally oblique.

In reading these *Essays*, which are unified only by the methodology of linguistic examination which never yields a really philosophical position, one is tempted to succumb to the exasperated judgment that this is indeed triviality, a criticism not uncommonly made by Thomists. But analysis,

including Ayer's analysis, does embody four virtues: it is patient of detail; it is modest, unpretentious; it is painfully honest, never pretending to certainty while a single doubt or reservation remains to be exploited; and it is aware, only too aware, that on the level of communication, philosophy is necessarily verbal. It is true that these virtues, in the absence of more significant philosophical gifts, create an atmosphere of peculiarly sophomoric debate. Yet some of the analysts' minute linguistic preoccupation has a place in Thomism, and that place is in the examination of the first principles. The method of analysis is particularly suited to the kind of indirect defense which Thomists undertake with regard to the principles of identity, sufficient reason, causality and finality.

Ayer's book is as excellent a working model of the analytic method as Scheler's is of the phenomenological method. The confluence in the thirties and the forties of English analysis with Austrian logical positivism and German scientific empiricism makes it likely that analysis is destined to be as important in this country as Pragmatism, and more important than Existentialism, Phenomenology or Marxism. If so, mere impatience, however understandable, is a dangerous luxury. It is always a mistake to decide too quickly that there are no spoils in a given Egypt.

The Doctrine of the Void. By Leonard McCann, C.S.B. Toronto: Basilian Press, 1955. Pp. 146.

St. John of the Cross has often been hailed as the " Doctor of the Void " or the " Doctor of Nothingness." It is natural, therefore, that a study of the spiritual doctrine of the greatest mystical writer since St. Augustine should be devoted in part to this aspect of St. John's doctrine. It should be remembered, however, that St. John of the Cross is not merely a Doctor of the Void, though he does stress the necessity of the active and passive purgations of the sense and the spirit in his *Ascent* and *Dark Night*. But the Mystical Doctor likewise treats at length of the positive aspect of growth in Christian perfection, as is evidenced in his *Spiritual Canticle* and *Living Flame*. Indeed, modern critics have shown that the former work is completely Christocentric, dealing as it does with the transformation of the soul in Christ, and the latter is Trinitarian, since it describes with incomparable clarity the soul's experience of the divine indwelling.

Neither is it accurate to propound that St. John of the Cross established a new school of spirituality, although it is true that his emphasis on active and passive purgation would make a special appeal to Carmelites with their insistence on mortification and detachment. But St. John is a universal Doctor and consequently, his spiritual doctrine is the common and orthodox doctrine on the spiritual life.

Father McCann has written brilliantly on the distinction between speculative and experimental theology and he does well to insist that even in spiritual theology there is a great difference between the speculative study of Christian perfection and the description of the sublime wonders of intimate union with God by one who has himself experienced these things. It is the difference between the scientist, who explains what nature is, and the poet, who describes how he has been affected by nature. The author has also manifested his firm grasp of the doctrine of the spiritual life when he writes on the distinction between the acquired and infused virtues and the gifts of the Holy Ghost.

However, St. John of the Cross did not treat explicitly of the gifts of the Holy Ghost in any of his works. It is a lawful supposition that he would have done so, had he completed his commentary on the *Dark Night*, but the fact is that he did not do so. And in this sense it seems that Father McCann did not quite accomplish what he set out to do in his study of the doctrine of the void, namely, to evaluate it in terms of Thomistic theology. What he did do, and do well, is to correlate the doctrine of St. John of the Cross with the spiritual doctrine of St. Thomas Aquinas. By outlining the spiritual doctrine of the Carmelite mystic, the author presented a neat summary of the negative aspect of the struggle for Christian perfection. Then he turns the coin to the other side and shows the positive aspect of that same spiritual struggle as taught by Aquinas. But the author did not evaluate or explain the doctrine of the void in the light of Thomistic theology.

There are a few points on which the present reviewer feels that the author should have expatiated at greater length. For example, it would have been very much in order if he had explained more fully the use of the division of the spiritual faculties into intellect, memory, and will. Since this threefold division is so common among mystical writers, there is a very good foundation for it. St. Thomas himself refers to the memory that is sensitive and the memory that is intellectual. Moreover, the purifying effect of the theological virtue of hope will most certainly be manifested primarily in the memory, since hope is a virtue that looks to the future and to eternity.

It would seem also that a more accurate term to be used in speaking of the dark nights would have been purgation or purification. The word " void " may often carry with it the overtone of emptiness or nothingness, which is certainly only half the picture that St. John was trying to convey. He himself stresses repeatedly that the soul empties itself and seeks to possess nothing so that it may be filled with God and thereby possess all things. It is interesting to note that some Protestant theologians who have written on St. John of the Cross have a predilection for the word " void,"

while Catholic scholars prefer to use St. John's own expression of purification or purgation.

One final observation has to do with the author's selection of the first redactions when quoting from the *Spiritual Canticle* and the *Living Flame.* It is true that Dom Chevallier, O. S. B., considered the first redaction of the *Spiritual Canticle* to be the only authentic one, but this opinion has been rejected by all modern critics and it is, in fact, outmoded since the discovery of the manuscript of Jaén. As to the second redaction of the *Living Flame,* Baruzi is the only critic who considers it spurious. The author, therefore, could have used the second redactions of these two works without any qualms whatever for they have been accepted as authentic by the majority of critics and scholars since the eighteenth century.

Sources of Christian Theology. Vol. I—Sacraments and Worship. Edited by Paul F. Palmer, S. J. Newman: Westminster, 1955. Pp. 249 with index. $4.75.

This is the first volume of an important series of textual compendia on the key doctrines of the Christian Faith. The title, *Sources of Christian Theology,* is explained in a general foreword. Sacred Scripture is not included except incidentally. All other sources from the Magisterium, the Fathers, the Liturgy, are included. In other words, these volumes are going to present the witness of Christian tradition down through the ages. A special feature, of great value, is the inclusion of the actual texts of heretical writings on the doctrines under consideration (e. g., in the present volume, the writings of the Reformers have been chosen).

This first volume is devoted to the three great sacraments of Christian initiation—Baptism, Confirmation and the Holy Eucharist. All are intimately connected with the Liturgy and so the work begins with two excellent chapters on: " The Early Rites of Initiation," and " The Early Eucharistic Liturgies." Very helpful is the chart of the basic liturgies to be found on pp. 67-71. The key chapter is the third on " The Sacramental System." The work ends with two sections on the Eucharist as Sacrament and Sacrifice. Fr. Palmer has added helpful historical and doctrinal notes.

St. Thomas Aquinas Theological Texts. Translated by THOMAS GILBY. New York: Oxford, 1955. Pp. 441 with index. $3.50.

Father Gilby has selected texts of St. Thomas on a variety of theological topics, arranged them according to the order of the *Summa Theologiae*, and finally set them out in a translation which he says is somewhere between the literal and the paraphrase. Two things mark and signal this selection, the choice of many little known but apt texts of St. Thomas and the high quality of Father Gilby's translation.

The editor has ranged throughout the entire works of St. Thomas, choosing a text for the shrewdness of its peculiar insight into a human problem, or for the clarity of its exposition, or perhaps as an argument for a familiar theological thesis, or even for its simple human interest. As a result the texts throw new sidelights on long familiar Thomistic doctrines and destinations. The reading of these is a delight because they combine new insights in a homogeneity with traditional and more familiar teaching. This is particularly true of the texts Father Gilby chose from St. Thomas' sermons and commentaries on the Scriptures.

In the translation well-known texts have a new crispness, brilliance or sparkle—even a hidden bit of humor. Old expressions and distinctions appear in new spring dress. Reading them is a double delight, for there is the joy of the substance of St. Thomas and the French cookery of Father Gilby's English.

For those who have no experience with the Latin text or English translations, this book serves as a bright introduction to the mind and method of St. Thomas. Most of the familiar doctrines and distinctions are here, the definitions and divisions and examples so that the substance of his theological thought is preserved.

On the other hand, the book is not sufficiently complete nor systematic to serve as a basic text for a course or study club in theology. Too much of the whole cloth of St. Thomas is omitted. Still the work will help admirably in two capacities, for side reading or occasional reference for the student of a course of theology in which St. Thomas is not used, or for the lecturer who will find a variety of side-lights on theological doctrines with sparkling quotations to quote.

As teachers know, Thomas without tears is an illusion. But Father Gilby's book of texts will bring a smile, a chuckle, a light touch, a moment of joy to an otherwise difficult and methodic proceeding. Students of St. Thomas who read these will see some of the wit and brillance of the mind of St. Thomas; teachers who use them can communicate that brilliance to their own students.

The Ethics of Rhetoric. By RICHARD WEAVER. Chicago: Regnery, 1953. Pp. 234 with index. $3.50.

Some years ago Richard Weaver wrote a book called *Ideas Have Consequences.* If enough people now read his *Ethics of Rhetoric,* his own ideas will have splendid consequences, for his present book is an invitation to his readers to become accomplished writers and speakers of the truth. While one might be at first glance misled by his table of contents into the impression that the book is nothing but a collection of disconnected critical essays on such rhetoricians as Plato, Milton, Burke and Lincoln, further perusal reveals a keen, lucid and constructive criticism of the use of rhetoric by these and other famous writers and orators. Mr. Weaver is himself a delightful example of a man with sharp observation, penetrating thinking and superb writing.

He first uses Plato's dialogue " The Phaedrus " in his discussion of the problem of the ethics of rhetoric. The orator indeed has a single definite purpose, to persuade his audience. Does this purpose then allow him to ignore the truth in his pursuit of his objective? Indeed it does not, for his primary duty is to reveal the truth, truth itself being his most persuasive weapon. Incidentally, although Plato, as the great mouthpiece of Socratic dialectic, is used to propose the author's teaching, it is the philosophy, especially the logic, of Aristotle which in the end dominates the book.

The Scopes evolution trial of 1925 is the initial case used by Professor Weaver. With deft skill and brilliant use of juxtaposition, the arguments of Darrow and Bryan are set forth, then carefully analyzed from rhetorical and logical principles. Of even greater interest is the comparison between Lincoln and Burke which leaves the reader convinced that the " great emancipator " was ethically a greater orator, and therefore a greater man than the " great commoner." Aristotelian logicians will be happy to note that Lincoln's power was derived especially from his skillful use of the argument from definition.

If the logician has cause to rejoice in the first chapters of Mr. Weaver's well-ordered thought the rhetorician or English teacher will be interested in the later chapters which set forth in good prose the art of grammar. Thus teaching by example as well as by doctrine, this rhetorician explains the use of each part of speech, sentence structure and stylistic devices. The author's objective in what might seem a departure from his purpose is to show that nouns convey the truth better than adjectives.

Thus the teacher of philosophy has in this book a wealth of examples based on real people and real events; the student, a stimulant to the serious study of philosophy and the art of speaking the truth; the general public, a revelation of the practical uses of philosophy with a healthy caution about the techniques of orators. The *Ethics of Rhetoric* is not only rewarding; it is refreshing.

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